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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if American Orthodox theologian David 
Bentley Hart's use of the classical Thomistic principle of the analogia entis (in his 
monograph The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth), can be 
deemed to be a valid, responsible and beneficial manner of affirming a continuity  
between the beauty of God and the beauty of creation, and opposing the 
seemingly problematic worldview of dualism.  
After reviewing a selection of works in the field of theological aesthetics, this study 
is conducted both as a historical analysis and a systematic exposition on the 
analogia entis, by critically examining the use (and critique) of analogy and the 
analogy of being in Greek (Aristotle), Scholastic (Thomas Aquinas) and 20th 
century thought (Erich Przywara, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar), before 
inspecting and ultimately affirming David Bentley Hart’s own use thereof (in 
regards to the beauty of God and the beauty of creation). 
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Opsomming 
 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om ondersoek in te stel of die Amerikaanse 
Ortodokse teoloog David Bentley Hart se gebruik van die klassieke Thomistiese 
beginsel van die analogia entis (in sy monografie The Beauty of the Infinite: The 
Aesthetics of Christian Truth) as geldige, verantwoordelike en voordelige wyse 
geag kan work om 'n kontinuïteit tussen die skoonheid van God en die skoonheid 
van die skepping te bevestig, en sodoende die oënskynlike problematiese 
wêreldbeskouing van dualisme aan te spreek.      
 
Na die beskouing van 'n reeks werke in die veld van teologiese estetika, fokus 
hierdie studie op beide die historiese analise en die sistematiese uiteensetting 
van die analogia entis, deur die gebruik (en ook kritiek) van analogie en die 
synsanalogie in Griekse (Aristoteles), Skolastiese (Thomas Aquinas) en 20ste 
eeuse denke (Erich Przywara, Karl Barth en Hans Urs von Balthasar) onder die 
loep te neem, waarna David Bentley Hart se eie gebruik daarvan (in terme van 
die skoonheid van God en die skoonheid van die skepping) ondersoek en 
uiteindelik bevestig word.  
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“... A man that looks on glass, 
On it may stay his eye, 
Or, if he pleaseth, through it pass, 
And then the heav’n espy ...” 
The Elixir, George Herbert 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Setting the Scene  
When it comes to the classical conundrum of what the relationship between the 
natural world and the supposed supernatural entails, it could be argued that many 
religious tradition has emphasized the importance of vigorously differentiating 
between corporeal reality and the divine, in an honest attempt to safeguard the 
transcendence of their god(s). 
 
This has then also been true of Christianity – a religion in which believers are 
continuously warned not to transgress the second commandment by equating the 
creaturely with the divine.  
 
Although this conviction stands true to scripture and tradition, it could be 
contended, however, that an over-emphasis on the distinction between God, as 
wholly other, and creation, often leads to a problematic dualistic Weltanschauung, 
where creation’s integrity is undermined in being seen as the realm of 
malevolence and turpitude, in opposition to, and as negation of, the goodness, 
truth and beauty of the realm of God. In several instances, this has given rise to a 
deep settled suspicion and even antagonism towards the physical, sensory world, 
and the beauty and splendor it holds, and indeed led to the prevalence of (what 
can be deemed as) otherworldliness in the thought, as well as practice of 
numerous Christian communities of faith. 
 
It is then unsurprising that some of the most severe and prevailing criticism that 
has been raised against Christianity has centered on its supposed belief that 
virtuous, heaven-bound followers of Christ should refrain from sensory pleasures 
and beauty, by willfully negating their earthly existence and disavowing their 
bodily state.  
 
In his poem, The Minister, poet R.S. Thomas, for example, mourns the fact that 
Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, botches one's flesh by acting as an 
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“adroit castrator ... of song and dance and the heart’s innocent joy” (Merchant 
1990:20), while Friedrich Nietzsche, in his Ecce Homo (and several other works, 
as will be seen later on in this thesis), similarly spurns Christianity for despising 
the physical world and the muses of Parnassus (Nietzsche 1969:272).  Simone 
Weil, in continuity herewith, also then bemoans the fact that "the beauty of the 
world ... (and the) pure and authentic reflections of this beauty in art and science" 
seemingly stands "outside visible Christianity", and goes as far as to state that it is 
exactly this fact that is keeping her "outside (of) the Church" (Weil 1959:108-9).   
 
If these voices are to be believed, and Christianity, as a myth of the soul, indeed 
involves a call to abdicate one’s bodily existence and is inherently irreconcilable 
with the beauty of life on earth, it is quite comprehensible that modern humanity, 
confident in its own ability, and more than willing to face Huxley’s brave new 
world, could make a choice to abandon the burden of religion, invent the death of 
God, and embrace without reservation a secular world, devoid of even a soupçon 
of transcendence – all based on the belief that God, and the world of faith, is “not 
compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and (above all!) universal 
happiness” (Huxley 2010:183). 
 
A dualistic worldview, where divine and creaturely existence are held over against 
each other, could thus partly be responsible for a world come of age, where 
humanity has chosen to outlive their gods – resulting in a cosmological and 
anthropological reduction of reality to take place1, and a radical “immanentism” to 
become the status quo2.  
 
Recently, however, a number of theologians, fully aware of the secular stand of 
Western society, have spoken out against the dangers of the misbelief of a 
dualistic worldview and called for Christianity, across different traditions, to 
reaffirm the intrinsic integrity, value and beauty of the created world3. For – it is 
																																																								
1 As pronounced and described by Hans Urs von Balthasar in the opening chapter of his 
Love alone in Credible (Bathasar 2005). 
2 A claim that will be discussed comprehensively in the fifth chapter of the study. 
3 See, e.g. Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflection”, 
University of Regensburg speech, September 12, 2006.  
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held – if it is true that God, as primordial instance of beauty, created the earth, 
declared it good, and also sent his Son to become flesh, the physical world, and 
especially the beauty therein, can surely not be dismissed as inherently abhorrent 
and ungodly.  
 
David Bentley Hart, an American Orthodox theologian and philosopher, is one of 
a number of contemporary (Christian) thinkers who has heeded this call by 
making a stout stand against any metaphysical system that sees God and 
creation in opposition to each other, and advocating for what can be seen as an 
aesthetic continuity between the creaturely and the divine. These ideas are then 
especially prevalent in his masterly and erudite extended essay, The Beauty of 
the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth – a work which has, as Ellen Charry 
writes, "broken on the theological scene as a cross between a comet and a hand 
grenade" (Charry 2006:101), and is (still) widely regarded as one of the most 
significant (and provocative) theological works in recent years 4  (McGuckin 
2007:90). 
When reading The Beauty of the Infinite, wherein Hart indeed then advances that 
corporeal reality should not be seen as the negation of the divine, but rather as a 
vessel of God’s glory, peace and above all, splendorous beauty, it is interestingly 
seen that his propositions (in regards to the relationship between God and 
creation) is evidently grounded in the classic Thomistic principle of the analogia 
entis (the analogy of being) – denoting an analogical continuity between the being 
of God and the being of creation.  
The analogy of being, according to Hart’s thought, indeed uniquely and effectually 
obliterates any dualistic thought, and properly allows for creation to be perceived 
as an analogical expression of God’s being, participating in the jubilant life of the 
Trinity and, thereby, bearing testimony to the richness of the beauty that marks 
God’s glorious infinitude.  
 
The analogia entis has, however, through the ages, and especially in the 20th 
																																																								
4 This is quite a remarkable feat, given that the book is in essence a revision of Hart's 
doctorial thesis (McGaukin 2007:90; Hart 2007:95). 
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century when it was at the heart of theological discussion and debate, been a very 
controversial principle, that has time and again been dismissed as a veiled 
endeavor in natural theology, whereby irresponsible lines between the creaturely 
and the divine are drawn. Karl Barth, arguably the most prominent (and influential) 
voice of Reformed theology in the last century, indeed famously stated in the 
opening passages of his Church Dogmatics that it should, in fact, be seen as the 
invention of none other than the anti-Christ (Barth 1975:xiii).  
 
Hart, thoroughly versed in Thomistic thought, following and building on thinkers 
such as Erich Przywara, the brilliant Jesuit Scholar who initially placed the 
principle of the analogy of being on the theological agenda in the last century, and 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, often described as the father of theological aesthetics, 
believes, though, that the analogia entis, functioning in accordance with classical 
rules of analogy (according to proportionality), does definitely not naively and 
idolatrously equate creation with God (as Barth suggests),  given that its proposal 
of a similitude between the creaturely and the divine is always set in an even 
greater dissimilitude (as God and creation can be said to have different moments 
of being, as will be explained throughout the thesis). For this reason, the analogia 
entis does presumably maintain God’s transcendence, whilst still not falling trap to 
a fatal dualism where the Creator and created are placed in opposition to each 
other – which, for Hart, indeed renders it the definitive theological principle 
regarding the (aesthetic) relationship between God and his creation. 
 
To engage and evaluate Hart’s proposition that a sound theological aesthetic, 
devoid of dualistic tendencies, needs to be built on the principle of the analogy of  
being, it is then of cardinal importance to undertake a comprehensive study of the 
history and development of analogical thinking, the analogia entis in particular, 
and the way that it has been used in the field of theological aesthetics – which is 
then exactly what this study hopes to do.  
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 5
The analogia entis has only been the subject-matter of two dissertations written at 
the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University four decades ago5. As the 
dispute regarding its use is far more than a mere academic quarrel, but, in 
essence, “a debate about everything” (Betz 2011:49), another study regarding the 
analogia entis is arguably long overdue, and could hopefully be of considerable 
value, especially in regards to ecumenical dialogue between the Reformed, 
Catholic and Orthodox traditions.  
1.2 The Research Problem  
The research problem of this study accordingly pertains to the classical 
metaphysical conundrum, which has haunted humanity throughout the ages, 
regarding the relationship between the divine and the creaturely, especially when 
speaking about the beauty of God and the beauty of creation. If Christianity, and 
Reformed Christianity in particular, has at times been guilty of a deep-settled 
suspicion, and (at worst) antagonism towards the splendor and beauty of this 
world (a view that will be further examined in the initial parts of this study), and is 
subsequently in truth haunted by a tendency towards an unhealthy and heretical 
dualistic worldview, the problématique of the matter lies in how theology could 
resist and recant such thought, without demolishing the confessed transcendence 
of God – to which, Hart believes, the analogia entis can be seen as the answer. 
 
The analogia entis, far from being a simple solution, straightforwardly solving one 
of theology’s biggest challenges, remains, however, as mentioned previously, a 
highly contentious notion, against which many warnings, especially out of the 
Reformed tradition, has been sounded. It ought thus to be approached in a 
meticulously informed and cautious manner, especially in the work of a skilled and 
convincing writer and rhetorician6 such as David Bentley Hart.  
																																																								
5 Potgieter, P.C. 1973. Die Analogia Entis in Historiese Perspektief. Universiteit van 
Stellenbosch & Durand, J.J.F. 1973. Heilsgeskiedenis en die dialektiek van syn en denke. 
Struktuele verbindingslyne tussen Thomas Aquinas en die teologie sedert die Aufklärung. 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch. 
6 Who, in fact, sees himself firstly as poet and storyteller, as is written in the introduction 
(or "Author's Apologia", as he calls it) of his anthology of short stories, The Devil and 
Pierre Gernet (Hart 2012:ix) 
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1.3 The Research Question 
By taking into account Christianity’s relationship with the notion of beauty 
throughout the ages (as presented by recent studies in the field of theological 
aesthetics), and inducting an enquiry into the invention, use and working of 
analogy and the analogia entis in Greek and Scholastic thought, as well as the 
innovative appropriation (and critique) thereof in certain 20th century theological 
endeavors (especially also then concerning aesthetics), this study, guided and 
cautioned by the research problem stated, will ask if David Bentley Hart’s 
employment of the analogia entis could indeed be seen as a valid, appropriate, 
responsible and beneficial manner of affirming an aesthetic continuity between 
God and Creation, and addressing the presumed problematic worldview of 
dualism, and the thought it gives rise to. 
1.4 The Research Method and Design 
After setting the scene by reviewing a selection of works in the broad (and fairly 
novel) field of theological aesthetics, this study will be conducted in part as 
historical analysis, and in part as systematic exposition of the analogia entis. This 
will be done by critically examining the use of analogy and the analogy of being in 
Greek (Aristotle), Scholastic (Thomas) and 20th century thought (Erich Przywara, 
Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar), before inspecting and evaluating David 
Bentley Hart’s use thereof in his The Beauty of the Infinite. 
 
This study will thus primarily take the form of a literary study of key texts 
pertaining to the matter at hand. A broad selection of writings, stemming from an 
array of classical thinkers, church historians and systematic theologians, as well 
as from David Bentley Hart’s own pen, will be consulted in order to fully 
comprehend and engage the question of the analogia entis (and Hart’s extensive 
use thereof).  
 
The rationale behind this approach is that a clear understanding of the working of 
and historical debates around the analogy of being will hopefully give much 
needed context and insight into Hart’s propositions, and subsequently assist in 
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assessing its legitimacy. 
1.5 the Structure of the Thesis 
 
After this introductory chapter, the study will continue – in Chapter 2 – with a  
review of recent and significant scholarship in and on theological aesthetics, 
whereby key voices in the field, the terminology employed and the arguments that 
are made will be examined and engaged. The chapter will then specifically give 
attention to arguments put forward with regards to Christianity’s traditional 
relationship with the notion of beauty, as well as focus on the revival of Thomistic 
metaphysics (and the use of analogy and the analogia entis) in many current 
thought concerning theological aesthetics – largely as a result of the influence of 
Hans Urs von Balthasar.  
 
Chapter 3 will then give a brief exposition of the classical use and working of 
analogy, as put forward by voices such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and 
also inspect how the analogy of proportionality, in particular, serves as foundation 
for the notion of the analogy of being, as used by Przywara, Von Balthasar, and, 
of utter importance for this study, David Bentley Hart.  
 
Chapter 4 will firstly succinctly examine and explicate the way in which Jesuit 
Scholar Erich Przywara, placed his interpretation of the analogia entis, firmly 
rooted in a Thomistic understanding of the analogy of proportionality, on the 20th 
century theological agenda, whereafter attention will also be given to the critique 
Przywara received – most notably from Reformed scholar, Karl Barth. Given the 
fact that David Bentley Hart’s theological project has been deeply influenced by, 
and stand in continuity with, the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, the father of 
contemporary theological aesthetics, this chapter will furthermore then focus on 
his defense and justification of the analogia entis against the concerns and 
critique raised by Karl Barth, and also enquire into his own appropriation thereof 
in his theological aesthetics. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 8
Chapter 5 will introduce Hart, and his work, The Beauty of the Infinite, to the 
conversation. It will then firstly focus on his assessment of the thought of 
Nietzsche and his postmodernist followers – who, in Hart's opinion, have, as a 
result of the reigning dualistic disposition in religious thought, chosen to affirm 
creaturely existence over against the realm of the divine – whereafter attention 
will be given to the way in which Hart, himself engages the tradition of the analogy 
of being (and important interlocutors such as Przywara, Barth and Von Balthasar). 
 
Bearing in mind the content of the previous sections of this study, Chapter 6 will 
then explore the way in which David Bentley Hart appropriates the analogia entis 
as cornerstone of his theological aesthetics presented in the form of a dogmatica 
minora (which consists of systematic expositions on the themes of Trinity, 
Creation, Salvation and Eschaton) in order to explain and assert the existence of 
an intrinsic relationship between the beauty of God and the beauty of creation. 
 
After conducting a thorough examination of the working and (historical) 
complexities of the analogia entis, and subsequently engaging the comprehensive 
use thereof in David Bentley Hart’s work, this study will draw to a close by 
critically evaluating in the concluding chapter if his insistence on an analogical 
continuity between the beauty of God and the beauty of Creation, set in the 
analogy of being, is indeed a responsible and helpful dogmatic proposition.  
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Chapter 2 – Theological Aesthetics  
and the Turn to Analogy 
2.1 The Reappraisal of Theological Aesthetics in the 20th Century 
No longer loved or fostered by religion, beauty is lifted from its face as 
a mask, and its absence exposes features on that face which threaten 
to become incomprehensible to man. We no longer dare to believe in 
beauty and we make of it a mere appearance in order the more easily 
to dispose of it. 
(Von Balthasar 1983:18) 
In the opening pages of the first volume of The Glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit)7, a 
work which evidently serves as one of the key stimuli for David Bentley Hart’s 
theological project8 (Bychhov 2005:663; Shepperd 2005:184; Morrison 2007:662), 
Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar (in accordance with the sentiments 
voiced by R.S. Thomas, Friedrich Nietzsche and Simon Weil, as stated in the 
introductory chapter of this study) argues that beauty, the sister of goodness and 
truth9, has often been negated, neglected and ignored in the history of religious 
thought. Convinced that this a grave and lamentable mistake (instigated by a 
heretical belief that the divine life is irreconcilable with earthly splendor), Von 
Balthasar subsequently sets out to construct a monumental theological aesthetic, 
wherein beauty is reinstated as a primary principle regarding Christian truth (of 
which more will be said in what follows, as well as in the fourth chapter of this 
study). 
 
																																																								
7 Which forms part of a trilogy on Systematic Theology, also consisting of his Theo-
Drama (Theodramatik) and Theo-logic (Theologik). 
8  Hart, in fact, writes that The Beauty of the Infinite can be seen as an "extended 
marginalium" on Von Balthasar's thought  (Hart 2003:29). 
9 Together forming Plato’s ‘triad of transcendentals’. 
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Von Balthasar’s pioneering thought, although mostly marginalized during his own 
lifetime10, has become immensely influential over the last few decades, inspiring a 
host of theologians to reconsider theology’s aesthetic dimensions and reaffirm 
Christianity’s relationship with beauty (Kearney 2010:332). Aesthetics is indeed, 
largely because of the contribution of Von Balthasar, no longer a forgotten or 
distrusted chapter in theological enquiry, but the subject matter of an incredible 
amount of intriguing and valuable scholarship – particularly then also pertaining to 
the dogmatic implications of what is deemed beautiful (as is the case with David 
Bentley Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite, the focus of this study).  
 
In order to come to grips with this current upsurge in scholarship centering on the 
relationship between aesthetics and theology, the importance and relevance of 
beauty, and the conviction that the splendor of creation does not necessarily 
stand in binary opposition to Christian truth (in which Hart’s work could be seen as 
a leading voice), this chapter will set the scene for the remainder of this study by 
succinctly surveying and engaging a selection of recent and significant works in 
the field of theological aesthetics. After initially investigating key terminology 
employed (such as the terms aesthetics and beauty), and also examining and 
explicating arguments made in regards to Christianity’s relationship to beauty 
throughout history, the focus will then specifically be on the way in which Hart’s 
theological thought, firmly dependent on and determined by the tradition of 
analogy and the analogia entis, forms part of the current conversation on how 
earthly beauty could possibly relate to the splendor of the glory of God.  
																																																								
10 Oakes (1994:4-6) argues that a combination of reasons, not always necessarily 
pertaining to the content of his work (e.g. his close association with mystic writer 
Adrienne von Speyr, him leaving the society of Jesus to form a ‘Secular Society’ and his 
publishing firm often publishing controversial works), led to the fact that he was 
continually isolated by the mid-20th century theological community, mistrusted by Rome 
and not invited to attend Vatican II.  
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2.2 Some Terminological Clarifications   
2.2.1 Aesthetics 
Given that this study is primarily concerned with the field of theological aesthetics 
– the appellation under which David Bentley Hart, following in the footsteps of Von 
Balthasar and others, conducts his theological endeavors – it is apt and important 
to understand, from the onset, what is meant by the term aesthetics: 
 
Aesthetics, deriving from the Greek word for perception (aesthesis), was originally 
coined and appropriated in the 18th century by German philosopher Alexander 
Gottlieb Baumgarten in his Reflections on Poetry (1735) and Aesthetica (1750). 
By way of this term, Baumgarten hoped to bring about a new school of thought, 
distinct from the “mathematization and rationalization” that marked the natural 
sciences of his time, wherein sensory experience, formerly exiled by Cartesian 
dualism 11 , would be reestablished as primary source for acquiring and 
internalizing knowledge (Hammermeister 2002:4). The origination of the term 
aesthetics was thus initially prompted by an attempt to establish and uphold 
sensorialism. 
 
Almost immediately after Baumgarten, however, the term was further developed, 
most prominently by his student G.F. Meier, to explicitly denote thoughts 
regarding the sensory perception of the beautiful, given that, as was put forward, 
human beings do not primarily experience the world around them as sets of 
numerical quantities, but rather as instances of splendor and beauty (Cilliers 
2012:51)  
 
Aesthetics’ linkage with the sensory experience of the beautiful, subsequently 
also then led to the term being appropriated in regards to art, traditionally believed 
to be a fundamental bearer and expresser of beauty. Over the course of time, 
though, this association resulted in art (and art theory in particular) coming to 
																																																								
11  Central to Descartes’ thought is a clear distinction between the thinking mind 
(rationality) and corporeal matter – the former being seen as the only true basis of 
knowledge (Newman 2010).  
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define aesthetics, leaving initial definitions (pertaining to sensory perception and 
the notion of beauty) in the distant past. Farley (2001:x) claims that in recent 
years almost all fashionable textbooks on aesthetics define the term exclusively 
as the philosophy or theory of the arts (regretfully omitting any mention of sensory 
experience or beauty).  
 
It is interesting to note, though, that in most contemporary theological reflections 
on this subject (manifestly influenced by Von Balthasarian thought), aesthetics is 
once again understood as a term which does indeed denote sensorial perception 
(in accordance with Baumgarten’s original purpose), and specifically and explicitly 
concerns the investigation and appreciation of that what is considered beautiful 
(see, e.g. Hart 2003:1,16). Von Balthasar’s call to rediscover and rethink the value 
of beauty has indeed been heeded, and while aesthetics, as philosophical 
discipline at large, remains skeptical about its relevance and possible significance 
(Scruton 2011:x), theological aesthetics undeniably sees beauty as central to its 
whole undertaking. Although art (and its place in the worship and life of the 
community of faith) also forms part of the conversation (and is indeed written on 
frequently), complex questions regarding theology’s fundamental understanding 
of the nature of perceived beauty and the dogmatic implications thereof, sits at the 
very core of the current flood of scholarship that is done under the label of 
theological aesthetics (Farley 2001:viii). 
2.2.2 Beauty  
Given the fact that theological aesthetics thus primarily concerns itself with 
(experienced) beauty, it is of immense importance to state what is meant by this 
term. This, however, is an arduous task. Although many attempts has undeniably 
been made to provide a lasting definition12, beauty, as Crispin Sartwell notes, is 
rather notorious for being a concept that “should not, and perhaps could not be 
																																																								
12 Without explicitly attempting to provide a genealogy of beauty, Farley (2001) proposes 
that there has been, broadly and simplistically speaking, amongst others, four distinct 
attempts at defining beauty throughout Western history: 1) beauty as harmonious 
proportion (in Ancient Greek and Medieval thought); 2) beauty as a sensibility (during the 
Enlightenment); 3) beauty as benevolence (in some 18th and 19th century pietistic 
thought); and 4) beauty as self-transcendence (in 19th and 20th century physiological, 
anthropologic thought). 
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defined” (2006:3). Beauty indeed seems to name instances of experience that 
“escape scientific analyses” (Milbank 2003:1) and transcend any categorical 
classifications (Gadamer 1986:18). The elusiveness of beauty, Farley contends, 
could then partly be responsible for the fact that the term has fallen out of use and 
become a nonissue in modern aesthetics (2001:6).  
 
This, however, does not mean that we cannot know or say (even just in part) what 
beauty entails, given that beauty, according to Von Balthasar, has a certain self-
evidence that leaves an undeniable impression on all who have been affected by 
it (1983:37). David Bentley Hart, in accordance with Von Balthasar, contends that 
although it is evidently an unreasonable charge to provide a clear cut denotation 
of beauty, it is nonetheless possible, and necessary (especially for theological 
aesthetics) to acknowledge and state certain “themes” that come to the fore when 
speaking about the beautiful (2003:17).  
 
It could thus be said that beauty is typically recognized as that which “pleases the 
sight” (as Thomas Aquinas famously proclaimed), and hence induces desire 
(Milbank 2011:1) - especially for those with the "eyes to see", as Josef Pieper 
writes (a thought that will be returned to throughout this thesis) (Pieper 1990:35). 
Von Balthasar, drawing from Dionysius the Areopagite, states that beauty elicits 
eros, bringing about a yearning for what is seen and experienced (Von Balthasar 
1983:122). This state of desire does not, interestingly enough, lead to an eventual 
resolve, but could be seen as something that binds exactly in its non-arrival; 
continually bringing forth an intensified longing, even as it pleases and satisfies 
(2011:2). True beauty is ostensibly never depleted, but subsists as a mysterious, 
inexhaustible well of delight, that endlessly continues to evoke desire, and 
constantly beckons onlookers to return for more (Oakes 2001:149). As Milbank 
says: “To experience beauty is not only to be satisfied, but also to be frustrated 
satisfyingly” (2011:2).  
 
Beauty, as the invocator of desire, should consequently, according to some 
contemporary voices (including David Bentley Hart), not principally be understood 
as a subjective sensibility, belonging to the eye of the beholder (as is the case in 
Kantian thought), but rather as an objective reality, with phenomenological 
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priority, that gives "shape to the will that receives it" (see, e.g. Hart 2003:17; 
Sartwell 2006:5). Beauty, it is held, in evoking desire (the response it is 
recognized most clearly in), appears not to be restrained or mastered by the 
human mind, but rather draws its onlookers out of themselves, into direct 
encounter with its objective otherness. The beautiful, it could thus be contended, 
is something that, in the moment of encounter, does not allow those touched by it 
to “belong to themselves” (Von Balthasar 1983:122) – which makes the 
confrontation therewith a startling experience that “pierces our everyday 
defenses” (Milbank 2003:3).  
 
It could then also be held that beauty, as objective phenomenon, which “pleases 
the sight” and evokes desire, is not encountered as an abstract, otherworldly 
reality, above and beyond the sights, colors, occurrences and sounds of everyday 
life. Beauty, albeit elusive and mysterious, is in fact seen and experienced as 
something that subsists in, and is expressed by substantial forms in this world. 
Von Balthasar ardently claims that, when speaking about the beautiful, form 
(Gestalt) stands central to everything, and that beauty cannot be rightfully 
understood distinct from it (Von Balthasar 1983:151). Beauty, it could be held, is 
indeed entrenched in the “intensity of surfaces, the particularity of form and the 
splendor of created things” (Hart 2003:24). This does not mean that one should 
fetishize on the exterior properties of objects (which could be seen an act of 
“profound disrespect for what is truly beautiful”), as Graham Ward warns 
(2003:63), but simply that one should recognize that the alluring, infinite depth of 
beauty does not come to expression apart from corporeal reality, but exactly in 
and through finite, material form. Roger Scruton thus says: “We call something 
beautiful when we gain pleasure from contemplating it as an individual object ... in 
its presented form” (Scruton 2009:26). 
 
Although much more can be said with regard to how beauty could be recognized 
and understood, attention will first be given to an array of scholars’ assessments 
of Christianity’s traditional relationship to this elusive, yet ubiquitous phenomenon.  
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2.3 Christianity's Relationship to Beauty  
 
While keeping the words of Nietzsche, R.S. Thomas, Simon Weil (in the previous 
chapter) and Von Balthasar (in the beginning of this chapter) in mind, it could be 
argued, however, that beauty has not necessarily been completely absent from 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, and that it has indeed sporadically played an 
important role in various understandings of religion and the life of faith.  
 
Walter Brueggemann writes that from early on in the Old Testament it is evident 
that the tabernacle-tradition (Exodus 25-31; 35-40) was utterly “preoccupied with 
beauty”, and that the temple-tradition, similarly, spared nothing “to create for 
Yahweh a place of beauty” (1997:426). It is furthermore seen that the Psalms are 
full of descriptions of the beauty of God’s creation, and that the wisdom literature 
continually compares wisdom and moral goodness to the beauty of the treasures 
of the earth – so much so that Claus Westermann (1997:597) argues that the 
description of beauty constitutes one of the most important elements in this book 
of Proverbs (a sentiment that is also promulgated by someone like Samuel 
Terrien; see Brueggemann 1997:339). Few would then also deny the sheer 
beauty of the prose and poetry employed in numerous Biblical texts. The power of 
verbal images and the art of writing beautifully was indeed something deeply 
rooted in Israel’s way of life (De Gruchy 2001:19). 
 
Beauty, it could be held, has then also indubitably been present in the Christian 
church throughout history. It should be remembered that from the time when 
Christianity became the dominant religion of the Roman Empire (and the arts and 
statues of antiquity was theatrically thrown into the river Tiber (De Gruchy 
2001:11)), up until the Enlightenment, most of the Western world’s notable works 
of beauty (whether visual art, music, poetry or architecture) were brought forth in 
and by the Christian church (Brown 1989:47-50).  
 
As Farley writes:  
Christianity employed (beautiful) visual arts in catacombs, on house 
church walls and in its basilicas. Strangely beautiful is the Gregorian 
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chants, textual illuminations by Celtic Monks and cathedral 
architecture. And from the poetic beauties of the Hebrew Bible and 
Greek and Roman rhetoric, a tradition of beautiful language formed the 
creeds, liturgies and prayers of the Church. The Christian movement 
did not turn away from beauty when it created its sacred spaces, 
copied its manuscripts and composed its official language.  
(Farley 2001:6) 
It could moreover be said that beauty has also been an (underlying) theme in 
various theological writings throughout the history of Christianity. In the second 
and third volumes of the Glory of the Lord, respectively titled Clerical Styles and 
Lay Styles, Hans Urs von Balthasar names and discusses a variety of thinkers 
and theologians, including Irenaeus, Augustine, Denys, Bonaventure, Dante and 
John of the Cross, who produced “beautiful theologies” in which the aesthetic 
dimensions of life, and the wonder of experienced beauty, was understood to be 
part and parcel of Christian truth and the life of faith (Nichols 1998:66).  
 
While Christianity has thus definitely not been completely devoid of aesthetic 
sensibilities through the ages, it should nevertheless be noted that there is an 
overwhelming consensus that the abovementioned is not the whole story: The 
Christian faith has seemingly also had, as Farley states, a “disturbing dark side”, 
characterized by a “powerful and intrinsic anti-aesthetic” wherein beauty’s status 
has always been “shaky and problematic” (2001:7,9). It could indeed be said that 
in Christianity’s long and ever variable history, beauty has regularly been negated 
and disregarded, and even, from time to time, held to be none other than an 
idolatrous and seductive “beast”, leading to “idleness and immorality”, and thus 
existing as the exact opposite of truth and goodness (2001:7).  
 
Although admitting the complexity of the matter, Farley suggests that, amongst 
others, three dominant themes could be held to lie behind Christianity’s seeming 
discounting, dismissal and suppression of beauty throughout the ages; 
iconoclasm, asceticism and futurism (2001:9). 
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2.4 Iconoclasm, Asceticism and Futurism (Farley) 
The first of these themes, iconoclasm, should be understood, according to Farley, 
against the occurrence of the Semitic, monotheistic revolution, characterized by 
the call to obedience to a single, personal deity – which stood in direct opposition 
to traditional, tribal types of faith, where the sacred was held to be multiple 
enabling and beautifying forces present in the very flow of the universe.  
 
In archaic “nature religions”, Farley writes (2001:9), communities were strangely 
attuned to the power and beauty in their immediate vicinity, as well as the cosmos 
at large, as it was believed that the particularities in the world, be it animal, storm, 
wave, sun or mountain, were expressions of deities. It was thus exactly in the 
mysterious splendors of the world that the divine, who presided over love, fertility, 
birth, war and death, were thought to be seen and experienced. In this view of life 
no distinctions between natural and supernatural realms were made, as it was 
assumed that everything was animated and beautified by a godly presence. It is 
accordingly no wonder that the making of beautiful relics and icons, thought to be 
enchanted by godly presence, were an important part of these traditional faith-
systems (2001:9).  
 
With the onset of radical monotheism, however, this conviction, that the divine 
constituted a set of immanent powers and beauties dispersed throughout the 
cosmos, was exposed to be revolting idolatry – the ultimate taboo in the 
monotheistic belief system. For as is proclaimed in Exodus 20:4-5a: 
You must not make a carved image for yourself, nor the likeness of 
anything in the heaven above, or on the earth below, or in the waters 
under the earth. You must not bow down to them in worship; for I, the 
Lord your God, am a jealous God. 
This declaration that there is only one, true God naturally led to a severe 
iconoclasm, where any thoughts equating nature with the divine (as was 
continually done in the past), were strongly condemned. The divine, in this new 
understanding of life, did no longer come to expression in and through the 
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splendors of the corporeal, finite world, but rather spoke through the words of 
mediating messengers, prophets and texts, from above and beyond. The 
“universal flow of symmetry (and) color”, stripped of its mystery and feared for 
inciting idolatry, thus became marginal in divine mediation (Farley 2001:10).  
 
Although it is true that, in the monotheistic revolution, the world and the beauty it 
holds were believed to be the creation of the one God, Farley contends that it was 
henceforth solely understood as the setting in which human beings should “work 
out the moral dimensions that define them”, until, as the Christian eschatology 
hold, they finally leave this world behind. The focus was thus never really again 
on nature and its beauties, but rather on human beings, their moral life and their 
eventual transnatural home (Farley 2011:10).  
 
Farley’s second theme, pertaining to Christianity’s marginalization and 
suppression of beauty, is asceticism – something that has, in his opinion, been 
present (in various degrees) in almost all traditional Christian pieties and thought 
patterns (2001:11).  
 
Asceticism, which could be understood as the self-denial of certain earthly desires 
and pleasures, is usually seen to be the result of a deeply engrained suspicion of 
humanity’s bodily existence (a view that has ostensibly haunted Christianity 
throughout the ages). Farley holds that there has indeed continually been a 
tendency within Christian communities of faith to assign, with far-reaching 
consequences, the origin of human evil and sin to the body, the senses and 
physical needs – the very things in which we see beauty to find its primary 
mediation (Farley 2001:11). 
 
The human body, according to Farley, should not be seen as the only villain in an 
account of asceticism however:  
A broader asceticism (also) targets the self as unworthy of esteem, 
attention and pleasurable experiences. Self-fulfillment, self-satisfaction 
pleasures, and innocent joys that attend engagements with nature, arts 
and human beings ... joys that come with the preoccupation of 
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‘idleness’ (is seen as something that) must be rooted out if the human 
being is to be the uncompromised servant of God. They are (indeed 
held as) incompatible with true spirituality and with the sanctity that 
lives from and only for God. 
(Farley 2001:11) 
This asceticism of the body and the soul, and the subsequent self-denial of 
worldly beauty it usually entails, has indeed, according to Farley, time and again 
robbed Christianity of its aesthetic dimensions, and contributed to beauty “being 
seen as the beast” (Farley 2001:11).  
 
The third theme in Christianity's suppression of beauty, according to Farley's 
thought, could then be held to be futurism – which he sees as the apocalyptic 
dimension of the monotheistic revolution (Farley 2001:11).  
 
Farley writes that religion can also marginalize beauty by the way that it interprets 
time. In an apocalyptic type of faith, ultimate goodness, justice, freedom and 
beauty is usually seen to be something that belongs to an impending future 
reality. Many apocalyptic Biblical texts, especially from the books of the prophets 
(for example Hosea 14:4-7), do indeed conjure up marvelous images of peaceful 
and beautiful realities – all, however, belonging to an age to come. It is thus seen 
that although religion sometimes does provide striking descriptions of beauty, it is 
more often than not a postponed beauty, that will only one day, when this world 
comes to an end, be experienced by God’s faithful. 
 
It should be understood, however, that by saying that the future will be beautiful, it 
is implicitly implied that the present is not. Embedded in the belief and hope of 
future beauty, is a conviction of the present’s utter ugliness.  
 
Although it is true that humanity lives in a sinful, cruel world, and many 
apocalyptic literature were indeed composed during very dire times (see, e.g. 
Pagan 1989), a simplistic and naive futurism, which has undeniably been 
prevalent in many Christian communities throughout history, could be held to be 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 20
utterly problematic, given that its insistence on the beauty of the future clearly 
denies any possibility of beauty in the present. Futurism, according to Farley, 
could thus be seen as something which negates the beauty humanity currently 
experience, by putting all hope on the coming “kingdom of God, salvation (and) 
heaven” (Farley 2001:11). 
2.5 Farley’s Themes in Practice  
When telling Christianity’s story, copious illustrations of where Farley’s themes of 
iconoclasm, asceticism and futurism seem to have been at work, becomes 
evident. Besides the examples out of certain Biblical texts (especially in the 
Deuteronomistic and Prophetic traditions), scholars (working on the historical 
trajectories of Christianity’s relationship to aesthetics) typically refer to early 
Patristic apologetic writings warning against idolatry (e.g. Eusebius of Caesarea), 
the iconoclastic controversies that occurred in the East, and the writing of a text 
such as the Libri Carolini by the Carolingian Divines in the West, as evident 
instances where Christianity’s aesthetic dimensions could be seen to have been 
suppressed (see, e.g. De Gruchy 2008:11-29; Nichols 2007:32-38).  
 
It is, however, in the occurrence of the Reformation, where numerous scholars 
allege the most blatant manifestation of Christianity’s negation of earthly beauty 
came to the fore. 
 
The fact that the early followers of Protestantism, enticed by the “dangerously 
ambiguous rhetoric” of leaders such as Luther, Karlstadt, Zwingli, Calvin and 
Henry Vlll, violently destroyed sculptures, paintings, rood screens and crucifixes in 
church buildings (De Gruchy 2008:38) indeed labeled the Protestant movement, 
from its onset, as a “new and severe iconoclasm, suppressing aesthetic 
dimensions in the interpretation of faith” (Farley 2001:6), and already in 1526, 
Erasmus professed that in Germany, “the arts do freeze”, because of Protestant 
influence (Woods 2007:265). 
 
De Gruchy, however, states that it is important to remember that the Reformation 
was “complex in its character and ambiguous in its achievements” (2008:37). 
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Although the dangers of images were indeed one of the central issues at stake, 
and there is “no denying, of course, that Protestant Christianity was largely 
aniconic, (and resulted in) a new wave of iconoclasm”, it is, in his opinion, not 
necessarily correct to say that the Reformers had no reverence for aesthetics 
whatsoever (2008:37).  
 
Calvin, for example, notably stated that creation is a “beautiful theatre”, and that 
humanity should take pleasure in its goodness (Bouwsma 1987:135). The 
problem, for many of the Reformers, did indeed not necessarily lie in creation, the 
material, and the beauty it held, but rather in the fact that humanity, in their fallen 
state, misused the visual in an idolatrous manner, to, as Eire writes, “reverse the 
order of creation by attempting to bring God down to their level” (Eire 1989:232). 
In late medieval Catholic religion, marked by superstitions and dubious faith 
practices, it was indeed commonly found that people’s faiths were heretically 
“fixed on images and their salvation bound up with iconic signs” – something the 
Reformers (with right) fervently opposed (De Gruchy 2008:37).  
 
While therefore not necessarily inherently against the aesthetic dimensions of the 
world, the Reformers, convinced of the utter otherness of God, the terrible danger 
of idolatry, as well as the primacy of the Word whilst the elect is still on this fallen 
earth (touching thus on Farley’s three themes), nonetheless devised a theology 
wherein a decisive shift “from the eye to the ear” would take place (De Gruchy 
2008:39). From here on God would exclusively be heard (through the reading and 
the preaching of the Word), instead of seen; the “eye lost its privileged role in 
religious practice”, Margaret Miles writes (2006:123), and, sadly, it was beauty 
that would come to pay the price for this development for generation on 
generation to come.  
 
Protestantism, rooted in the unassailable initial aniconic and iconoclastic 
tendencies of the Reformation, would thus, as a result of its (virtually) exclusive 
focus on the ear, and the subsequent development of the belief that the wholly 
other Creator, and bodily creation, is “set in opposition” (Webster 2010:387), 
indeed come to be known as a faith tradition with a low view of the corporeal 
world, the arts and the wonder of experienced beauty.  Although many 
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illustrations could be given where this anti-aesthetic ethos came to clear 
expression throughout the years (e.g. 17th and 18th century pietism) 13 , it is 
interesting to note that it is especially in the last century that a multitude of 
theological thought, explicitly excluding and suppressing beauty, came to the fore. 
Some examples include the theologies of Anders Nygren, Gerhard Nebel and 
Rudolf Bultmann. 
 
In his magisterial work, Agape and Eros, theologian Anders Nygren (in 
accordance with a long line of thought stemming from Tertullian’s initial 
exclamation “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem!”) contends that the history of 
the world is marked by two distinct and conflicting houses – the house of Greece 
(with its controlling concept of Eros) and the house of Christianity (with its 
controlling concept of Agape). Given that beauty, as was said earlier in this 
chapter, has always been associated with desire (Eros), Nygren declares that, 
together with other aspects of pagan culture, it undeniably belongs to the vile 
Greek, instead of the Judeo-Christian house. Earthly beauty, in Nygren’s thought, 
is thus something that subsists as a sinful distortion of the goodness of God and 
accordingly, can never be associated with the Christian faith tradition (Farley 
2001:69).  
 
In his Das Ereignis des Schönen, Gerhard Nebel, similarly advocates that earthly 
beauty has no place in the Christian understanding of the life of faith. Central to 
his argument (which closely relates to what was proposed by Nygren) is the belief 
that the aesthetic world, the tragic current setting of beauty, stand in direct 
opposition to the iconoclastic world of Israel. Although he does believe that true 
beauty belongs to God (Nichols 1998:11), and that it will eventually be 
experienced in Paradise (with God’s final and complete revealing), he is 
nonetheless of firm opinion that earthly beauty seduces humanity into idolatry – 
as seen in the narrative of the golden calf (Nebel 1953:127).  
 
																																																								
13 It is important to note that examples could also be given where an anti-aesthetic did not 
prevail; theologian P.T. Forsyth, poet John Milton and artists such as Rembrandt and Van 
Gogh are but a few examples of ardent Protestants who did not see any discrepancies 
between their faith and their appreciation for the beauty of creation.  
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The thought of Rudolf Bultmann provides perhaps then the most striking 
illustration from the last century of the way in which the aesthetic dimensions of 
life was banished in certain Protestant theology. Bultmann, in setting out to reveal 
the deeper, subjective meaning within the “religious myth”, attempts to de-
historicize the Christian faith, and, in accordance with the usual “climes of the 
existential”, portray the “self” as a “homeless wanderer seeking escape from 
history” (Hart 2003:22). In this endeavor, Bultmann treats the physical world as an 
enclosed continuum wherein the supernatural’s salvation of the human “self” 
could only happen through an “interruption” or “perforation” of history (Bultmann 
1958:15), thus explicitly excluding “the aesthetic and the concept of beauty from 
playing any role in the Christian life here and now” (De Gruchy 2013:80), as seen 
in this extract from his “Glauben und Verstehen: Gesammelte Aufsätze”: 
The idea of the beautiful is of no significance in forming the life of 
Christian faith, which sees in the beautiful the temptation of a false 
transfiguration of the world which distracts the gaze from ‘beyond’ ... 
The beautiful is ... as far as the Christian faith is concerned, always 
something that lies beyond this life. 
(Translation found in Von Balthasar 1989:27) 
In abovementioned theologies, visibly haunted by iconoclasm, asceticism and 
futurism, corporeal reality is time and again held to be completely irreconcilable 
with the goodness and splendor of God, which, as clearly seen, results in the 
aggressive negation and suppression of earthly beauty. For these thinkers, the 
“sphere of fixed stars, the stellatum” could indeed not be admired and adored for 
its magnificent splendor, but should rather be seen as “the final barrier” between 
the glorious world of God and the broken, sinful world of humanity (Hart 2003:24) 
– an outlook which can undeniably be described as dualism is the truest sense of 
the word. It is thus no wonder that Von Balthasar, as a contemporary of 
theologians such as Nygren, Nebel and Bultmann, bemoans the fact that that 
beauty is “no longer loved or fostered by religion” and indeed “lifted from its face 
as a mask”. 
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The "story" that has been told up until this point could indeed then, in the words of 
Edward Oakes, be summed up as follows: 
Myth emerges as the natural expression of man’s innate sense that the 
world is saturated with the divine ... Christian thought gradually weans 
itself from this (understanding) under the influence of revelation, 
especially in the Old Testament, with its polemic against idolatry ... 
When Protestantism arrives, the European soul has but two choices to 
make: naturalism (of either the scientific or romantic variety) or fideism 
... and in either case, the openness to the divine has been lost, and we 
meet Bultmann waiting for us at the end of the garden path.  
(Oakes 1997:182)  
2.6 Beauty Revisited  
It is exactly in this swamp of 20th century anti-aesthetic thought that Hans Urs von 
Balthasar emerges as a theologian convinced of the fact that beauty should be 
rediscovered as something inseparable from the life of faith. For Von Balthasar 
the category of the beautiful, far from being something that stands in opposition to 
the divine, (in fact) abolishes any dualistic thought, and illuminates the wondrous 
truth that there exists an ontological, aesthetic relationship between God and 
earthly life (Von Balthasar 1983:148, 151).  
 
Von Balthasar’s momentous claims (which will further be discussed in the fourth 
chapter of this study) principally rests on his belief that true beauty is not a finite 
occurrence, limited by the totality of this corrupted, passing world (as recurrently 
held to be the case in many theologies since the monotheistic revolution), but 
rather, the third transcendental, underlying all that is, and thus belonging first and 
foremost to the being of God. Beauty, according to Von Balthasar, intrinsically 
linked to goodness and truth (the other two transcendentals), indeed 
“characterizes the form of ultimate reality”, is “part of God’s nature” and should in 
truth be seen as the “essence of God’s glory (doxa)” – hence the fact that his 
theological aesthetics is named “The Glory of the Lord” (De Gruchy 2008:103).  
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Following a Thomistic metaphysic14, and strongly relying on the tradition of the 
analogia entis, Von Balthasar also then asserts that, since the transcendental 
properties of being is predictable to both divine and worldly being (as separate 
modes of being, as will be seen in the next chapter), the beauty of the finite world 
ought to be seen an analogous expression of this infinite glory of the Trinity (Van 
Erp 2004:106) – a “shimmer” participating in “the absolute, fascinating 
preciousness (Kostbarkeit) of God” (as he writes in his essay Kunst und 
Verkündigung, translated and quoted by Nichols 2007:56).  
 
According to Von Balthasar, earthly beauty, as a correlate of divine beauty does 
thus not stand in opposition to God and the life of faith (as Nygren, Nebel and 
Bultmann argued), but rather reveals the glory of the Lord – which brilliantly 
explains why it has immeasurable depth, “pleases the sight” and elicits desire, as 
was held earlier in this chapter. As the Angelic Doctor says: “All things are turned 
to the beautiful ... desiring God (the supersubstantial pulchrum and fount of all 
beauty) as their end, and, on account of the beautiful, seeking after him ...” 
(quoted in Nichols 2007:12-3).  
 
Von Balthasar’s use of a Thomistic ontology and his subsequent insistence on the 
fact that, instead of a dualistic dichotomy, there in actuality exists an analogous, 
ontological correlation between the beauty of God and the beauty of the world, 
has, as said in the beginning of this chapter, been incredibly influential over the 
last couple of decades. When thus surveying an array of recent scholarships in 
and on theological aesthetics, it is striking to see similar propositions (clearly 
instigated by Von Balthasar's thought) being avowed by theologians stemming 
from diverse traditions and schools of thought. 
 
 
In Towards a Theology of Beauty, for example – which has come to be seen as 
one of the central works in 20th theological aesthetics (Farley 2001:76) – Jesuit 
																																																								
14 Which Von Balthasar sees as the highpoint of Western philosophical thought (Oakes 
1994:181).  In his opinion , Thomas’s ontology, with its real distinction between esse and 
essentia (which will be discussed in the next chapter), truly enables “theologians” as well 
as the “ordinary believer” to “recover the true meaning of glory” (Von Balthasar 
1989:395). 
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scholar John Navone protests that beauty should not be degraded and negated 
by religious (or secular) thought, seeing as beauty, in his opinion, can in truth be 
understood as nothing less than the joyous expression of the infinite splendor of 
the beautiful Trinity.  
 
For Navone, a self-proclaimed Thomistic theologian (Navone 1996:57), beauty 
can be described as the “mystery that enchants and delights” (Farley 2001:xi), 
and should primarily be seen as one of the transcendentals, eternally grounded in 
the divine life of God. Given that the corporeal world was created by God, and is 
utterly contingent on his being, earthly beauty, Navone holds, also then “reflects 
and participates in the splendor of (this) Beauty”, and could therefore be grasped 
as an analogous expression of the divine (1996:1). The thought of a “basic and 
profound analogy between human existence and the very being of the living God”, 
is indeed of cardinal importance to Navone’s entire theology (1996:12). It is 
because of this understanding that Navone can truly contend that “things are 
beautiful because their Creator is Beauty Itself” (1996:8).  
 
In Grace and Necessity: Reflections on Art and Love, wherein former Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, innovatively investigates the creative processes 
involved in the creation of the beautiful (by focusing on the thought and work of   
Jacques Maritain, David Jones and Flannery O’Connor), it is also professed that 
earthly beauty exists in wondrous continuity with the beautiful life of God the 
Creator.  Williams states that it is interesting to note that there seems to be 
significant convergences between the understanding of the artist’s creative labor, 
and theological discourse regarding God’s act of creation. For as artists give birth 
to what is necessarily continuous, but also utterly other, free and independent 
from their being, “(creation’s) life is radically grounded in God (as its artist), and 
just as radically different from God”; both “wholly drawn from the generator’s 
substance, and wholly a free re-presentation (and) re-realization” (Williams 
2006:161).  
 
Artists’ relationship to their beautiful artwork can consequently, according to 
Williams, help the believer to understand God’s relationship to his beautiful 
creation, as something continuous, yet completely different from the beauty of the 
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divine life. It could indeed then, Williams asserts, be said that there exists a 
profound “analogy between the being of creatures and the being of God”, in much 
the same way as there exists a similarity, as well as an “irreducible difference” 
between “the being of a work of art and the creative being of the artist” (Williams 
2006:166).  
 
In his inventive and erudite study, Christianity, Art and Transformation: 
Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice, South African Reformed 
theologian, John de Gruchy, specifically focusing on the relationship between 
social ethics, justice and the beautiful, also holds that beauty cannot be ignored or 
negated, and should, in fact, stand central to religious thought (especially in the 
opposition to the utter ugliness of injustice, dehumanization and oppression found 
in this world) (De Gruchy 2008:2). 
 
De Gruchy’s “senior partner in dialogue” for this work is then none other than 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (De Gruchy 2008:7), whose pronouncement that beauty 
should be understood as the expression of the glory of the Lord, is thoroughly 
engaged throughout the work. In this regard, Von Balthasar’s conception and 
appropriation of analogical thinking, and the analogia entis in particular, which, 
according to De Gruchy, has vast implications for theological aesthetics at large, 
forms an important part of the discussion (2008:104). Although the analogy of 
being is not explicitly affirmed or denied in this study, it is nonetheless apparent 
that De Gruchy is very adamant on the fact that the splendor of creation should be 
deemed to be fundamentally related to, and in continuum with, the splendor of 
God.  
 
This is then especially seen in his discussion (and backing) of Bonhoeffer’s notion 
of “aesthetic living”, vested in the “mature worldliness” of the Scholastics, wherein 
the sensual beauty of the world is fervently affirmed as a cardinal part of Christian 
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truth, and any dualistic separation between God and earthly splendor is strongly 
opposed (De Gruchy 2008:153)15. 
 
The Radical Orthodoxy movement, being of firm belief that aesthetics is 
intrinsically linked to metaphysics (Ward 2003:58), has also regarded it as one of 
their main objectives to affirm an aesthetic, participatory continuity between God 
and the beauty on earth.  
 
In his essay, Beauty of the Soul, in the compilation Theological Perspectives on 
God and Beauty, John Milbank, for example, engaging the epistemology of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, contends that the beauty of the world, strangely 
experienced as something “not reducible to mere appearance” (Milbank 2003:11), 
eternally originates in, and returns to, the “drama of the Trinity” – which then 
explains its "ontological depth" (2003:34). Earthly beauty, Milbank argues, could 
therefore veritably be said to mediate the “invisible in the invisible”, and as such, 
analogously express God’s infinite glory in “finite surfaces” (2003:2). This 
analogical understanding (of the relationship between God and creation), evident 
in the essay, is then indeed central to Milbank’s entire theological thought (as 
seen in e.g. his Theology and Social Theory; Milbank 1990:304-316). 
 
In his essay, The Beauty of God (from the same compilation Theological 
Perspectives on God and Beauty), Graham Ward, another key voice in the 
Radical Orthodoxy movement, setting out to defend the tradition of iconography 
(against e.g. the thought of philosopher Jean-Luc Marion16), also argues that 
earthly beauty, although dissimilar to the divine, expresses, and participates in, 
the beauty of God.  Similar to Milbank (and the other works described previously), 
Ward’s views concerning beauty is also then deeply influenced by, and dependent 
on, the (theological) notion of analogy, as he writes that earthly beauty can truly 
																																																								
15  In another publication, Icons as a Means of Grace, De Gruchy writes that: “No 
Protestant theologian in recent times has spoken out more strongly against the dangers 
of dividing reality into two spheres than Bonhoeffer”, and quotes Bonhoeffer in saying in 
his Ethics: “There are not two realities, but only one reality and that is God's reality” (De 
Gruchy 2008:100). 
16 And his startling work, God without Being. 
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be seen as an “analogical ordering ... with respect to the (beauty of the) Word” 
(2003:58). 
2.7 Introducing David Bentley Hart as part of the Discussion   
When reading the abovementioned works (which serves as only a small 
representation of scholarship recently published on this theme), it is evident that 
the notion of an aesthetic (and analogical) continuity between God and his 
creation (over against a dualistic cosmology where earthly splendor is ignored or 
negated), has been at the heart of the current conversation conducted in and on 
theological aesthetics. It is also then as part of this conversation, and manifest 
strand of thought, that David Bentley Hart’s recent theological project in aesthetics 
could be read and understood.  
 
Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite, in agreement with the texts mentioned, is 
veritably a work wherein creation, and the beauty it holds, is perceived (in words 
also favored by Orthodox theologian Paul Evdokimov17) as a “tabernacle and 
manifestation of (God’s) beauty” (Hart 2003:181). For Hart, experienced beauty 
“reflects the way in which God utters himself” (2003:178), which makes any 
ontology with the tendency towards oppositions, ruptures or negations between 
the divine and earthly (as was the case in the theologies of Nygren, Nebel and 
Bultmann), an “absurd attempt to limit the limitlessness of creation” (2003:207). 
God, as “endless display of beauty”, according to Hart, imparts “beauty to beings 
from (His) own depth of loveliness”, which results in the corporeal world being a 
“God-fashioned creation”, existing as “vessel of his glory” (as Von Balthasar also 
continually proclaimed) (2003:207). For Hart, the “whole fabric of being is (indeed) 
woven in infinite Taboric light”, and therefore truly beautiful beyond words 
(2003:237). 
 
In accord with the voices stated above, yet markedly more adamant and 
relentless on the matter, Hart also then holds that analogical thinking, and the 
analogia entis par excellence, is paramount to an aesthetic theology, wherein 
																																																								
17 See Evdokimov (2000) 
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experienced earthly beauty is deemed to stand in continuity with the infinite and 
wondrous glory of God.  For Hart, the analogy of being, vested in a Thomistic 
ontology, as used by thinkers such as Przywara and Von Balthasar (as will be 
seen in Chapter 4), indeed serves as nothing other than a divine gift through 
which every dualism, especially the "separation between flesh and spirit" (leading 
to the negation of corporeal creation) is overcome, and the “grammar of doxology” 
is magnificently revealed in this world - which leads him to utilize it as the central 
principle in his theological project (as evident in his dogmatica minora which will 
be discussed in Chapter 6 of this study) (2003:306).  The analogy of being is 
indeed, according to him, the ultimate “destiny of Christian metaphysics” (Hart 
2010:395), illuminating, in evident manner, the fact that the beauty “of heaven and 
earth truly declares and belongs to the glory of the infinite God” (2003:20).  
 
In order to properly engage Hart's propositions (which, as shown, stand in clear 
continuity with an array of other recent works in theological aesthetics), attention 
will now be given to the origination and appropriation of analogical thinking, and 
the analogia entis in particular in Greek and Scholastic (Chapter 3) and 20th 
century thought (Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 3 – The Use of Analogy in Ancient Greek  
and Scholastic Thought 
 3.1 A Third Alternative  
 
Analogy, and the analogia entis in particular, as employed by David Bentley Hart 
and other contemporary voices in theological aesthetics, stems, as mentioned, 
from the classical conceptions thereof found in the philosophies that were brought 
forth by thinkers such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In order to thoroughly 
engage Hart, and his belief that the analogy of being should stand central to all 
(aesthetic) theological endeavors, it is thus important and necessary to enquire 
into these original understandings and appropriations of analogical thought. 
 
Greek philosopher and polymath, Aristotle, is commonly held to be the most 
prominent and influential proponent of analogical thinking in classical antiquity 
(Bartha 2013). When consulting his writings, it is indeed seen that he recurrently 
(albeit not necessarily systematically) contends that apart from the fact that 
different entities could be perceived to be similar to each other (and thus in an 
univocal relationship), or dissimilar to each other (and thus in an equivocal 
relationship), a third alternative, namely that of an analogical correspondence, 
referring to the occurrence where the compared entities are neither completely 
identical nor completely distinct, but somehow related (amidst their ostensible 
divergence from each other), is also conceivable (Betz 2011:47).  
 
According to Aristotle, there could thus veritably be said to be a midpoint or 
“mean” between univocal and equivocal relationships (see, e.g. his Nicomachean 
Ethics 5.3.1131b.), brought about by a similarity occasionally apparent “among 
otherwise disparate things” – which is then effectually expressed by the concept 
of analogy (Betz 2011:46).  
 
Analogy, thus understood as a concept signifying and naming a presumed 
similarity-amidst-difference between compared entities, is then usually interpreted 
to be utilized in two distinct manners in Aristotelian thought (Ross 2000:15): 
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Its first use, it could be argued, typically entails a description of how diverse 
correlates, which are similarly termed, are seen to be related to one primary 
analogate from which their different meanings derive. This use of analogy, which 
has come to be known as the pros hen (“to one”) analogy, or analogy of 
attribution (analogia attributionis), is customarily explained with the hackneyed 
example of the term “health”, which could be employed in regards to an animal, 
urine and nourishment, where the animal is the primary analogate, and urine and 
nourishment are only “healthy” in an analogical sense – respectively as sign and 
cause of health proper (Betz 2011:46). 
 
The second utilization of analogy, in contrast to the pros hen analogy, is then 
seen to involve the comparison of two completely distinct (yet related) proportions 
(recalling the first traces of analogical thinking in Greek arithmetic), where, for 
example, it could be said that 2 is to 4, as 4 is to 8, or (deliberately moving away 
from the restrictedness of mathematical precision) that sight is to the eyes, as 
thinking is to the mind (Betz 2011:48). This use of analogy, which therefore has to 
do with the resemblances between the inner workings of different proportions, has 
appropriately come to be known as the analogy of proportionality (analogia 
proportionalitatis) (2011:48).  
3.2 The Analogy of Proportionality in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas  
As a result of the “accidents of history”, Aristotle’s work remained unknown to the 
Christian Church for the first millennium of its existence. Once it was discovered 
and translated into Latin in the 11th century, however, it truly instigated a 
revolution in Christian thought (that was until then primarily marked by a Platonic 
and neo-Platonic rationale18), and, with time, it was properly assumed that it was 
																																																								
18 Pasnau writes: “Although almost none of Plato’s own works were available until the 
15th century, a version of Platonism was indeed transmitted through the Neo-Platonism 
infusing Augustine’s thought, as well as through various Neo-Platonic tracts that made 
their way into the Latin philosophical canon (of these the most notable were the Liber de 
causis, derived from Proclus, and the writings of pseudo-Dionysius” (2012:665).  
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almost impossible to be a theologian “unless one (is) one with Aristotle”19 (Höffe 
2003:199; Oakes 1997:30). It is thus unsurprising that the Aristotelian notion of 
analogy would become paramount in Scholastic thinking – as then indeed overtly 
seen in the theology of the Church’s Common Doctor, Thomas Aquinas.  
 
For Thomas, analogical thinking, which he adeptly appropriated and restructured 
in regards to Christian metaphysics, was “not only a mere doctrine, a ‘that’, but a 
whole way of life; a ‘how’, that demanded the fullest commitment of the soul” 
(Oakes 1997:37).  
 
Gerald Phelan, a revered Thomistic scholar out of the last century, writes:  
(According to Thomistic thought) there is not a problem either in the 
order of being, or in the order of knowing, or in the order of predicating, 
which does not depend for its ultimate solution on the principle of 
analogy. (For Thomas) there is not a question that can be asked either 
in speculative or practical philosophy which does not require for its final 
answer an understanding of analogy. 
(Phelan 2011:1)  
 
It could then be held that Thomas, following Aristotelian thought, also 
distinguished, amongst others, between pros hen analogies, where “one notion is 
referred to several things, which nevertheless has being only in one ... (as is the 
case with) the notion of health”, and analogies of proper proportionality, where the 
focus is on the resembling inner-workings of different proportions (see, e.g. 
Thomas’s Scriptum super Sententiis 1, d.19, q.5, art. 2, ad 1; Betz 2011 47; Long 
2011:41).  
 
It is then this second type of analogy, according to Steven Long, which stood 
central to Thomas’s understanding of the relationship between God and creation 
(especially in some of his earlier texts, as will be explicated in what follows) (Long 
																																																								
19 A view Martin Luther, who saw Aristotle as an “intellectual power that threatened to 
displace the scriptural viewpoint”, countered by proclaiming exactly the opposite in his 
40th thesis of his treaty Against Scholastic Theology (Höffe	2003:199). 
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2011:21). In order to comprehend this application of the principle of analogy 
(according to proportionality), it is, however, firstly important to investigate his 
groundbreaking ontological distinction, wherein a differentiation between a being’s 
existence (esse) and essence (essentia) is proposed.  
 
Thomas indeed claimed, most famously in his De ente et essentia, a commentary 
on Boethius’s De Trinitate, that a distinction between a being’s essentia, referring 
to its “set of special characteristics ... by virtue of what the creature is what it is”, 
and its existence, which has to do with the fact that it truly is, can be made 
(Johnson 2010:71; Oakes 1994:31). When using the example of a tree, it could 
therefore be said that a tree’s essence is its tree-ness (referring to its roots, stem, 
bark, branches and leaves etc.). The fact that it is a tree (distinguishable by its 
tree-ness), however, does not necessitate that it is or indicate why it is, which can 
then, following Thomas’s logic, be attributed to its existence (something, visibly 
different from its essence). It could therefore be argued, according to Thomas’s 
thought, that finite beings are utterly groundless in themselves, seeing as what 
they are (their essence), does not necessitate the fact that they are (given the 
evident distinction between esse and essentia) (Oakes 1994:32). 
 
In this understanding, in which all beings are said to have both essence and 
existence (that are distinguished from one another), there is, according to 
Thomas, however one radical exception, namely God. For in God, it is seen that 
his essentia is to exist, resulting in the fact that his existence, unlike creation’s, is 
a necessary fact, bound-up with his essence (that he is, belongs to what he is). 
As Thomas says: “There is a thing, God, whose essence is his existence itself” 
(Aquinas 2000:69) – which indeed then makes him “the First Being, who 
possesses being most perfectly” (Summa Theologicae 1.44.1, quoted in Johnson 
2010:71). 
It could then accordingly be said that creaturely beings’ instances of esse, 
groundless in itself (since it is not necessitated by the beings’ essences), can only 
ever occur as something dependent on the One who necessarily exists, namely 
God (whose essence is existence). Creaturely existence is thus indeed always 
contingent on God’s existence – which, according to Thomas’s thought, results in 
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the fact that it, in its finite (and thus limited) act of being, shares and participates 
in the divine essence which is “ever-perfect ... as pure act” (Horrigan 2007:143-
144).  
 
This, however, according to Gilson, does not mean to say that “God should be 
seen as universal being”, or that being itself should be understood as a common 
genus of sorts, but rather that “the only instance in which ‘to be’ is absolutely pure 
of any addition or determination is also the only instance in which being is (in 
actual fact) distinct from the rest (namely creation) ... He is He, precisely because 
He alone is ‘to be’ in its absolute purity: “Unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse 
distinctum ab omni esse” (Gilson 1952:177 with quotation from De esse et 
essentia 4.4). God is thus “... (his own infinite) being and, as such, wholly distinct 
from all creatures ...”, whose instances of being are nonetheless always 
contingent on God’s act of existence (Johnson, 2010:71).  
 
It could hence be said that the being of God and the being of creation, as two 
“varying modes of being”, with dissimilar proportions of esse and essentia (“For in 
him they are one, while in other things they are diversified” – Aquinas 2000:70), 
are utterly disparate from each other, and that God should indeed be deemed to 
exist according to his own perfect and infinite existence (separate and sufficient in 
its boundless self20), just as creation ought to be deemed to exist according to its 
own existence (dependent on, and thus participative in God’s being) (Long 
2011:43). Even though creation derives from God, and undeniably receives its 
(original and continual) being as divine gift (since it is groundless in itself), it can 
thus never be equated with the distinct act of existence of God (where esse and 
essentia are one and the same thing), and should therefore be understood as 
something with a completely different existence (with its own integrity), infinitely 
exceeded by the one whose essence is identical to pure act.   
 
Yet, as a result of the fact that we are dealing with two “modes of being” that are 
comparable by the very fact that both are as proportions of essence and 
																																																								
20 Which will be seen to be a significant theme in David Bentley Hart’s aesthetics (with its 
emphasis on the importance of the doctrine of Divine Apatheia).  
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existence (even though God’s essence is to exist) – with creaturely being, 
originating from, and thus continually participating in God’s essentia (which is 
esse) – it is nonetheless possible, in addition to the admittance of a colossal 
difference between the two realities, to also argue for a very real and intrinsic 
correspondence between the existence of God and the existence of creation 
(Long 2011:43). As God is (and stand to the things which are his own), creation, 
dependent on God’s being, also is (and stand to the things which are its own), 
which indeed leads to an assertion of a sure similarity (the fact that God and 
creatures both are), amid the evident dissimilarity (the fact that they are 
differently, given that God exists necessarily, and creation, only contingently by 
participation) (Oakes 1994:32).  It is thus possible to define the relationship 
between God and creation in terms of the analogy of proportionality, since their 
similarity to one another, transpires amidst (and because of) two (infinitely) 
different proportions relating to their being (Menn 2003:165).   
 
General consensus exists that the clearest example of Thomas’s conception of 
the relationship between the being of God and the being of creation in terms of 
the analogy of proportionality (as explicated above) is found in his Scriptum super 
Sententiis (a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard) and his 
Questiones disputatae De Veritate, or De Veritate in short (a collection of 
responses to twenty nine disputed questions on aspects of faith and the human 
condition) – two texts, it should be noted, which were composed relatively early in 
Thomas’s career (Long 2011:39). 
 
In Scriptum super Sententiis, Thomas is thus seen to say: 
... And similarly I say that ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ and all such items 
(which, in the context of this study can also comprise ‘beauty’) are said 
analogically (dicuntur analogice) of God and creatures. Hence, it is 
necessary that according to their being, all these be in God and in 
creatures according to the intelligible character of greater and lesser 
perfection; from which it follows since they cannot be according to one 
being (esse) in both places, that there are diverse truths ... 
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(I, d. 19, q. 5, art 2, ad 1, quoted and translated in Long 2011:41) 
It is thus seen that Thomas lucidly professes that being (which encompasses 
features such as “truth”, “goodness”, and also, without a doubt, “beauty”), cannot 
be said in the same manner of God and creatures, as they are according to 
different “perfections”, which, according to Long, refer to “diverse rationes" of esse 
and essentia (Long 2011:42). Thomas is thus seen to suggest that the 
relationship between the two separate (yet related) existences and truths of the 
creaturely and the divine can only rightfully be described in terms of analogy (by 
proper proportionality).  
 
This notion is then further developed in Thomas’s De Veritate, in the question: “Is 
knowledge Predicated of God and Men Purely Equivocally?” – a passage which 
needs to be read in full, to fully comprehend and appreciate the significance of the 
argument made:  
It is impossible to say that something is predicated univocally of a 
creature and God because in all univocal predication the nature 
signified by the name is common to those of whom the univocal 
predication is made. Hence, from the point of view of the nature 
signified by the predicate, the subjects of the univocal predication are 
equal, even though from the point of its real existence one may take 
precedence over another. For example, all numbers are equal from the 
point of view of the nature of the number, even though, by the nature of 
things, one number is naturally prior to another. No matter how much a 
creature imitates God, however a point cannot be reached where 
something would belong to it for the same reason it belongs to God ... 
Whatever is in God is His own act of being; and just as His essence is 
the same as His act of being, so is his knowledge the same as His act 
of being a knower. Hence, since the act of existence proper to one 
thing cannot be communicated to another, it is impossible that a 
creature ever attain to the profession of something in the same manner 
in which God has it, just as it is impossible for it to attain the same act 
of being as that which God has.  
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Nevertheless, it cannot be said that whatever is predicated of God and 
creatures is an equivocal predication; for unless there were at least 
some real agreement between creatures and God, His essence would 
not be the likeness of creatures, and so He could not know them by 
knowing His essence. Similarly, we would not be able to attain any 
knowledge of God from creatures, nor from among the names devised 
for creatures could we apply one to Him more than another; for in 
equivocal predication it makes no difference what name is used, since 
the word does not signify any real agreement. 
Consequently, it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither 
entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God’s knowledge and 
ours. Instead it is predicated analogously, or in other words, according 
to a proportion. Since an agreement according to proportion can 
happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. 
There is a certain agreement between things having a proportion to 
each other from the fact that they have a determined distance between 
each other or some other relation to each other, like the proportion 
which the number two has to unity in as far as it is double of unity. 
Again, the agreement is occasionally noted not between two things 
which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related 
proportions – for example, six has something in common with four 
because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. This first 
type of agreement is one of proportion; the second of proportionality. 
We find something predicated analogously of two realities according to 
the first type of agreement when one of them has a relation to the other 
... as when healthy is predicated of urine and animal because urine has 
some relation to the health of an animal. Sometimes, however, a thing 
is predicated analogously according to the second type of agreement, 
as when sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because 
understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye.  
In those terms predicated according to the first type of analogy, there 
must be some definite relation between the things having something in 
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common analogously. Consequently, nothing can be predicated 
analogously of God and creature according to this type of analogy. But 
in the other type of analogy, no definite relation is involved between the 
things which have something in common analogously, so there is no 
reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously of God and 
creature in this manner. 
(q.2, art. 11 quoted in Long 2011:43-5) 
In this passage, which brilliantly encapsulates that which has been put forward 
and explicated throughout this chapter, Thomas thus clearly affirms that due to 
the fact that God and creation can neither be deemed to stand in a univocal 
relationship (since it is impossible for creatures “to attain the same act of being as 
that which God has”), nor in an equivocal relationship (as that would imply that 
“from among the names devised for creatures (we would not be able to) apply one 
to Him ... since (no word would) signify any real agreement”), the only appropriate 
manner to speak of the relationship between the creaturely and the divine, is 
through analogy (as an effective “mean” between univocity and equivocity, as 
Aristotle said). Thomas then furthermore argues that although one could 
potentially speak of an analogy of proportion (which in this case refers to the 
analogy of attribution or the pros hen analogy), it is indeed important to realize 
that it is primarily by means of the analogy of proportionality, wherein the 
relationship between God and creation is not defined in a determinable manner 
(as is the case with the Aristotelian example of “health”), but truly as a mysterious 
similarity-amidst-difference between two distinct proportions of being (in the same 
manner as it could be said that “sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the 
intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye”) that 
predications regarding the creaturely and the divine can indeed be made.  
3.3 The Analogy of Proportionality Reconsidered? 
From the previously cited passages out of Scriptum super Sententiis and 
Questiones disputatae De Veritate it is clear to see that Thomas (at least in these 
writings) believed that it is only through the analogy of proportionality, wherein “... 
creatures stand to the things which are its own as God does to those which 
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belongs to him” (De Veritate q.23 art.7 ad.9, quoted and translated in Long 
2011:50), that a “proportion” between God and creation may be affirmed 
(2011:50).  
 
Yet, it is important to note that many scholars (especially in the second half of the 
20th century) have argued that although it is indeed evident that Thomas strongly 
avowed the importance of proper proportionality in the “proportionality texts”, as 
Scriptum super Sententiis and De Veritate would come to be known, it could in 
fact be contended that he only held these views for a brief period early in his 
career, and overtly abandoned them in his later, mature writings (see e.g. 
Klubertanz 1960). This suggestion, which stands contrary to almost five centuries 
of Thomistic study and interpretation (Osborne 2012), is normally substantiated by 
the seeming facts that Thomas does not explicitly reiterate or affirm the 
arguments and explications in favor of proper proportionality (as mentioned 
previously) in any writing after De Veritate, and moreover appears to call upon the 
(before shunned) analogy of attribution when speaking about the relationship 
between God and creation (in a passage such as question 13, article 16 of the 
first part of his magnum opus, the Summa Theologica). 
 
Steven Long, though, is of strong opinion that these arguments are not as 
convincing as they seem, and that it is definitely still possible to see the analogy 
of proper proportionality as the primary principal according to which Thomas 
understands the relationship between God and his creation. Although it is indeed 
true, Long argues, that Thomas does not explicitly mention the analogy of 
proportionality by name in his later writings, it should be noted however, that he 
also does not explicitly refute or deny his former declarations (which he most 
certainly would have done if he had indeed changed his mind, as a result of the 
strong manner in which they were originally posed) (Long 2011:56). According to 
Long, chances are thus good that Thomas expected his readers to continue to 
understand the analogy of proportionality, as explicated in the “proportionality 
texts”, as a normative principle serving as enduring foundation for all that would 
be proposed in future texts (2011:56).  
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It could indeed then be argued that even though no overt references to the 
analogy of proportionality (by name) can be found in Thomas’s mature works, a 
text such as Summa Theologica nonetheless seems to presume and imply 
exactly what the analogy of proportionality, with its identifiable emphasis on the 
facts that God and creation have different “modes of being” (brought about by 
varying rationes of esse and essentia), proposes. The text of Question 13, for 
example, which makes extensive reference to analogical thinking and the 
predication of qualities in terms of the creaturely and the divine, states that being 
is the “one primary thing” which needs to be understood as analogical (Aquinas 
2013:95); that names are thus not predicated “of God and the man according to 
the same concept” (2013:94); that “God is not a measure that is proportioned to 
the things that are measured” (2013:95); and that “God and creatures (are not) 
contained in a single genus” (2013:95) – which are all pronouncements which 
clearly coincide with that which was said in Scriptum super Sententiis and De 
Veritate (as explicated previously)21.  
 
It could subsequently, according to Long, also then be argued that when Thomas 
indeed refers to what seems to be the analogy of attribution, as is seen when he, 
for example, writes: “... In the case of all names that are said of many things 
analogously, there must be some one thing with respect to which they are all said 
... (which then in) a primary sense (is) God” (Aquinas 2013:96), he is specifically 
referring to the causal relation between Creator and creation (given that “the 
effect qua effect is indeed virtually ordered to its source”), which nonetheless 
could be held to be translatable to, and contained in, a prior instance of the 
analogy according to proportionality (Long 2011:59). Long thus contends that the 
analogy of attribution is always a secondary analogy in Thomas’s work, which is 
solely used in terms of the analogy of proportionality (and its proposition that God 
and creaturely being is indeed distinct from each other, as a result of  their 
differing proportions of esse and essentia) (Long 2011:59). 
According to Long, Thomas does thus not deny or contradict what was proposed 
																																																								
21 Further instances where clear traces of the analogy of proportionality could be seen to 
occur (even though “proportionality” is not mentioned by name) is, for example, Summa 
contra gentiles 4.12 and Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 3, art. 5, ad 1 (Osborne, 2012). 
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by means of the analogy of proportionality (as Klubertanz suggests), but in actual 
fact builds on its propositions, in order to further develop his understanding of the 
relationship between the creaturely and the divine (Long 2011:56).  
3.4 Cajetan, the Analogy of Being and Beyond 
Throughout this chapter it has thus been seen that one manner of interpreting 
Thomas’s appropriation of analogy (as a “mean” between univocity and 
equivocity) in terms of being, is according to proper proportionality (which could 
then, as was shown, consequently also serve as a foundation for a transferred 
analogy of attribution when speaking about the causal link between the creaturely 
and the divine). Even though this is a contested interpretation, it is important to 
note that it was exactly this understanding of analogy within the work of Thomas 
that was originally coined as the analogy of being, or analogia entis, by Cardinal 
Cajetan – one of the first and most influential interpreters of the Angelic Doctor’s 
thought in history (Betz, 2011:47-49). It was indeed also then this interpretation of 
Thomas’s analogical thinking, under the Cajetanist title of the analogia entis, 
which served as the foundation for Erich Przywara’s and his student Hans Urs 
von Balthasar’s theologies (see, e.g. Przywara 1962c:136; Dalzell 2000:68), 
which, in turn, influenced a host of theologians’ writing on aesthetics, including 
David Bentley Hart. 
Equipped with an understanding of how analogy functioned in classical antiquity 
and during the Scholastic area, it is thus now possible to explicate the theologies 
of the thinkers by analogy of the previous century (as well as the critique they 
received), which will directly assist in engaging David Bentley Hart’s use of the 
analogia entis in his theological aesthetics.  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 43
Chapter 4 – The Analogy of Being in the 20th Century 
4.1 From Aristotle and Thomas to Przywara, Barth and Von Balthasar 
Although analogical thinking and the analogia entis (as the Cajetanian title for 
Thomas’s description of an analogical correspondence between the being of 
creation and the being of God) were often invoked in theological and philosophical 
discussion ever since the Scholastic era (see, e.g. Randall 2006; Betz 2011:49), it 
was, however, with the commencement of the 20th century (a century that would 
notably be marked by two brutal world wars), that a renewed interest in the 
relevance and significance thereof to theology and metaphysics arose (White 
2011:11). This, it could be argued, was largely as a result of the significant 
scholarship by Roman Catholic theologians such as Erich Przywara and Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, who believed that the value of Thomistic thought, with its reliance 
on analogy (especially when it comes to the matter of ontology, as seen in the 
previous chapter), should be rediscovered and reutilized in a post-Cartesian 
world, unable “to hold together the polarity between God’s transcendence and 
imminence” (Oakes 1997:36).  
 
As it is evident that David Bentley Hart’s employment of the analogy of being 
(especially in regards to aesthetics and the notion of beauty) is fundamentally 
influenced by these 20th century thinkers (and their interpretations and utilizations 
of Thomas’s thought), it is of utmost importance to analyze their propositions as 
final groundwork for the following chapters’ focus on Hart’s work.  
 
This chapter will thus commence with a description of Przywara’s reintroduction of 
the analogia entis to the modern theological discourse (which, as will be seen, 
was strongly bound up with the occurrence of the First World War), after which 
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Karl Barth’s critique of Przywara’s proposals will be discussed22. This will serve as 
an important segment of this thesis at large, given the fact that Barth’s arguments 
against the analogy of being could still be seen to be definitive objections to what 
Hart proposes in the Beauty of the Infinite. The chapter will then conclude with an 
explication of Przywara’s student, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s rebuttal against 
Barth’s critique, as well as a description of his own employment of the analogia 
entis in his theological aesthetics (which will serve as an appropriate introduction 
to the following chapters on David Bentley Hart’s theology). 
4.2 War, Przywara and Analogy 
The conundrum regarding creation’s relationship to the divine, which has, as was 
postulated in the introduction of this thesis, haunted humanity throughout the 
ages, was, as could be expected, also at the forefront of discussion during the 
20th century. Given the tragic occurrences of two world wars, where humanity, 
who were held in particularly high esteem ever since the Enlightenment (Leigh 
1999:68), were exposed to be “carnivorous beast(s)”, living in what could be seen 
as an ever-erupting “volcano” (Johnson 2010:35; Przywara 1967:47), many were 
unsure if the truth of God (if indeed there was a God23), could in any way be 
brought into relation with the vile and atrocious reality of the war-ridden modern 
world, or if it was indeed the case that creaturely existence was irreconcilable with 
the reality of the divine, as several factions within different faith communities – 
clearly enthused by the themes proposed by Farley (as mentioned in the second 
chapter of this study) – proposed (2010:36).  
 
A leading voice in the discourse regarding the relationship between God and 
																																																								
22 It is important to note that this segment will exclusively focus on (the development of) 
Barth's thought in terms of the analogy of being (for the purpose of this thesis's argument 
at large), and will thus not attend to his propositions regarding  beauty and aesthetics 
(which although relevant to the themes of this thesis, falls outside the perimeters set by 
the Research Problem and Research Question).  For an interesting read regarding 
Barth's understanding of beauty (and especially then, the beauty of God), in relation to 
someone like Hans Urs von Balthasar's, see De Gruchy (2001:111-21)  
23 It could be said that the Nietzschean notion of the “death of God” culminated in the 20th 
century, partly due to events such as the two world wars (Kritzman & Reilly 2007:131; 
White 2011:2-3). 
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creation during this period of disillusionment and uncertainty, was a young Jesuit 
theologian, Erich Przywara, who fervently held that although it is true that God is 
utterly distinct from the world (by the very fact that he created it ex nihilo), it 
should nonetheless be recognized and professed, especially amidst the “storms 
of the times”, that He, as Creator, Sustainer and Redeemer of earthly reality, is 
also an active force in the world, and that creation, in its finite state, can truly be 
deemed to stand in wondrous continuity with his infinite being (Johnson 2010:36). 
According to Przywara, theologies that expediently “crossed out” God’s nearness 
to the world and saw ontic existence as a “pure negation” of the divine, were not 
only unsound (as it, to his mind, evidently stood in contrast to the basic Christian 
truths of creation and the incarnation of Jesus Christ), but also led to tragedy and 
despair (Johnson 2010:47; Przywara 1923:350). Przywara indeed thought that it 
was exactly because of the fact that the Christian Church, in all its shapes and 
forms, had construed reality in dualistic terms (with a clear polarization between 
the realm of God and the realm of humanity), and recurrently opted to retreat from 
culture, instead of engaging it with the truth that God is also present in it, that the 
modern world was in such a dire state (Johnson 2010:32).  
 
In the face of Europe’s political and cultural turmoil, Przywara thus believed that 
theological reforms, wherein the existing accent on God’s distinctiveness would 
be balanced out with a subsequent account of his involvement in, and connection 
to creation, was urgently needed. In his opinion, Christianity indeed had an 
obligation, amidst the unsettling events that were shaking the foundations of the 
world, to right the wrong of continually “running in the background”, which he saw 
as one of the “illnesses” of the church (Johnson 2010:39-40; Przywara 1962:124), 
by proclaiming to the world that God is not only above all that is, but indeed also 
present and active in earthly existence (2010:36). 
 
In order to uphold and theologically account for this conviction that God is not only 
beyond, but also within the world, Przywara, who was well schooled in the history 
of philosophical thought, deemed it imperative to revisit and revive Thomistic 
metaphysics, wherein, in his opinion, God’s relationship with creation is 
comprehended in terms of the “miracle of the analogy of being”, as account of the 
simultaneous “similarity and dissimilarity between God and the creature in its own 
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being” (Johnson 2010:41; Przywara 1962:213-4).  
 
Przywara indeed believed that it was solely by means of a Thomistic ontology, as 
expressed in the tradition of the analogia entis, that the tragic and utter 
problematic dichotomy between the earthly and the divine (which has, as was 
argued in the second chapter, been present and prevalent throughout the ages), 
could truly and rightfully be rectified, given the fact that its ingenious proposal of a 
continuity-amidst-discontinuity between the being of creation and the being of 
divine, properly illuminated God’s immanence within earthly reality, without 
surrendering or compromising his transcendence (which, notwithstanding 
Przywara’s fervent focus on God’s presence and involvement in the world, 
remained paramount in his thinking, as will be seen in what follows) (Johnson 
2010:23). For Przywara, indeed, the analogia entis showed God to be “the God 
exterior and interior, the towering God of both incomprehensibility and the 
unutterable indwelling within all creation: God in us and above us”, and could 
therefore be understood to be “the primordial metaphysical fact” regarding the 
relationship between the creaturely and the divine” (2010:42; Oakes 1994:33; 
Przywara 1962:403; Przywara 1962b:193) 
 
It is thus no wonder that the analogy of being would become the single, decisive 
principle in almost all of Przywara’s philosophical and theological works (Oakes 
1994:37).  
4.3 Przywara’s Conception of the Analogia entis  
Przywara’s initial encounter with the idea of a profound analogy between God and 
creation occurred through his study of De ente et essentia (wherein Thomas’s 
distinction between essence and existence is famously laid out), as well as 
Scriptum super Sententiis and De Veritate (the “proportionality texts”, investigated 
in the previous chapter) (Przywara 1962c:7). From the onset, Przywara’s 
conception and utilization of the analogia entis was therefore strongly bound up 
with the Thomistic assertion that any proposed continuity between God and 
creation should always be understood in terms of the fact that the creaturely and 
the divine have distinct instances of existence, that are neither in an equivocal 
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relationship (whereby God would only be transcendent, as Przywara’s 
adversaries proposed), nor, on the other side of the spectrum, in an univocal 
relationship (whereby God would only be imminent, as the Hegelian tradition 
propagated 24 ), but truly analogical to each other, given their differing, yet 
comparable proportions of esse and essentia (as explained in the previous 
chapter) (Oakes 1994:37). It could thus be held that Przywara’s basic conception 
of the analogia entis, which remained dominant throughout his whole lifetime, was 
primarily according to the analogy of proportionality (Betz 2011:69; Johnson 
2010:139) – the instance of analogy which captures the "restless separating line 
of the distinction" between God and creation (Przywara 1962c:136; Johnson 
2010:139)  – as evidently seen in this revealing passage: 
(Creation is) similar to God through the possession of a unity of 
essence and existence, but even in this similarity it is essentially 
dissimilar to God because, in God, the unity of essence and existence 
is that of identity, whereas in the creature the unity of essence and 
existence is one of tension. Now since the relation of essence and 
existence is the essence of being, so God and the creature are in being 
similar and dissimilar – that is, they are analogous to each other: and 
this is what we mean by analogia entis, analogy of being.  
(Przywara 1962b:403, quoted and translated in Johnson 2010:73) 
Although the analogy of proportionality, inspired by Thomas’s “proportionality 
texts”, continually remained foundational in Przywara’s understanding of the 
analogy of being, he furthermore also then deemed it possible, because of the 
analogy of proportionality’s affirmation of a similarity (amidst difference) between 
God and creation, and the fact that creation’s being is contingent on God’s acts of 
creation and sustainment, to employ the analogy of attribution (or pros hen 
analogy) when speaking of certain characteristics that are found in both God, 
primordially, and in creation (with the focus being on the causal link between the 
two) (Johnson 2010:136). As was the case in Thomas’s thought (according to 
																																																								
24  In an attempt to counter Cartesian Dualism, Hegel proposed that “God is the 
subsistence of all things, and is actually in all things” and that the world is thus “divine in 
its Allness” (Yerkes 1978:196).  
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Steven Long, as seen in the previous chapter), it should be noted however, that 
Przywara’s use of attribution always functions in terms of proportionality, as 
evidently seen in these passage out of his work, Analogia entis:  
The unlimitable ‘tensioning’ analogy (which is the analogy of 
proportionality) is the (sole) basis for an ... ‘attributive’ analogy. 
(Przywara 1962c:139 quoted and translated in Johnson 2010:139) 
Przywara’s analogia entis (in its fullest expression) should thus be understood to 
be made up of both a primary, indispensible analogy of proportionality (inspired by 
Thomas’s “proportionality texts”), emphasizing the fact that God and creation, 
although in continuity with each other, have an infinitely different “way” of being 
(as a result of their varying proportions of esse and essentia), as well as a 
secondary analogy of attribution, emphasizing the fact that since there indeed 
exists a continuity between the earthly and the divine, creation can truly be said to 
have similar characteristics and qualities to what is found in God, it’s creator 
(Johnson 2010:137). By honoring both these classical forms of analogy, the 
analogia entis, according to Przywara, accounts for both God’s transcendence 
and imminence, and thus effectively illuminates the truth that God is not only 
above and beyond the world, but also wondrously connected to its very existence. 
4.4 From Above to Below: The Analogy of Being and Faith 
Even though Przywara’s conception of the analogia entis aimed at showing, 
amidst the calamities of war-ridden Europe, that God is truly present in, and 
connected to worldly existence, he was nonetheless very adamant on the fact 
(especially as his thought matured) that the use of analogy does not form some 
kind of “natural bridge between God and creatures” that granted humanity 
“traversable access to the divine” (Betz 2011:54). For Przywara, any comparison 
that would be made between God and creation (by means of analogy, and 
especially then, the analogy of attribution), always occurred within an even 
greater instance of dissimilarity (as famously stated by the Fourth Lateran 
Council, already a generation before Thomas), which truly, in his opinion, 
suggests that the analogia entis can only ever function “from above to below” (a 
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phrase that will be seen to be of crucial importance in both Von Balthasar’s and 
Hart’s works) (Johnson 2010:145). Przywara, answering to the critique that his 
analogia entis is nothing other than a disguised instance of natural theology, thus 
writes:  
The analogia entis is an abbreviated way of stating what the Fourth 
Lateran Council – and thus a Christianity that was still united – defined 
in 1215: that even in the most extreme regions of the supernatural ... 
‘one cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature – 
however great – that would not require one always to note an ever 
greater dissimilarity’25. Thus the analogia entis in no way signifies a 
‘natural theology’, on the contrary, it obtains precisely in the domain of 
the supernatural and the genuinely Christian. 
(Przywara 1955:277, quoted and translated in Betz 2011:75-76) 
According to Przywara, the analogia entis should thus not be seen as a crafty 
formula whereby God’s being can be deduced from earthly existence by means of 
the “potentiality in the creature’s power” (an interpretation he viewed as a 
“grotesque distortion of his views”, given his emphasis on the fact that God is 
infinitely different, and thus principally incomprehensible, to creation), but rather 
as something which functions in “the domain of the supernatural”, and is received 
as “gift from above” (Przywara 1955:277; Przywara 1962c:133-4; Betz, 2011:67-8, 
75).  
For Przywara, the “gift” of the analogia entis is then indeed understood to be 
given through God’s revelation – initially in creation (Przywara, in accordance with 
classical Catholic theology, believed that creation, even after the fall, remained a 
divine manifestation of God’s goodness, although humanity continually fails to see 
this truth, because of the blinding effect of sin (Betz 2011:72), and furthermore, 
all-importantly, through the incarnation of Jesus Christ, whose life, death and 
resurrection fully revealed, redeemed and fulfilled God’s deep-settled connection 
and affinity to ontic reality (an idea which is further developed by Von Balthasar, 
																																																								
25  The precise wording of the Fourth Lateran Council reads as follows: "Quia inter 
creatorem et creaturam non potest (tanta) similutudo natari, quin inter eos maior sit 
dissimilitudo notanda" (White 2011:5).     
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and also emphasized by Hart, as will be seen in what follows) (2011:84; White 
2011:13). According to Przywara, the truth of the analogia entis is thus always 
tied up with the faith-confessions that God spoke the world into existence ex nihilo 
(and that its being is therefore utterly dependent upon the “gracious and free act” 
of God (Oakes 2011:156)) and sent his son, as God-incarnated, to abolish the 
powers of death, make void the lie of totality, and liberate creation to see and 
know finite existence’s wondrous continuity with the infinite being of the divine (as 
expressed in “the miracle of the analogia entis”)26 (Betz 2011:80). 
Przywara thus says:  
The final mystery (of the analogia entis) is (made visible by) God alone, 
in reverent looking to him who is beyond all creation. 
(Przywara 1962c:443 quoted and translated in Betz 2011:81) 
Even though it is thus clear that Przywara explicitly framed his conception of the 
analogia entis with the assertion that revelation (received in faith) is the only 
manner of truly coming to understand the truth of the relationship between God 
and creation, Protestant theologian, Karl Barth nonetheless believed that his 
proposals were heretical and false, and should therefore be rejected and opposed 
– especially amidst the realities brought about by the wars. When investigating 
the analogia entis’s reemergence in 20th century theological discourse (mainly as 
a result of Przywara’s scholarship) it is hence also of immense importance to 
consider and evaluate Barth’s substantial critique of Przywara’s thought (which, 
as said in the beginning of this chapter, can still be deemed to be the most severe 
critique that has been raised against the analogy of being).  
																																																								
26	Which	 results	 in	 the	analogia	entis	 not	only	dealing	with	ontology,	 but	 also	with	
epistemology,	 seeing	 as	 it	 does	 not	 merely	 state	 how	 things	 really	 are,	 but	 also	
pronounces	the	way	in	which	humanity	sees	and	understands	the	way	everything	is:	
by	means	of	faith	(see	e.g.	Przywara’s	description	of	the	close	connection	of	ontology	
and	epistemology	in	Przywara	1990:128).  
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4.5  A Different Take on the War: Karl Barth’s Break from Liberal 
Protestantism  
Contrary to Przywara’s conviction that the Christian community did not do enough 
before, amidst and after the First World War (because of the assumed dualistic 
conception that the divine and worldly realities are mutually exclusive), Karl Barth, 
arguably the most important and influential Reformed theologian of the 20th 
century (Oakes 1994:45), was of opinion that Christianity (and especially the 
Protestant tradition to which he belonged), had actually done too much in the face 
of the tragedies that occurred, given the fact that many clergy members and 
theologians openly and actively endorsed the wars on the basis of theological 
grounds (Johnson 2010:15). This, according to Barth, was regretfully made 
possible by the fashionable belief (propagated, in particular, by Liberal 
Protestantism), that subjective experience is one of the cornerstones of 
theological reflection, and that the presence of a “religious war” sentiment among 
many (authoritative) German Christians, could thus be seen to be sufficient 
reason to endorse the political powers of the day’s war-hungry cause (2010:16).  
For Barth, though, the fact that subjective experience could be used to validate an 
atrocity such as the war (which, according to his thought, stood in clear opposition 
to the will of God), made its validity completely void, and also showed any 
theology that promulgated its worth, “false to the core” (Johnson 2010:16). In a 
sermon he delivers only one month after the outbreak of the war, he indeed 
ardently pronounces that anyone calling upon the experience of God to justify its 
own side in the war, is indubitably engaging in an act “completely alien to the 
innermost being of God”, given that, as he had come to realize, “the innermost 
being of God” can truly be deemed to be “completely alien to humankind” (Barth 
1974:465 quoted and translated in Johnson 2010:16).  
This insight, that the “being of God” should be regarded as “alien” and 
unknowable to human understanding (which clearly stands in opposition to what 
Przywara, following Thomas, proposes), would then indeed mark the theological 
trajectory Barth would travel on for most of his lifetime, as will be seen in what 
follows (Johnson 2010:16).  
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4.6 God as Wholly Other 
After his break from liberal theology, Barth, in rereading the Bible and certain 
“primary sources” of the Christian faith, became increasingly convinced that his 
objection to the use of experience in theological enquiry, was indeed correct, and 
that God, according to Scripture and the “old orthodoxy of Luther and the 
Reformed tradition”, could only ever be understood to be the wholly other, whose 
revelation breaks forth into human existence “from above” (see, e.g. his lecture 
“The Righteousness of God”, delivered near the end of the war; Barth 1978:9-27;  
Johnson 2010:17-20). This conviction, it could be held, came to full expression in 
the theology found in his provocative commentary on the book of Romans – a 
work, according to Robert Jenson, which “represents in theology the end of 
historical religion” (Jenson 1969:51).  
In the Epistle to the Romans, Barth indeed proclaims that, according to Paul’s 
thought, God ought to be understood as “the pure and absolute boundary and 
beginning of all that we are to have and do” who is thus “distinguished 
qualitatively from men and from everything human, and (can) never be identified 
with anything which we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship as God” 
(Barth 1933:330). The reality of God, for Barth, is then solely encountered when 
his revelation, through the person of Christ, breaks forth into human existence as 
“a pure, absolute, vertical miracle”27 (1933:60), and even then, human history and 
God’s truth is seen to remain “separated absolutely” from one another (1933:77). 
According to Barth’s understanding of Romans, God’s manifestation through 
Christ does thus not lead to a “merging or fusion” between the creaturely and the 
divine realities, but precisely illuminates the fact that they are in stark opposition 
to one another at every given moment (1933:108).  
As Johnson says:  
(For Barth) the place where God is revealed to the world is the place 
where the world in and of itself – that which Barth had named ‘so-called 
																																																								
27 Which could be seen as the Urgestalt of the interaction between God and creation that 
will be described as the Analogia Fidei (as will be seen later in this chapter) (McCormack 
2011:92). 
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history’ – is negated ... there is (thus) no connection between God and 
humanity apart from God’s revelation in Jesus Christ ... (and) even 
Jesus himself is seen not in terms of material and concrete events of 
human life ...  
(Johnson 2010:29) 
4.7 Barth’s Interactions with Przywara at Göttingen and Münster 
After the publication of the first, as well as the second revised edition of the 
Epistle to the Romans, Barth, albeit not in possession of a Doctorate, was offered 
an academic appointment as honorary professor in Reformed theology at the 
University of Göttingen – which he gladly accepted, as he was convinced that 
“(his) place was among the theological students of Germany”, given the muddle 
Protestant Theology was in (Barth & Bultmann 1981:156).  
It was during his time at Göttingen that Barth first encountered Przywara’s 
theology, and the notion of the analogia entis, when his friend and mentor, Eduard 
Thurneysen, urged him to acquaint himself with the young Jesuit theologian’s 
work (Johnson 2010:48). Although Barth, in reading Przywara’s propositions, was 
highly impressed by his theological skill and knowledge, he was nonetheless of 
opinion that his own understanding of God, as the wholly other, who is only 
encountered in faith, stood superior to Przywara proposals (Johnson 2010:50).  
In his first university lecture series on dogmatics (later published as the Göttingen 
Dogmatics) Barth thus (arguably) confirms the gist of what he had said in his 
Epistle to the Romans, albeit in a more refined manner (Johnson 2010:59), by 
asserting that there is a fundamental diastasis between God and creature; that 
God consequently only enters human reality when his “Logos” manifests from 
above (in “revelation, scripture and preaching”28) (Barth 1991:14); and that any 
human words about the divine, therefore exclusively refer to an “original speaking 
by God” from beyond29 (1991:12).  
																																																								
28 As “Three-fold Word of God” (Barth 1991:14). 
29 A notion précised in the post-Reformation expression: “Deus dixit” – “God speaks” 
(Johnson 2010:59). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 54
Shortly after this lecture-series, where he blatantly avowed his allegiance to 
classical Reformed theology, Barth, however, decided to move from Göttingen to 
the University of Münster (which was a predominately Roman Catholic institution) 
– presumably to learn of, and engage with Catholic theology on a deeper level 
than before (Johnson 2010:84). That Przywara, and the analogia entis in 
particular, was on his mind when he made this decision is quite clear, as he 
started working on a second cycle of dogmatics on his arrival at his new 
workplace, wherein he surprisingly attempted to incorporate a version of the 
analogy of being into his understanding of God’s relationship with creation 
2010:85). Amy Marga notes, though, that he was clearly quite anxious about this 
new consideration, as he added an exclamation mark in the margin next to every 
occurrence of the term analogia entis, in the handwritten manuscript of this work 
(which, to this day, remains unpublished) (Marga 2006:161).  
Amidst his evident uncertainty regarding the use of the analogy of being, Barth 
decided to invite Przywara to visit the seminar he was teaching on Thomas 
Aquinas, so that he, together with his students, could direct questions and 
reservations regarding the analogia entis to him in person (Johnson 2010:87). 
Przywara, who was very keen to engage other theologians with his propositions, 
accepted the invitation, and on the appointed dates, came and gave a 
comprehensive lecture on the way in which he interpreted Thomas, and 
consequently understood the analogia entis to function (2010:88).  
Directly after Przywara’s visit, Barth wrote to Thurneysen, the very person who 
first introduced him to his thought, that the lecture Przywara delivered was a 
masterpiece and that he “shone” while answering his and his students’ questions 
(Barth & Thurneysen 1974:652; Johnson 2010:91).  
He also then described Przywara’s visit to his household, as follows: 
... he overwhelmed me ... just as, according to his doctrine, the dear 
God overwhelms people with grace (at least within the Catholic 
Church) so that the formula ‘God in-above the human from God’s side’ 
is, at one and the same time, the shorthand of his existence as well as 
the dissolution of all Protestant and modernist, transcendental and 
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immanent stupidity and reason and tension in the peace of the 
analogia entis ... 
(Barth & Thurneysen 1974:652 quoted and translated in Johnson 
2010:92) 
This excitement over Przywara’s lecture, and the prospects of utilizing the 
analogy of being in his own theology (as he had already gradually started to do) 
was, however, very short-lived, as Barth, after further study of his work, and an 
apparent reconsideration of what was presented at his Thomas Aquinas seminar, 
soon changed his mind on Przywara’s suggestions, as will be seen in what 
follows.  
4.8 Barth’s Rejection of the Analogia entis  
Only a few weeks after Przywara’s visit to Münster, Barth delivered a four part 
lecture series at the Hochschulinstitut in Dortmund entitled Fate and Idea in 
Theology, wherein he, surprisingly (given his prior disposition towards Przywara’s 
proposals), overtly objected to the use of the analogia entis. It is thus clear that 
Barth rethought and reevaluated the notion of a similarity-amidst-dissimilarity 
between the being of God and the being of creation after the dust of Przywara’s 
visit settled, and eventually came to the conclusion that the belief that God is 
completely alien to human existence, and is only met in and through Christ, 
should indeed be upheld (Johnson 2010:94).  
In the lectures, Barth is thus seen to fervently protest the proposal that earthly 
reality stands in an intrinsic relationship to the divine, simply by virtue of the fact 
that it is. In proclaiming God’s association with creation (by means of being), the 
analogia entis, according to Barth, indeed leads to the treacherous illusion that 
the unknowable, wholly other God, can somehow “be inferred from the given” 
(namely human existence), without any mention of the revelatory act of the 
incarnation (Barth 1986:33, 38) – which makes its propositions, in the same 
manner as was the case with liberal Protestantism, false to the very core 
(Johnson 2010:96, 99, 101, 162). 
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Barth then goes on to argue that God and the world, in their very existences, 
should indeed be understood to be completely distinct from each other, with the 
only point of interaction between them being the person of Jesus Christ, wherein 
the Logos of God is communicated, from beyond. For Barth, the Christ-event, 
other than for Przywara, does thus not reveal, fulfill or redeem a supposed truth of 
a similarity-amidst-dissimilarity between the creaturely and the divine, but is 
indeed the first and lone instance of association between two utterly distinct 
realities (Johnson 2010:100): 
God’s Word (namely Jesus Christ) is something new to them. It comes 
to them as light into darkness. If they hear something that they 
basically already know, then they certainly hear something other than 
the Word of God. 
(Barth 1986:39) 
In the end of the Fate and Idea in Theology lectures, Barth asserts that theology 
should thus incessantly respect the infinite dissimilarity between God and 
creation, and “refrain from all reaching – however ingeniously, piously or covertly 
– for a grand synthesis of opposites” (Barth 1986:54).  
The analogia entis, which supposedly indeed tries to bridge the polarity between 
infinite and finite existence, is therefore, for Barth, nothing but an “illusion”, far 
removed from the actual truth that creation only meets God through Christ (Barth 
1986:54). 
Barth thus says: 
(The God of the analogia entis is) no wholly other at all, but simply the 
last in a long line of human works ... For precisely when we want to find 
God in it, believing we have spoken our ultimate word, we remain alone 
with ourselves, shut up in our prison of distance, alienation and hostility 
towards God ... To speak a human word at the very point where 
everything depends on God’s Word being spoken is fatal self-assertion. 
Theology must therefore resist the impulse to devise a grand synthesis 
of opposites. 
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(Barth 1986:56) 
After the Fate and Idea in Theology lecture series, Barth, continuing to think of the 
analogia entis (and his now public refutation thereof), spent a considerable time 
rereading Luther – whose dogmatic expositions further confirmed to him that 
Przywara’s thought is indeed wrong, and therefore needed to be opposed 
persistently (McCormack 1995:389). When, at the end of his designated reading 
period, he was asked to lecture on the theme of The Holy Spirit and the Christian 
Life at Elberfeld as part of a “theological week”, it was thus, to his mind, the 
perfect opportunity to employ what he had learned from Luther, to further disprove 
and dismiss Przywara’s proposals (Johnson 2010:109-10). 
In the address at Elberfeld, Barth’s main critique of the analogia entis, which 
follows on what he had said in his Fate and Idea in Theology lectures, is then 
seen to center on Przywara’s assumingly flawed understanding of the sinful state 
of creation (Johnson 2010:111). Barth, enthused by Luther’s theology, indeed 
charges Przywara (and his analogia entis) of relying on the suspect Augustinian 
notion that sin does not undo creation’s relationship with the divine, but only 
temporarily distorts and clouds “the (otherwise) undisturbed continuity of man with 
God” (Barth 1993:23). For Barth, Augustine’s understanding, that sin is “a disease 
to be cured” (through the redemption of Jesus Christ), rather “a sign of spiritual 
death ... which fundamentally separates the human from God” completely 
misunderstands Scripture’s account of the Fall, and leads to an utterly distorted 
view of creation’s relationship to God (as illustrated in the falsehood of the 
analogia entis).  
Contrary to Augustine’s (and subsequently Przywara’s) assessment of creation, 
Barth, in accordance with classic Protestant theology, then fervently declares that 
the reality of sin, far from being something that brings about a mere disturbance 
between the creaturely and the divine, in actual fact ensures an “irreconcilable 
contradiction” between God and the very existence of creation – a contradiction 
which remains extant even after the redemptive act of Christ (Johnson 2010:115).  
For Barth, the task of the Holy Spirit is then not to cooperate with human action, 
or to help illuminate, restore or redeem some primordial connection between the 
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being of God and the being of ontic reality (given that any inherent connection is 
permanently abolished due to the reality of the Fall), but rather to establish a 
barrier between the revelation of Christ, and the ever-enduring sinful nature of 
creation, so that humanity, who, even in the aftermath of Christ’s redemptive act 
continues to act in opposition to God, can wondrously be “made fit by God for 
God”, through the hearing of his Word (Johnson 2010:117).  
In this lecture, Barth is thus once again seen to be very adamant on the fact that 
the analogia entis’s proposition that God and creation’s beings stand in an 
intrinsic continuity-amidst-discontinuity with each other (even after the occurrence 
of the Fall), and that the revelation of Christ reveals and redeems this everlasting 
truth, is completely false. For him, indeed, creation, as a result of its sinful state, 
has always, and will always, by the very fact that it is, exists distinct from God, as 
wholly other, and can therefore only encounter the divine through the act of God’s 
revelation in Christ (for which it is prepared, through the work of the Holy Spirit) 
(Johnson 2010:117). 
4.9 The Analogia Entis as the Invention of the Anti-Christ  
Given the fact that Barth, after brief flirtations with Roman Catholic theology and 
an idea such as Przywara’s analogy of being, was manifestly starting to reach 
certain conclusions regarding his dogmatic positions (as seen in lectures such as, 
amongst others, Fate and Idea in Theology and The Holy Spirit and the Christian 
Life), the time was arguably ripe to “begin at the beginning” and compose a 
comprehensive, multi-volume dogmatic-collection, wherein he would have the 
opportunity to lay out his understandings of the Christian faith’s inner working in a 
systematic manner (Barth 1975:xi).  
Barth thus commenced with the writing of his magnum opus, the Church 
Dogmatics – a work wherein he, as could be expected, planned to make 
substantial utterances on Przywara, the analogia entis, and the Protestant 
position on the relationship between the creaturely and the divine. As he was 
putting the first volume together, however, he clearly came to the realization that 
the time had passed for polite disagreement in terms of something that was so 
fundamental to the Christian faith (and its understanding of God and creation), 
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and that a radical and bold statement regarding the use of the analogia entis 
needed to be made (Johnson 2010:153).  
This verdict, Johnson argues, was partly reached as a result of Barth’s concern, 
given the tumultuous and uncertain political situation in Germany (which would 
eventually develop into the Nazi takeover of the German government as well as 
the Second World War), that the analogy of being, which he now was convinced 
could only ever function “from below to above” (and could thus be understood to 
be natural theology in its purest form), would be used, in the same manner as was 
the case with the propositions of Liberal Protestantism in the First World War, to 
link what was happening in the world, with thoughts regarding God, in order to 
justify political activity with reference to the divine30 (Johnson 2010:153).  
When the time thus came to write the preface to the first volume of his Church 
Dogmatics, Barth seized the opportunity and made a momentous statement 
regarding Przywara’s proposals, which, in no uncertain terms, elucidated his 
position regarding the analogia entis once and for all (Johnson 2010:153): 
The Word or existence? ... I hope that now, at least at it concerns my 
own intention, the answer is clear ... I can see no third possibility 
between the tolerance of the analogia entis which is legitimate only on 
the grounds of Roman Catholicism – that is, between the greatness 
and misery of a so called natural knowledge of God ... and a Protestant 
theology which draws on its own sources, stands on its own feet, and is 
finally liberated from this secular misery; for all these reasons I can only 
say ‘No’ here. I regard the analogia entis as the invention of the anti-
Christ, and I think that because of it, one cannot become Roman 
Catholic. Whereas, at the same time, I do not approve of any of the 
other reasons that one can have for not becoming a Catholic, as they 
																																																								
30 McCormack notes that Barth clearly expressed these fears in a lecture he delivered on 
July 1930, titled Die Theology und der heutige Mensch: “Barth was very concerned at the 
time of this address with a situation which he say to be developing in the Evangelical 
churches in Germany. Everywhere, he noted, there were people in the church who ... 
were ‘rediscovering their Catholic hearts’. By this, Barth meant that from every corner and 
in every possible way, the cry for natural theology was being heard with increasing 
intensity. This development represented, to his mind, the ‘most dangerous possibility in a 
most dangerous moment’“ (McCormack 1995:416).  
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are short sighted and trivial. 
(Barth 1975:xiii) 
In this infamous piece of writing, Barth is thus seen to admit that the analogia 
entis is completely irreconcilable with his theology, seeing as God, according to 
the “sources” of Protestantism (to which he, to his mind, fully aligns himself), could 
never be brought into relation with what is seen and experienced in earthly reality. 
For Barth, therefore, the suggestion of a similarity-amidst-dissimilarity between 
the being of creation and the being of the divine is nothing other than the ultimate 
heresy, functioning as a “tool of the devil” (Johnson 2010:156). 
4.10 An Eventual Turn to Analogy 
After the aforementioned declaration, wherein a conclusive verdict concerning the 
use of analogy (in terms of the relationship of God and creation) is seemingly 
reached, Barth continued to emphasize, in accordance herewith, the fact that 
God, other than what the analogia entis suggests, is indeed the wholly other, who 
is completely distinct from creaturely reality and only ever encountered and known 
in the person of Jesus Christ – something which does not occur through creation 
(as if there was a continuity between the earthly and the divine), but rather “in 
spite” of that which everlastingly “contradicts him” (Barth 1975:166,168; Johnson 
2010:161,167; Betz 2011:37).  
As his arguments in the Church Dogmatics develop, it is interestingly and 
surprisingly seen, though, that Barth eventually does call upon the notion of 
analogy when he attempt to explicate how exactly the interaction of God and 
creation, through the revelation of the Word, occurs31. Contrary to Przywara’s 
suggestion, Barth’s use of analogy, however, does not refer to the category of 
being (given that he still fervently believes that God’s being is unknowable to 
human reality 32 ), but is rather seen to denote a temporary correspondence 
																																																								
31 Barth would later note that he, in writing on the interaction between God and creation, 
came to realize that “the concept of analogy is in fact unavoidable” (quoted in Von 
Balthasar 1992:109). 
32 And that theology should indeed never attempt to engage issues of ontology (see e.g. 
what is said in Barth 1975:36). 
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(amidst an infinite dissimilarity) between God’s act of revelation (through his 
Word, Jesus Christ), and creation’s acceptance of this revelation (in the faith 
given to them by God)33. Barth describes this instance of analogy, which would 
come to be termed the analogia fidei, as follows: 
Hearing of the Word of God could not take place if there were not 
something common to the speaking God and the hearing person, an 
analogy, a similarity in and what this event for all the dissimilarity 
implied by the difference between God and humanity – if we may now 
adopt this term – a ‘point of contact’ between God and humanity ... This 
point of contact is (however) not real outside faith; it is real only in faith. 
In faith man is created by the Word of God for the Word of God, 
existing in the Word of God and not in himself, not in virtue of his 
humanity and personality, not even on the basis of creation ... Hence 
one can only speak of this point of contact theologically and not both 
theologically and also philosophically, as of all else that is real in faith. 
(Barth 1975:238-9)  
In the end, against what would be expected, Barth is thus indeed seen to employ 
analogical thinking in his understanding of the relationship between God and 
creation – but only when speaking of the moment when Christ, as the Word of 
God, is revealed to humanity (and this revelation is received in faith) 34 . His 
judgment on the analogy of being’s proposal of a similarity-amidst-difference 
between the being of God and the being of creation has thus (seemingly) not 
changed, as he still fundamentally believes that despite a “point of contact” in 
																																																								
33 Making his theology a “theology of happening” rather than “a theology of being” (Dalzell 
2000:83). 
34 Barth would also later on in his Church Dogmatics (CD III/1-2) briefly speak of an 
analogia relationis between God and creation, which, in the same manner as the analogia 
fidei, is intrinsically reliant on God's revelation in Christ.  The logic of the analogia 
relationis works as follows:  "(T)he relation between God and the human Jesus 
corresponds to the relation between the eternal Father and the eternal Son; the relation 
between the human Jesus and humanity in general corresponds to the relation between 
the human Jesus and God; the relation between humans to other humans correspond to 
the relationship between the human Jesus and humanity; and thus, the relation between 
humans to other humans correspond to the relations within the Trinity.  This 
correspondence in relationship, with (the revealed) Jesus Christ as center, is (then) how 
a human exists in analogy to God" (Johnson 2010:197-8)     
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revelation, creaturely existence, in its sinful state, remains irreconcilable with the 
splendor and majesty of God’s infinite being (Johnson 2010:169-70).  
Barth would then, notwithstanding the obvious controversy it caused, never fully 
withdraw his proclamation that Przywara’s proposal of an analogical 
correspondence between creaturely reality and the divine is the “invention of the 
anti-Christ” (Johnson 2010:189, 191-2), and until the end of his life, speak of the 
analogia entis as an “idol”, denoting a false and heretical understanding of God’s 
relationship to creation (see Barth 1995:88-9). 
This harsh confutation of the analogia entis by Barth was very hard on Przywara, 
who indeed later commented that he was utterly dismayed that a theological 
proposition which he had hoped would become the “point of departure of fruitful 
discussion”, was turned into a “point of ... great conflict” instead (Przywara 
1955:177 quoted and translated in Shenk 2011:172).  
Przywara truly believed that his account of the analogia entis was not, as Barth 
held, an attempt to draw idolatrous line between the earthly with the divine (which 
would indeed have made it an “invention of the anti-Christ”), but rather, as 
explicated, a humble assertion, in accordance with classic Thomistic thought, that 
amidst the infinite dissimilarity between the creaturely and the divine (brought 
about by the fact that God and creation exist differently, due to their varying 
proportions of esse and essentia), there also subsists a wondrous continuity 
between the being of God and the being of creation (since both, in fact, are, and 
God, as creator, can be seen to be the primordial instance of being from which 
everything stems) – a truth, according to Przywara, which, contrary to what Barth 
stated, only ever comes to light by means of revelation (through creation, as well 
as, definitively, through the incarnation of Christ). 
Przywara was thus convinced that Barth grossly misunderstood (and 
misrepresented) what he was trying to express through his proposal of the 
analogia entis, and that the dismissive criticism that was levied against his 
theology was therefore indeed groundless.  
One of the most prominent theologians to share Przywara’s sentiments, was then 
none other than Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
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4.11 From One Swiss to Another 
Even though Hans Urs von Balthasar held Barth in very high regard, and 
especially appreciated his fellow Swiss’s Christocentrism and emphasis on the 
importance of revelation (which would indeed be seen to be important themes in 
Von Balthasar’s own theology, partly due to his interaction with Barth) (Oakes 
1994:50; White 2011:18), he nonetheless was of opinion that Barth’s assessment 
of Przywara’s theology was erroneous and unfair, and that it indeed could be said 
that “nothing whatever can be found of that ogre Barth has made (the) analogy of 
being (to be)” (Von Balthasar 1992:50).  
In his book, The Theology of Karl Barth (Karl Barth: Darstelling und Deutung 
seiner Theologie) 35 , Von Balthasar is thus seen to argue that Barth’s major 
accusation against the analogy of being – that it does not honor God’s 
transcendence and idolatrously attempts to equate the things of the world with the 
unknowable existence of God – is in actual fact applicable to his own dialectical 
method (wherein it is held that creation, in its “fallenness”, stands in absolute  
contradiction to the truth of the divine36). For Von Balthasar, it could indeed be 
contended that a theology that only speaks of God’s distinctiveness from creation 
(yet also wants to avoid an Epicurean understanding of God, by nevertheless 
referring to some point of contact between the creaturely and the divine), ironically 
capsizes transcendence into immanence, seeing as creation, in such an 
understanding, could only ever be overwhelmed, submerged and made one with 
God, in the eventual moment of encounter (McCormack 2011:108-9; Oakes 
1994:58-59). 
Von Balthasar thus writes: 
God is identified (in all his aseity!) with his revelation. Then the creature 
is defined as the pure opposite to God and thus is identified with 
nothingness. And finally, when the creature is retrieved by God through 
revelation ... (which is an absolute and divine movement), creation is 
																																																								
35 A book that Barth (interestingly enough) considered to be the best book ever written 
about his work (White 2011:xi) 
36 As found in his commentary on the book of Romans, and the works that follows its 
trajectory. 
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then equated with God himself ... The irony is that at every place where 
Barth wants to do pure theology, where human thought has no more 
room for maneuver unless it be ... ‘superseded’, here we encounter the 
unexpected (but also unavoidable!) irruption of a very unbiblical 
philosophical pantheism (or more precisely, theopanism)37.  
(Von Balthasar 1992:84)  
Contrary to Barth’s dialectical theology, which, in a seeming attempt to safeguard 
God’s transcendence, utters “... Not I! Rather God!”, yet precisely herein directs all 
eyes on creation instead (Von Balthasar 1992:84), the analogy of being, 
according to Von Balthasar, can truly be seen to protect the dissimilarity between 
the creaturely and the divine (as Przywara continuously held) (Hanby 2011:341; 
Von Balthasar 1992:50). This is because its suggestion of a similarity-amidst-
difference between the being of God and the being of creation indeed preserve 
creation’s integrity (as something with a different existence than God), even in the 
moment of its interaction and similarity with the divine (Dalzell 2000:61; Hanby 
2011:365; Oakes 1994:113; see also Von Balthasar 1989:404) – a point which will 
be seen to be of immense importance in David Bentley Hart’s theology.  
Von Balthasar then holds that when Barth eventually realizes that the interaction 
of God with creation, through his Word, inevitably needs to be described in terms 
of some sort of analogy (a realization Von Balthasar describes as a "conversion" 
Barth undergoes (Von Balthasar 1992:93)), his suggestions of an analogy of faith 
(and an analogy of relationship) between God and creation do not stand opposed 
to what Przywara advocates in his theology (as Barth believed it did), but in actual 
fact necessarily presupposes and fulfills the wonder of the analogia entis 
(Johnson 2010:197; McCormack 2011:116).  
																																																								
37 Von Balthasar explains: “Technically, pantheism says the universe, all that is, is God; 
whereas theopanism says that God is everything ... In a sense they both mean the same 
thing, since both versions assert that God (is equal) to nature” (Von Balthasar 1992:94).  
In this critique, Von Balthasar clearly echoes what Przywara has also said regarding 
Barth's (early) work, as e.g. seen in this passage: “(in Barth’s theology) transcendence 
and immanence are no longer bound together in a ‘tension of opposites’ but have been 
made identical. In that the hidden, incomprehensible God, the Deus absconditus as 
Luther liked to say, is not merely ‘all in all’, but rather everything alone’ (Przywara 
1923:348, quoted and translated in McCormack 2011:95). 
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Von Balthasar is thus seen to argue:  
However much ... creation may be dependent ... on God’s revelation in 
Christ, it is just as true that we can glimpse in this revelation a 
presupposition lying at its foundations that makes revelation possible in 
the first place. 
(Von Balthasar 1992:112)  
The "miracle of the incarnation" of Christ, according to Von Balthasar, indeed 
reveals an original ontological "continuity" between God and creation – a 
continuity which, in fact, "no contradiction (brought about by the Fall) ... can break 
in upon" (Von Balthasar 1992:114; Johnson 2010:197 McCormack 2011:115). 
For, he writes, "if revelation is centered in Jesus Christ there must by definition be 
a periphery to this center ... ", namely creaturely existence (1992:163; 2010:197)    
McCormack writes: 
(A)ccording to Von Balthasar, the incarnation does not establish for the 
first time a 'compatibility' that did not exist prior to it.  On the contrary, 
the incarnation requires the existence of this basic 'compatibility' if God 
and the human are to be united in the one divine-human person.  As he 
puts it 'we can glimpse' in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ 'a 
presupposition lying at its foundations that makes revelation possible in 
the first place'38.  What is presupposed is the 'compatibility' of the divine 
and the human as established in the creation.  'The order or the 
Incarnation presupposes the order of creation'39. Thus the two natures 
cannot exclude each other. They cannot be so related as they 
'correspond to Yes and No, thesis and antithesis, statement and 
contradiction. Otherwise his humanity would not be authentic, and 
sinful humanity would not be redeemed though his Incarnation'. 
(McCormack 2011:115-6) 
																																																								
38 See Von Balthasar (1992:108) 
39 See Von Balthasar (1992:163) 
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For Von Balthasar, the revelation of Christ, received in faith, can indeed thus be 
seen to reveal (and fulfill) a deep-settled, primordial continuity (amidst 
discontinuity) between the very existence of creation and the infinite being of the 
divine (as expressed by the analogia entis) – exactly what Przywara had in fact 
been proposing in his theology all along (as described previously in this chapter). 
Przywara’s analogia entis, for Von Balthasar, is therefore not only compatible with 
Barth’s mature theology, but is in actual fact (unknowingly) presupposed by what 
Barth suggests in his work.  
The analogy of being, according to Von Balthasar’s thought, should thus not be 
seen as “the invention of the anti-Christ”, but rather as a fundamental truth 
regarding the relationship between God and creation. For in and through its 
suggestion of a continuity-amidst-discontinuity between God and creation, it 
rightfully holds that God is truly distinct from creation (seeing as creation, even in 
the moment of interaction and similarity with the divine, is indeed, in the words of 
Von Balthasar, “something and not nothing” (1992:94), with its own instance of 
being), yet also in wondrous continuity with creation’s existence – a similarity that 
enables revelation in and through the creaturely to take place (as definitively seen 
in the incarnation of Christ).  
It is then especially this affirmation of a similarity (amidst dissimilarity) between 
the being of God and the being of creation, that can be seen to be of essential 
importance in Von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics. 
4.12 Von Balthasar’s Return to the Whole 
When reading the magisterial Herrlichkeit (The Glory of the Lord), it indeed 
becomes evident that the analogy of being acts as foundation for Hans Urs von 
Balthasar’s theological aesthetics (wherein he, as mentioned in the second 
chapter of this study, endeavors to reinstate beauty as one of the primary 
principles of the Christian faith), given the fact that its unique proposition of an 
ontological continuity (amidst discontinuity) between the being of God and the 
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being of creation (first and foremost by means of the analogy of proportionality40), 
brilliantly enables and illuminates the truth that beauty, as one of Plato’s 
“supracategorical” transcendentals (which underlies all instances of being) acts as 
“vehicle” through which the glory (doxa) of God is manifested within creaturely 
reality41 (Nichols 2011:7,42).  
Imperative to Von Balthasar’s understanding and utilization of the truth of the 
analogy of being (especially in terms of theological aesthetics), which can be seen 
as a further development of Przywara’s original propositions, is then the assertion 
that the continuity between the glory of God and the beauty of creation (which, 
according to the rules of the analogy of proportionality, always functions within an 
ever-greater dissimilarity), does not come to expression in abstract manner, or as 
subjective sentimentality (in the eye of the beholder), but rather in and through 
objective, historical form (Gestalt) in the world (De Gruchy 2008:109; Oakes 
1994:148)42.  
Von Balthasar thus says: 
The beautiful (as earthly expression of God’s glory) is above all a form, 
and the light does not fall on this form from above or and from inside, 
rather it breaks forth from the form’s interior. Visible form not only 
‘points’ to the invisible, unfathomable mystery; form is the apparition of 
this mystery, and reveals it while, naturally (according to the rules of 
analogy), at the same time protecting and veiling it. (Forms) have an 
exterior manifestum which appears and an interior depth radiating (with 
the glory of the Lord) through the external aspect, neither of which, 
however, are separable in the form itself. The content (of God’s 
revelation) does not lie behind the form but within it. 
																																																								
40 Von Balthasar, in accordance with Erich Przywara, indeed believed that the analogy of 
proportionality, consisting of the comparison of two differing proportions of esse and 
essentia within creation and God’s being, serves as the foundation of the analogia entis 
(wherein the analogy of attribution functions) (Dalzell 2000:64; Nichols, 2011:62).  
41  Which makes Von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics “a theology of God’s self-
revelation in the light of the third transcendental” (Dalzell 2000:101).  
42  Which explains why beauty can indeed be held to be an objective reality with 
ontological priority as stated in the second chapter of this study. 
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(Von Balthasar 1983:151) 
Von Balthasar is very adamant however, on the fact that even though it could be 
said that the glory of God comes to manifestation in and through the (beautiful) 
forms of this world, and creaturely reality, in its corporeal state, thus witnesses to, 
and participates in the splendor of the infinite, the truth of the relationship between 
the creaturely and the divine is not overtly apparent to humanity, (among other) as 
a result of the the reality of creation’s sinful state (as Przywara also emphasized) 
(Oakes 1994:157). According to Von Balthasar, sin, which for him comprises of a 
wicked anthropocentric disposition in which the world is regarded as a self-
sufficient, enclosed continuum (wherein humanity is its own god) (see Oakes 
1994:112-113)43, truly renders humanity unable to read the forms and “perceive 
the content” of the divine beauty that fills creation (Von Balthasar 1983:151; 
Nichols 2011:68). Instead of seeing the truth of the “whole” (that the creaturely 
and divine stand in harmony with each other, and that God’s glory beautifies the 
forms of the corporeal world (Dalzell 2010:59, 61), the reality of sin, Von Balthasar 
argues, causes humanity to falsely perceive the world as an autonomous realm, 
without any association with a supposed God – which, naturally, leads to 
disastrous consequences (Oakes 1994:157)44.  
It is then exactly because of the world’s sinful state (wherein humanity remains 
willfully blind to the truth of God’s continuity and affinity with his beloved creation), 
that God, according to Von Balthasar, sends his Son to reveal, redeem and fulfill 
the fundamental truth encompassed in the analogy of being. Christ, as the 
ultimate union of divine and created being, and thus the “form of all forms” (Von 
Balthasar 1983:432), is indeed deemed by Von Balthasar to be the analogia entis 
																																																								
43  Von Balthasar indeed sees (original) sin as: “... a revolt against the creator, a 
disavowing of the nature in which man was placed and created ... Man does not want to 
be man but something else (as he imagines, something ‘higher’); as a ‘religious’ person, 
he gives, as it were, his ‘resignation letter’ to God ... Instead of accepting the primary fact 
of his creatureliness ... he tries, as it were, to leap over this basis and seek for a magical 
way to reach, on his own, the creator’s way of being – almost as if he were trying to eat 
some kind of philosophical or spiritual apple, endowed with that same charm that 
ensnared Adam and Eve” (Von Balthasar 1939:69-70 quoted and translated in Oakes 
1994:111).  In the following chapters it will be seen that Hart also holds this view.   
44 Von Balthasar writes that humanity, in rebelling against the truth that it stands in  
continuity-amidst-discontinuity with a reality different from its own, “attack only (itself)” 
(Von Balthasar 1983:449-50).  
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in person, through which the glory of the Lord is fully and definitively revealed in 
creaturely reality45 (O' Donnell 2001:126; Dalzell 2000:76). Although the world, by 
its sinful nature, rebels against this truth (which threatens the very foundation of 
earthly autonomy) and murders Jesus, his death on the cross46 and resurrection47 
precisely reveals him to be the “most sublime of beauties” (1983:33), who 
“embraces the ... abysmal ugliness of sin” (1983:124), offers redemptions to a 
world infected by human pretension and will to power (De Gruchy 2008:124), 
recapitulates everything in "heaven and on earth" (Balthasar 2004:292), and, 
through the light that shines forth from his figure, illuminates the glory of the Lord 
radiating throughout history (Oakes 1994:198). 
Von Balthasar then holds that it is only in the self-surrender to the light shining 
forth from the Christ-form, as the ultimate revelation of God’s beauty and 
splendor, that creation, by means of the faith it receives, is enabled to see the 
world as the “whole” it truly is (Dalzell 2000:32). Faith, acquired in saying “yes” to 
what is revealed in Jesus, is thus, according to Von Balthasar, a “gift of a new 
light” whereby the glory of the Lord becomes apparent in creaturely existence 
(Dalzell 2000:80).  
Von Balthasar’s conception of the analogy of being is thus thoroughly dependent 
on the revelation of Christ, as the analogia entis in person, given that it is only 
through him that the wondrous truth of a continuity-amidst-difference between the 
creaturely and the divine can truly be seen, understood, and also expressed 
through the lives of believers48. Von Balthasar’s use of the analogy of being could 
																																																								
45 Nichols writes that for Von Balthasar the incarnation is the “pouring of God’s glory” into 
the form of this world, in one of its primordial embodiments, namely humankind (Nichols 
1998:35). 
46 Which, according to Von Balthasar, would always have been the end-result of Christ’s 
“provocation” (that the glory of God is now fully revealed in worldly existence) (Oakes 
1994:188). 
47 Which, for Von Balthasar, serves as God’s validation that Christ was right in making the 
claims he had made, and that God’s glory has indeed been fully revealed in earthly reality 
(Oakes 1994:188). 
48 Nichols writes that for Von Balthasar “seeing” always goes hand in hand with the 
transformation of one’s life: “A theory of perception cannot be had in this context without 
a doctrine of conversion, and so ultimately of sanctification ... (Indeed), the lives of the 
saints are signs of the authenticity of divine revelation in Christ" (Nichols 2000:3). The 
transformation of a believer’s life as a result of seeing the glory of God, is then the theme 
of Von Balthasar’s Theo-dramatics. 
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thus be held to stand in continuity with what was proposed by Przywara in his 
mature theology (seeing as Przywara, as previously shown, also believed that it is 
only through faith coming from the revelation of Christ, that the analogy of being 
comes to its right), as well as with Karl Barth’s analogy of faith and analogia 
relationis (as instances of analogy which presupposes and points to the fact that 
God and creation are evermore “compatible” with each other).  
4.13 Returning to the Theology of David Bentley Hart   
With Von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics examined and discussed, the ground 
is prepared to once again return to David Bentley Hart, and his theological 
aesthetics, as put forward in The Beauty of the Infinite. In engaging with Hart’s 
work, it will become clear that Aristotle’s, Thomas’s, Przywara’s, Barth’s and Von 
Balthasar’s thought veritably had an immense influence on his theology, and that 
the content of the last two chapters thus offers much needed assistance in the 
comprehension and critical assessment of his propositions. 
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Chapter 5 – The Analogia Entis according to Hart 
5.1 A Brief Review  
At this point in the thesis, it is important to shortly summarize what has been said 
over the last couple of chapters, given the fact that the content of these chapters 
will, as mentioned, serve as a framework whereby Hart’s work will be explicated 
and evaluated. 
 
After the Research Problem and Research Question were introduced in the 
introductory chapter of this study, Chapter 2 set out to investigate the broad 
theme of theological aesthetics (which can be deemed to be the general 
designation under which David Bentley Hart conducts his theology in his 
monograph The Beauty of the Infinite). Herein it was held that Hart’s work forms 
part of a discussion initiated by Hans Urs von Balthasar (as Hart himself 
confesses; 2003:29), which centers on the belief that beauty, as one of Plato’s 
supracategorical transcendentals, which pleases the sight, invokes endless desire 
and comes to expression in the physical, objective forms in earthly reality, should 
not be negated, neglected and ignored in religious thought (as has arguably been 
the case throughout the centuries, due to the prevalence of themes such as 
iconoclasm, asceticism and futurism in the Judeo-Christian tradition), but in fact 
be seen to stand in continuity with the goodness, splendor and glory of the divine.  
 
It was subsequently held that although the concept of analogy, and the tradition of 
the analogy of being (which stands central to Von Balthasar’s thought), can be 
said to play an important role in the work of many contemporary voices in the field 
of theological aesthetics, none can be seen to be as adamant on the importance 
thereof, as David Bentley Hart.  This indeed then begs the question if this 
unyielding insistence on the use of the analogia entis can in fact be seen to be a 
responsible and beneficial manner of affirming an aesthetic continuity between 
God and Creation (as the Research Question of the study asks). 
 
In order to better understand and engage with Hart’s use of the analogy of being 
in his theological aesthetics, Chapter 3 investigated the classical (and formative) 
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conceptions of analogy and the analogia entis in the thought of Aristotle (in Greek 
antiquity) and Thomas Aquinas (in the Scholastic era). In this chapter, it was thus 
seen how Thomas utilized Aristotle’s concept of analogy (as a mean between 
univocity and equivocity), in order to describe a similarity-amidst-difference (first 
and foremost according to proper proportionality and derivatively according to 
attribution) between the being of God and the being of creation, given their 
differing, yet comparable proportions of esse and essentia, and the fact that 
creation’s act of being stems from, and is contingent on, God’s acts of creation 
and sustainment – a description that would then come to be called the analogia 
entis (the title Cardinal Cajetan bestowed upon Thomas’s propositions).  
 
Chapter 4, following what was said in Chapter 3, then showed how the principle of 
analogy and the analogia entis in particular was placed back on the agenda of the 
modern theological discourse by Erich Przywara, who believed that it could help 
war-ridden Europe to see that God is not only distinct from the world, but also 
actively present in it. It was further then emphasized that Przywara (especially as 
his thought matured) did not see the analogy of being as a form of natural 
theology, whereby God’s inner-being could be deduced by enquiring into 
creation’s nature (given that the similarities between the creaturely and the divine 
is always outweighed by the dissimilarities between them, and sin renders 
humanity blind to the truth of all that is), but rather as something functioning from 
“above to below”, which becomes evident in the faith-confessions that God 
created the world, and sent his Son to reveal, redeem and fulfill its relationship to 
him.  
 
After the description of Przywara’s theology, attention was given to Karl Barth’s 
critique of the analogy of being (which will again be discussed in what follows). It 
was thus seen that Barth, arguably the foremost Reformed theologian during the 
mid-twentieth century, had a different view on the reality of war-ridden Europe, 
which ultimately led him to the conviction that God, contrary to what Przywara 
suggests, should be seen exclusively as the wholly other, who is solely met in the 
revelation of his Logos, Jesus Christ – a belief which ultimately culminated in his 
infamous declaration that the analogy of being is nothing other than the invention 
of the anti-Christ. It was also then seen that Barth did eventually turn to analogy in 
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his mature theology – but only when speaking of the point of contact between the 
creaturely and divine which occurs when revelation is received by faith, and 
definitely not in regards to the being of creation and the being of God (as 
Przywara, following Thomas, had argued).  
 
In the last segment of this chapter on the use of the analogy of being in the 20th 
century, the focus shifted to Hans Urs von Balthasar. It was thus shown how Von 
Balthasar rebutted Barth’s critique on Przywara’s thought (by saying that it is only 
by analogy that God’s transcendence can actually be upheld, and that Barth’s 
analogia fidei and analogia relationis presupposes the analogy of being), 
whereafter Von Balthasar’s own use of the analogy of being in his theological 
aesthetics was explicated. 
5.2  Dionysus Against the Crucified: Nietzsche and his Postmodernist 
Disciples  
With the itinerary travelled thus far in mind, the focus of the thesis now shifts to  
an investigation of Hart’s theological aesthetics in his The Beauty of the Infinite. 
When reading his monograph, it is however seen that Hart does not immediately 
set out to affirm or explicate his proposition of an aesthetic continuity between the 
splendor of God and the beauty of creation, but firstly focuses on the objection 
that the Nietzschean strand in postmodern philosophical thought raises to such a 
suggestion (Hart 2003:33,43).  
 
Hart is thus seen to argue that the tendency within Christianity (and Western 
Metaphysics in general) to construe reality in dualistic terms (which ultimately 
results in corporeal reality, and the beauty it encompasses, to be villainized and 
negated, as Von Balthasar, Farley, and most other voices in theological 
aesthetics argue – as was seen in Chapter 2), has indeed prompted many 
thinkers, unwilling to denounce their creaturely status, to turn their backs on the 
supposed transcendent realm (held to stand over against corporeal being), and 
fervently affirm ontic existence to be the be all and end all of reality49 (see Hart 
																																																								
49 Instead of thus negating creaturely existence (as is asked of them), a choice is rather 
made to negate the transcendent realm (see e.g. Hart 2003:136). 
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2003:10, 92). This position, which has veritably become the status quo in 
postmodern thought, can, according to Hart, then indeed be seen to have its 
foundation in the “antimetaphysical” philosophy of none other than Friedrich 
Nietzsche – the "most prescient philosopher of Nihilism (as he writes in his book 
Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies; 
2009:106). 
   
According to Hart, Nietzsche’s denunciation of Christianity, which can indubitably 
be regarded as a “virtuoso performance” and “a rhetorical tour de force” (Hart 
2003:94), predominately centers on his utter distaste for the Christian life as 
aesthetic phenomenon, as already alluded to in the introductory chapter of this 
study (2003:95). Hart writes that for Nietzsche, Christianity, with its dualistic 
cosmology (where the realm of God is placed over against the realm of humanity), 
can indeed be deemed “one great curse pronounced on (earthly) life”, which 
exalts weakness “at the expense of ... beauty”, “drains life from this world by 
directing life’s energies towards another, unreal world”, and is expressed most 
perfectly as “hatred for the flesh” (2003:95; Nietzsche 1968:155-6,186). According 
to Nietzsche’s thought, Hart argues, Christianity’s continual reference to an 
“other” world, indeed only ever led to the “squalid defamation of the world that is” 
(Hart 2003:96; 1968:155-6).  
 
Nietzsche can thus be seen to say: 
Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally life’s 
nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, 
dressed up as, faith in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life. Hatred of the world, 
condemnation of the passions, fear of (real) beauty and sensuality, a 
beyond invented ... to slander this world ... (truly leading to an) 
impoverishment of life.  
(Nietzsche 1967:22-4)  
Hart further holds that for Nietzsche, Christianity’s aversion to earthly existence is 
best exemplified in its belief that Christ, as the “immaculate conception” (a title, 
according to Nietzsche, whereby the church had in actual fact forever “maculated 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 75
(natural) conception” (Nietzsche 1968:147), suffered and died on a cross, in pure 
innocence, in order to supposedly save believers from the evils of this life. For 
Nietzsche, this narrative of Christ can most certainly not be seen as the good 
news Christians hold it to be, but should in fact be deemed to be a “gospel of 
castration”, which forever condemns earthly existence in the most severe manner 
imaginable (Hart 2003:96; Jaspers 1965:320). 
 
Nietzsche thus says: 
(T)he crucified and the innocent one – counts as an objection to life, as 
a formula for its condemnation ... The god on the cross is a curse on 
life, a signpost to seek redemption from (it) ...  
(Nietzsche 1983:542-43)  
Hart then holds that Nietzsche, disgusted by Christianity’s ethos of “castratism” 
that “denigrates the senses, strives against the instincts of the flesh, and defers 
ultimate value to the realm of the spiritual alone”, goes on to propose an 
alternative view of reality – complete with a figurative “god appropriate to (his) 
own ... piety”, namely “Dionysus, (the) god of indestructible life, ecstasy, joy and 
power” standing over against the “Crucified” (Hart 2003:96,106).  
 
For Nietzsche, Dionysus, the mythic Greek god associated with the joyful 
celebration of chaos, irrationality, human instincts and tragedy (Pfeffer 1972:30), 
is truly the perfect emblem of the “most pious godlessness”, who, in his 
“extravagant (and) contradictory magnificence”, represents an “enmity against 
every faith that distracts life from itself” (2003:106). A life lived in accordance with 
the latter-day cult of Dionysus, according to Nietzsche’s thought, does indeed not 
attempt to look for relief or consolation from the reality of the world, but is rather 
utterly true to its bodily state, and continually surrenders to the underlying fact of 
all carnal existence, which can be summed up as “the will to power” (Hart 
2003:98). 
 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, done under the “patronage” of Dionysus, thus serves, 
according to Hart, as a call to “invent and narrate the death of God”, move beyond 
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Christianity’s dualistic conception of reality (with the morality of “good and evil” it 
entails), and wholeheartedly commit to earthly existence – wherein beauty (in its 
tragic truthfulness) is indeed then seen to come to glorious expression in the very 
ferocity, disorder, difference, strife and violence brought about by the ever-
enduring “will to power” (see Hart 2003:151).  
 
Hart thus says: 
(Nietzsche’s) pure affirmation (of earthly reality), as could scarcely be 
otherwise within a discourse of defiant immanentism ... embrace(s) the 
(prior) negative as the positive, being’s essential positivity, its creative 
and wanton élan, in which violence (is) not a dialectical negation ... but 
... the world’s essential, if atelic, creative power (which indeed brings 
about beauty).  
(Hart 2003:40) 
According to Hart, Nietzsche’s philosophy, as succinctly (and selectively) 
described above, can then veritably be said to have instigated the prevailing 
postmodernist discourses, in their “godless forms”, propounded by voices such as 
Gilles Deleuze, Michael Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and 
others (Hart 2003:30, 35). These thinkers, Hart argues, “disenchanted with all the 
beguiling promises of faith ...” (2003:43), and entranced by the counter-gospel of 
Dionysus, have indeed chosen to complete the Nietzschean destruction of 
metaphysics by definitively dismissing the transcendent reality of God (as an 
indeterminate “no-thingness” lying behind the veil of the Kantian sublime50), and 
committing themselves fully, as Nietzsche has requested, to ontic existence (see 
2003:43-93). 
  
																																																								
50 Hart writes that the Kantian notion of the Sublime, which, in his opinion, is almost 
always presumed by the philosophers being discussed in this section of the study 
(binding them, in fact, together, as e.g. held in the essay Du Sublime by Courtine, 1988), 
can be said to repeat at the level of the aesthetic the first Critique’s prohibition upon 
“metaphysical adventures beyond the theoretical”, in a manner far more radical than the 
less threatening “noumenon”, by signaling an impenetrable midpoint between the 
(beautiful) forms of this world (the world of representation), and the unknowable realm of 
the infinite (the world of the unrepresentable) (see Hart 2003:43-52). 
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For Hart, postmodernist discourses (in their Nietzschean form) can thus always be 
seen to center on being’s “finitude, its absolute limitation to the condition of the 
world in its ‘worlding’ ...”, given that God, as Derrida has proclaimed, has become 
the name of indifference itself (Derrida 1974:71), and humanity, in the words of 
Deleuze, has “become ... creature(s) of the surface” in the same manner as 
“tick(s) or louse(s)” (Deleuze 1990:133).  This indeed then makes postmodernist 
discourses, “ontologies of violence” (as John Milbank has pointed out51), where 
being is a “tragic economy”; some sort of “structure of sacrifice in which beings 
suffer incompletion and destruction”, exactly so that “being may be”; the realm 
where Dionysian violence, rooted in the ultimate truth of difference, everlastingly 
reign supreme (Hart 2003:10,128-9).  
 
For, as Derrida says: 
If we must say ... ‘all is but Dionysus’ ... we must know – and this is to 
write – that, like pure force, Dionysus is worked by difference. He sees 
and lets himself be seen. And tears out (his) eyes. For all eternity, he 
has a relationship to his exterior, to visible form, to structure (as 
opposed to the “unrepresentable”), as he does to his death (an ever-
enduring, ever-repetitive event52). This is how he appears (as himself). 
(Derrida 1978:28-9) 
5.3 God Beyond, yet also Within the World  
Hart then proceeds to proclaim that the tragedy regarding Nietzsche's and his 
postmodernist disciples' thought (as described above), is the fact that the 
essential premise on which it is built – that Christianity requires, and in fact 
demands, a flight from ontic existence (and the joys and splendors it 
encompasses) – is an utterly false, unbiblical and unorthodox interpretation of the 
Christian story (Hart 2003:133). For, Hart holds, when the Christian narrative is 
seen for what it truly is (as expressed in Scripture and the orthodox decrees of 
																																																								
51 In his Theology and Social Theory – see e.g. Milbank (1990:278-9). 
52 Nietzsche’s notion of Eternal Recurrence can indeed be seen to play an important role 
in many a postmodernist’s view of the Dionysian reality (see e.g. Hart 2003:60-2). 
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faith), it becomes clear that it has always been a “discourse of the surface” 
(2003:15), where God does not stand above and beyond finite existence 
(expecting humanity to abdicate their creaturely state, as Nietzsche believed), but 
is utterly present and active in the physical, time-bound history of the creation 
which he lovingly affirmed to be “good” following his free act of creation ex nihilo 
(a very important theme in Hart’s theology, which will be discussed 
comprehensively in what follows).  
 
Hart thus writes that the Christian God:  
... does not inhibit only a particular temenos (lying behind the veil of the 
sublime) ... (since he can indeed be seen to be the One) who 
tabernacles among his people, whose skekhinah abides in his temple; 
... who ... indeed, as he chooses, dwell upon the earth. The same God 
who infinitely exceeds all things addresses Moses out of the burning 
bush to proclaim himself ‘Ehyeh asher Ehyeh’, ‘I am that I am’, or 
rather, ‘I will be what (where, when) I will be’ ... He is the infinite who is 
not merely boundlessly ‘sublime’ but who ... goes where he will ...  
(Hart 2003:212) 
Hart also then argues that the Christ-event, far from signaling the final rejection of 
earthly existence, as Nietzsche and his disciples (especially Deleuze) believes, 
could in actual fact be said to be the definitive assertion of earthly reality. Christ, 
Hart writes, indeed assumed human finitude into himself without despoiling it, or 
rejecting it (Hart 2003:205). Instead of being a “gnostic savior”, it is in the very 
flesh of Christ, Hart holds, that his divinity is revealed, and it is indeed then also 
by the breaking of his physical flesh, that his divinity is imparted to other 
(2003:32). For Hart there is thus “something almost tediously wrong” in claiming 
that Christ’s life on earth has ever figured in the Christian tradition as a 
“repudiation”, rather than “an affirmation of the fleshly life” (Hart 2003:107). The 
fact that God became incarnated in corporeal existence, Hart holds, does 
veritably not only reconcile creation with God, but also definitively reunite 
humanity with creation, seeing as Christ, according to him, in his very life, death 
and ultimate life-giving resurrection re-declares and re-reveals creation’s ultimate 
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goodness (a point which will also be returned to, and discussed in length, in what 
follows) (Hart 2003:134).  
 
Hart thus asserts that the belief that Christianity is a religion wherein ontic 
existence stands in opposition to the realm of God, should be deemed to be a 
severe distortion of the Christian evangel which, in actual fact, centers on “... life, 
and that in all abundance” by preaching “creation, divine incarnation and 
resurrection of the flesh, and the ultimate restoration of heavens and earth” 
(2003:107).  
 
Hart indeed says: 
If Christian culture were simply spiritualist, if it endorsed only ethos like 
that of the Corpus Hermeticum or the libretto of Parsifal, Nietzsche 
(and his followers’) indictment of Christian ‘castratism’ would command 
great force; but for all the cunning and psychological inventiveness of 
his genealogy, it fails at every juncture to accommodate the complexity 
of what (they) want to describe. The orthodox doctrine of creation out 
of nothingness (as well as the belief in Christ’s incarnation) ... (leads to 
the conviction that) all things (has) to be affirmed, and with equal 
emphasis, as God’s good creation. 
(Hart 2003:107) 
This declaration of God’s presence and involvement in ontic existence, together 
with the affirmation of creation ultimate goodness is then, according to Hart, 
brilliantly accentuated when addressing the matter of ontology.  
 
Hart argues that contrary to abovementioned Nietzschean “ontologies of 
violence”, where creaturely existence is purposefully divorced from any notion of 
transcendence; or the dualistic ontologies that has often marked Christianity, from 
which these Nietzschean “ontologies of violence” were “misbegotten” (wherein it 
is held that earthly existence should always be seen as a negation of the truth of 
God) (Hart 2003:30); a genuine, orthodox Christian ontology, as has occasionally 
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been present in the Church53, insists on the fact that earthly being, although 
distinct from God (since it was created ex nihilo), stands in wondrous continuity 
with the infinite and joyous existence of the divine – as is then expressed by the 
“miracle of the analogia entis” (2003:241).  
The analogy of being, Hart holds, indeed uniquely illuminates the fact that earthly 
being cannot be grasped under the confines of some sort of "immanentism", and 
also then, that violence and chaos is most certainly not the foundational grammar 
of earthly existence; but that creation, in the words of Gregory of Nyssa, is a 
“song praising God, the true primordial, archetypal music”, in whom creaturely 
existence can in fact “glimpse itself as in a mirror” (Hart 2003:194).  
5.4 The Analogia Entis  
Hart’s initial explication of the analogy of being, which serves as the foundation for 
his use thereof in his theological aesthetic, taking the form of a dogmatica minora, 
is quite a complex and composite piece of writing – which indeed then makes the 
content of the last few chapters extremely relevant and helpful in deciphering his 
thought.  
 
It is thus seen that Hart holds that the analogia entis, true to the original 
Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding of the principle of analogy, indicates that 
the relationship between God and creation should neither be understood to be 
univocal, nor equivocal, but properly analogical (denoting a midpoint between the 
utter sameness of univocity and the utter distinctness of equivocity, as was said in 
Chapter 3) (Hart 2003:213, 235).  
 
This analogical relationship – Hart (following Thomas and Przywara) then holds – 
“cannot (first and foremost) take the form of a homonymy of ‘attributes’ applied to 
two substances”, but should rather be seen to “consist in the rhythm of the 
creature’s difference from God, its likeness to his unlikeness, under the form of a 
dynamic synthesis of distinct moments of being” (2003:214, 235). Expounding on 
																																																								
53 In, for example, the thought of the Cappadocians, Augustine, Maximus, Dionysius the 
Areopagite etc. (Hart 2003:223). 
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what is meant by this phrase, “distinct moments of being”, Hart then evidently 
turns to Thomas’s ontological distinction (described in Chapter 3), and claims that 
finite beings, defined as that wherein a differentiation between “what it is (its 
essentia), and that it is (its esse)” is made (rending them, as shown, groundless in 
themselves, given that their essence is distinct from, and does not necessitate 
their existence), should be seen to be completely different from the infinite life of 
God, who, contrary to creation’s, is “not so divided” (seeing as God’s essences is 
“his existence itself”, as Thomas held) – a difference, Hart argues, that 
nevertheless illuminates “within the (tenuous) unity of every being, an analogy 
pointing to the God in whom being and being determined (or of being Who He Is) 
are not divided” (which then indeed can be recognized, in accordance with the 
content of the previous chapters, as an instance of the analogy of proportionality) 
(Hart 2003:214). 
 
Hart thus writes:  
The analogy of being does not analogize God and creatures under the 
more general category of being, but is the analogization of being (itself) 
in the difference between God and creatures ... (I)f the primary analogy 
is one of being then an infinite analogical interval has been introduced 
between God and creation ... Thus the analogia entis renders all 
‘essentialist’ analogy impossible54. 
(Hart 2003:241-2) 
The analogy of being, according to Hart’s thought, does thus not attempt to draw 
a naïve or simplistic comparison “between creatures and God as two kinds of 
existents, who subsists in the shared abstract quality of being”, but rather, through 
its reliance on the ontological distinction and the analogy of proper proportionality, 
“introduces an analogical interval into being itself” (as Thomas and Przywara also 
																																																								
54 A thought he also accentuates in his essay The Destiny of Christian Metaphysics, by 
saying: “The (analogy of being) does not treat being as some genus under which God 
and the creature – or the infinite and the finite – are placed ... Quite the reverse, in fact: it 
is precisely being that is seen to be understood as analogous; and it is precisely any 
univocal concept of being – any notion that God and creatures are ... comprehended by 
being as such – that the analogia entis as principle denies” (Hart 2011:379). 
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held). This indeed then leads to an affirmation that God and creation have 
infinitely different “moments of being” – amongst which there nonetheless subsist 
a similarity and continuity (by which attributive predication can be made), seeing 
as both “moments of being” can be said to exist as proportions of esse and 
essentia (although differently), with creation’s esse necessarily being contingent 
on, participative in and expressive of “the transcendent act of being, that is also 
subsistence: the life of God” (Hart 2003:232-3). For Hart, in accordance with 
Thomas and Przywara, the analogy of being is thus (firstly) marked by a “maior 
dissimilitudo”, wherein a further “similitudo” between God and creatures can also 
wondrously be affirmed55 (2003:246).  
 
Hart thus says: 
Certainly the analogical never offers an epistemic grasp of the divine, 
such that God comes to occupy a more and stable place in the 
taxonomy of concepts. Insofar as analogy describes the way in which 
creation manifests the God who gives being, difference is the first term 
of the likeness, and speaks of the Trinitarian God who always has 
distance and difference. And so analogy widens the interval of 
difference even as it closes it, asserts an ever greater dissimilitude 
embracing every similitude ...  
(Hart 2003:314) 
Hart subsequently holds that the criticism that has been sounded against the 
analogy of being (most notably by Karl Barth, as shown in the previous chapter) – 
that it is nothing other than an idolatrous attempt to equate the creaturely with the 
divine – should frankly speaking be dismissed as total “nonsense”, which truly 
reveals an inability to understand what the analogia entis actually proposes (as 
Przywara and Von Balthasar also contended) (Hart 2003:241; 2011:396). Far 
from endeavoring to bridge (and thus destroy) God’s otherness (as Barth, in his 
“notorious (and) fairly barbarous” pronouncements, implies (2003:241)), the 
																																																								
55 Here, Hart notably uses the terminology of the Fourth Lateran Council, which reads (as 
mentioned in the Chapter 3), "Quia inter creatorem et creaturam non potest (tanta) 
similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda".  
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analogy of being, Hart argues, in actual fact, properly honors and professes to 
God’s infinite transcendence – something which, in ironic manner, cannot be said 
of a theology with a dualistic disposition. 
 
Clearly rehearsing and building on Von Balthasar’s (as well as Przywara’s) 
arguments (as discussed in the previous chapter), Hart holds that theologies that 
focus exclusively on God as wholly other (and are thus marked by “a duality that 
... makes of God and creation dialectical opposition(s)”), inevitably fall prey to the 
paradox whereby radical transcendence in actual fact becomes a radical kind of 
immanence, since God, in this understanding, is evidently placed on the same 
plane as creation, by being turned into some sort of supreme being set atop a 
summit of lesser being (who then, as instance of pure negation, can indeed only 
be overwhelmed and absorbed into the One who is everything, in an eventual 
moment of interaction, as Von Balthasar held) (Hart 2003:238, 241-2; 2011:398).  
 
Hart therefore writes: 
(P)urely dialectical (systems) ... (are ultimately the same as) ‘identist' 
systems ... imprisoning God and world within an economy of the 
absolute ... If God is thought ... (as) total absence ... or static ‘Wholly 
Other’, God appears merely as the world’s highest principle (that 
overwhelms everything else) rather than its transcendent source.  
(Hart 2003:243) 
The analogy of being, in opposition herewith, Hart argues, in its “purely positive 
account of finite being” as the “analogical expression of a positive and 
determinate infinite act of being”, counters any conception that equates the 
creaturely with the divine in holding that creation's “moment of being" is not 
destroyed, but in fact comes to its right, in its distinctness, in its continuity with 
God, who, as fount (and not “highest principle”) of creation’s existence, also has 
his own, distinct “moment of being” – “that depends upon no other for his 
existence ... that is not a ‘thing’ set off against ... nothingness ... (and) that is not a 
(higher) being among other beings” (Hart 2003:234, 243; 2011:398-9).  
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According to Hart, every theology that therefore does not subscribe to the analogy 
of being (and instead succumbs to a dualistic schema), is indeed then, as already 
mentioned in the second chapter, a “tower of babel”, that heretically attempts to 
“mount up to (a) supreme principle, rather than dwelling in and giving voice to the 
prodigality of the gift” – namely creaturely being (Hart 2003:249). 
 
Subsequently, Hart also then holds that the accusation that the analogy of being 
nullifies the importance of divine revelation and faith should be seen as utterly 
fallacious. In the same manner as Von Balthasar, Hart argues that God’s 
revelation to creation, received in faith, in fact always presupposes the analogia 
entis – without which it undeniably would have been one big "contradiction": 
... Apart from the analogia entis, the very concept of revelation (if 
creation then supposedly does not become one with the divine is the 
moment of interaction) is a contradiction: only insofar as creaturely 
being is analogous to divine being, and proper to God’s nature, can 
God show himself as God, rather than in alienation from himself; there 
would be no revelation otherwise, only ... perhaps the ghostly call of 
the Gnostic’s stranger god ...  
(Hart 2003:242) 
As was the case with Przywara and Von Balthasar, Hart truly also believes that, 
as a result of the fact that the proposed similarities between God and creation is 
always outweighed by infinite dissimilarities (as the Fourth Lateran Council 
professed), and especially then also because of creation’s sinful state (leading to 
a willful blindness, as Von Balthasar held, and will be discussed in what follows), 
the truth of the analogy of being only rightly becomes evident in God’s 
manifestation through revelation (and then in particular the definitive revelation of 
Jesus Christ, the analogia entis in person). For Hart, the analogia entis, far from 
being faith’s antithesis, can actually be said to be a “receiving of words” – 
something which veritably “culminates – or rather, abide – in faith” (a point which 
will be discussed comprehensively in the next chapter) (Hart 2003:314-5). 
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Hart is consequently of the conviction that the critique that has been sounded 
against the analogy of being (especially by Karl Barth, as described in the 
previous chapter) does definitely not hold water, and could therefore confidently 
be dismissed as mere “examples of inane (and cruel) invective”56 (Hart 2003:241) 
– for, he argues, contrary to being some sort of “naive natural theology”, or an 
attempt to grasp the very being of God, the analogia entis is indeed nothing other 
than a “poetic” (faith) confession which declares, in line with Scripture and the 
orthodox tradition, that creation is not a negation or alienation, nor a (violent) 
totality where God is but an absence existing as an instance of “no-thing” beyond 
the veil of the sublime, but, in fact, a (continual) act of God’s grace, wherein 
something other than God, which nevertheless exists in continuity (amidst 
discontinuity) with the infinite and plenteous being of the divine, is lovingly and 
joyously brought forth ex nihilo and declared “good” (as God is primordially good) 
(Hart 2003:242). A rejection of the analogy of being, according to Hart, is thus 
“ultimately ...” a “rejection ... of Genesis 1, and everything that follows after it ...” 
(2003:242). 
5.5 Towards a Theological Aesthetics 
Hart, in accordance with Hans Urs von Balthasar, also then believes that the 
analogy of being naturally gives rise to and “properly belongs within” a theological 
aesthetic (Hart 2003:211), since its proposal of a continuity-amidst-discontinuity 
between the being of God (in its infinite profusion) and the being of creation (in its 
finite occurrence) – coupled with the conviction that the category of the beautiful, 
as one of Plato’s supracategorical transcendentals that underlies all instance of 
being, transpires “oblivious of the (supposed) boundaries that divide the 
transcendent from the immanent (and) the supernatural from the natural” (Hart 
2003:20) – brilliantly illuminates the fact that the beauty of creation, as freely 
given “other”, is neither an “idol” standing in opposition to the divine, nor the 
violent workings of Nietzsche’s Dionysus, but a magnificent “icon”, prevailing as 
																																																								
56 Hart, playing on Barth’s words, also then teasingly says that “if (a) rejection of the 
analogia entis were in some sense at the very core of Protestant theology, as Barth 
believed, one would... be obliged to observe that it is also the invention of the anti-Christ, 
and so would have to be accounted the most compelling reason not becoming 
Protestant” (Hart 2003:242)  
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an “intonation of grace” and expressing the infinite and joyous splendor and glory 
of the beauty of God (for those with the eyes of faith to see) (2003:144,181).  
 
After investigating the Nietzschean “ontologies of violence” (standing against the 
notion that the world could be said to exist in aesthetic continuity with the infinite 
existence of God), and also giving an introductory explication of the working of the 
analogy of being, Hart is then indeed seen to develop and present his own 
theological aesthetic in the form of a dogmatica minora – with the analogia entis 
as foundational principle – wherein it is affirmed that creation truly transpires as a 
“theatre of divine glory ... good, gracious, lovely and desirable, participating in 
God’s splendor ...” (Hart 2003:21).  
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Chapter 6 – The Beauty of the Infinite: Hart's Theological 
Aesthetics   
6.1 A Dogmatica Minora  
For David Bentley Hart, as explicated in the preceding chapter, the Thomistic 
ontology encapsulated in the principle of the analogy of being, with its preposition 
that creation, as a contingent “moment” of being, exists in continuity (amidst 
discontinuity) with the infinite and splendorous life of the divine, veritably counters 
(what he sees as) the “sterile” theologies “of the religious dualist(s)”, which affirm 
God’s glory only through the negation of worldly beauty (as specifically explicated 
in the second chapter), as well as the subsequent tragic “ontologies of violence”, 
proposed by the Nietzschean postmodernists, which, on the other side of the coin, 
only affirm corporeal reality’s (violent) 'goodness' through the negation of the 
godly realm (Hart 2003:213, 242, 245).  
 
For this reason, Hart, in accordance with Hans Urs von Balthasar, indeed then 
utilizes the analogy of being as “speculative context” for his theological aesthetic 
(the “heart” of his book The Beauty of the Infinite at large (Hart 2003:33)), wherein 
he, through the presentation of a dogmatica minora, built on Nicene and 
Chalcedonian orthodoxy, and centering on the key themes of Trinity, Creation, 
Salvation and Eschaton, endeavors to illustrate that beauty (in terms of the infinite 
life of God, and especially then also in terms of finite life of creation) can truly be 
said to be an all-important (and even all-determining) leitmotif in the story told by 
Christianity (2003:154, 243).  
 
This second-last chapter of the thesis will subsequently engage and explicate the 
ways in which Hart uses the analogy of being in his theological aesthetics, whilst 
continually keeping the content of the previous chapters – which indubitably 
serves as foundation and inspiration for his thought – in mind. 
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6.2 Trinity 
Hart – convinced, in accordance with Przywara’s thought, that a theology 
proposing an analogical relationship between God and creation should always 
function from “above to below” (leaving any accusation of natural theology void) – 
commences his dogmatica minora by proclaiming that the triune God, who, 
according to Thomas, “possesses being most perfectly” and “is absolutely pure of 
any addition or determination” (as quoted in the third chapter), is boundlessly 
beautiful (Hart 2003:157, 177). 
 
For Hart, the most elementary truth of any theological aesthetics is indeed that 
God’s very essence (as pure and perfect act), eternally radiates with 
unfathomable beauty, since He, in his “uncircumscribable” infinity, can truly be 
deemed to be the “supereminent”, primordial actuality of goodness, whose 
glorious existence, in the idiom of Gregory of Nyssa, “cannot be passed beyond” 
(Hart 2003:192-3). Hart writes that God does not have to “find or determine 
himself” as the beautiful God He is (in or through his involvement in creaturely 
existence), but is everlastingly “sufficient, at peace ... good, sovereign and wholly 
beautiful ... with or without creation” (2003:157)57.  
 
This, Hart holds, does not suggest that God’s beauty is “simply ideal” – a “remote, 
cold, characterless ... (and) formless” archetype (existing as “no-thingness” 
beyond the sublime, as the Nietzschean postmodernist would contend), but that 
He, in actual fact, exists as the “fullness of all form”58 (2003:177). Besides being 
infinite, Hart pronounces, God is indeed thus also “infinitely formosus ...” 
(2003:177).  
 
According to Hart, this truth of God’s everlasting and infinite beauty is then 
																																																								
57  Something which, according to Hart, is properly expressed by the traditionally 
controversial, yet (in his opinion) largely misunderstood notion of Divine Apatheia – which 
he, himself unequivocally subscribes to (Hart 2003:158).  
58 As seen when the Psalmist praises “the savor, the sweetness of the Lord” (27:4), and 
exclaims “I shall be sated, upon awakening, in beholding thy (beautiful) form” (17:15); and 
when Zechariah declares “how great is His goodness ... and how great is His beauty” 
(27:4) (Hart 2003:177). 
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principally perceived (and understood) within a Trinitarian theology, where it is 
confessed that the triune God exists as “perichoresis of love ... a dynamic 
coinherence of three divine persons 59 , whose life is eternally one of shared 
regard, delight ... feasting and joy” – as exquisitely illustrated in the narrative of 
Christ’s baptism (Hart 2003:155,168,175-7).  
 
True to the Orthodox tradition (to which he belongs), Hart holds that the “tableau” 
of Jesus’s baptism, where God the Father proclaims his “pleasure” in the beauty 
of the Son, and the Spirit jubilantly concurs to the Father’s words by ascending as 
a dove, constitutes an “icon ... a crystallization” of the joy that everlastingly mark 
the “intradivine relations” (Hart 2003:168). Employing the words of Gregory of 
Nyssa, Hart writes that the Trinity, as on the day at the river Jordan, 
(everlastingly) “looks upon itself”, and in the recognition of its beauty, “desires 
what it possesses” while also thus “possess(ing) what it desires” (2003:173). 
God’s beauty, Hart continues, should therefore essentially be understood as 
“delight and the object of delight; ... what God beholds, what the Father sees and 
rejoices in in the Son, in the sweetness of the Spirit, what Son and Spirit find 
delightful in each other” (2003:177). 
 
Hart then suggests that given that beauty, in its most perfect and magnificent 
occurrence, transpires within the dance between the three (distinct) persons of 
the Trinity, and is seen to be marked by a continual recognition and rejoicing in 
the other’s glorious “otherness” (within the unity of “divine simplicity”), difference 
and distance can veritably be said to be part and parcel of its actuality. This truth, 
Hart holds, clearly thus presents an alternative account of difference that does not 
																																																								
59 Hart writes that although many theologians, especially in modern Western dogmatics, 
is cautious of using the term “persons” (as a result of the supposed “imprecision” of the 
word, the different connotations thereof and the fact that the modern understanding of 
personality is far removed of that which could sensibly be said about God), the terms 
routinely offered as alternative (such as Barth’s “mode of subsistence”) invariably “fail to 
reflect the immediacy, livingness, and concreteness of the scriptural portrayal of God, 
either in the Old Testament or in the New”. For Hart, “John’s account of the prayers of 
Christ – heard as addresses to the Father, but also clearly as response to the Father’s 
mission to the Son – are resonant with both an intimacy and a distinction of voices, of 
places of address, that makes ‘persons’, for all its inadequacy, an indispensible word” 
(Hart 2003:170-1).  
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involve chaos, violence, opposition and strife (as is the case in the Dionysian 
understanding thereof), but, in actual fact, speaks of infinite joy, delight, peace 
and beauty (the everlasting motifs in God’s glorious life as Trinity) – which indeed 
then serves as foundation for the fact that creation can be deemed to be 
something “other” than God, existing, in its distinctness, as “tabernacle and ... 
manifestation of his beauty” (Hart 2003:177, 181). 
6.3 Creation  
According to Hart’s thought, God’s free and loving act of creation, ex nihilo, of 
something “other” than himself, naturally and necessarily stands at the heart of 
the analogy of being’s assertion of a continuity-amidst-discontinuity between the 
being of God and the being of creation (as discussed throughout this thesis). The 
account of God’s creation of the world and the analogical relationship that is 
established thereby, thus constitutes a vital part of his dogmatica minora at large, 
as will indeed become clear in what follows. 
 
For Hart, the astounding feature of Christianity’s conception of creation, which 
veritably sets it apart from all other traditional creation myths, and also then 
indeed serves as the foundation for the truth of the analogy of being, is the fact 
that it does not regard the coming into being of creaturely existence as some sort 
of (necessary) emanation from God’s being – as “a cosmic sacrifice ... (a) cosmic 
venery ... or (an) effluence of divine substance” (in which an “eidetic or substantial 
continuity” between the creaturely and divine essences would necessarily have 
been established); but truly as an unoccasioned and deliberate making (“Let us 
make ...”), out of sheer nothingness, of that which is “other” than God; and 
consequently, as “a kind of play, a kind of artistry for the sake of artistry”60, an 
invention out of “delight”, an “expression” of love, a “gift” of grace, something 
“receiving all, while meriting nothing” (Hart 2003:251, 257). 
This fact, Hart contends, that creaturely existence, in the Christian telling of 
creation, does not transpire as a lesser instance of the divine eidos, but truly 
																																																								
60 A notion, according to Hart, brilliantly expressed by the figure of Wisdom in the book of 
Proverbs, at play like a child before the eyes of God (Hart 2003:251). 
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come to be as a freely and needlessly devised work of art, an eikon, that is 
gratuitously and joyously wrought, ex nihilo, and “handed over” by its artist 
(whereby it is clearly distinguished from the “creative being” from which it stems, 
while obviously remaining intrinsically connected thereto), is exactly then the 
reason why it, in its distinct being (with its “gracious marriage of ‘essence’ and 
‘existence’”) can be said to exist as an ontological analogy of the infinite and 
utterly beautiful life of the divine (Hart 2003:131, 251, 307). For, Hart holds, in not 
being a negation of God’s infinite and sufficient existence, creation, in its 
positively and joyously determined “moment of being”, can veritably only ever 
jubilantly “tell of”, point to and participate in (what can be deemed as) “infinite 
proportion ... ever yet greater magnitude, ‘quantity’ and beauty’”, from which it 
stems, and on which it depends for its initial and continual existence, being utterly 
groundless in itself (Hart 2003:251, 300).   
Hart writes: 
Precisely because creation ... is other than the dynamic life ... of God ... 
precisely because creation is not part of God ... precisely because it is 
not ‘substantially’ from God, or metaphysically cognate to God’s 
essence, or a pathos of God, is it an analogy of the divine ... 
(Hart 2003:158)  
It is thus indeed within Christianity’s unique telling of God’s act of making, 
according to Hart’s thought, where it is held that creaturely existence is needlessly 
and joyously brought forth ex nihilo as something other than God’s infinite and 
sufficient essence, that the truth of a similarity-amidst-discontinuity (or similitudo 
within maior dissimilitudo, to use Hart’s wording) between the creaturely and 
divine “moments” of being, as beautifully encapsulated and expressed by the 
principle of the analogia entis (and explained throughout the thesis), is illuminated 
and everlastingly affirmed. 
 
Following Von Balthasar’s thought (as held in the fourth chapter), Hart then 
stresses that abovementioned necessarily leads to a vociferous assertion that the 
beauty that transpires in God’s elated act of creation truly expresses, reflects and 
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participates in the glorious splendor and joy that marks the infinite and abundant 
life of the Creator God, who, as Trinity, “is beauty and infinitely beautiful” (as 
Gregory the Theologian originally remarked) (Hart 2003:251-3).  
 
Creaturely splendor, Hart holds, far from standing in opposition to the beautiful life 
of the divine (as believed by the “religious dualist”), can indeed thus be said to be 
a proclamation of divine beauty – “a shining fabric of glory ... whose inmost truth 
is its aesthetic (analogical) correspondence to the beauty of divine love, as it is 
eternally expressed by the Trinity” (Hart 2003:252). Hart notes that, when reading 
the account of creation as described in the first chapter of Genesis, it is seen that 
God recurrently identifies that which He had willfully brought forth ex nihilo as 
“good” (as He himself, indeed, is primordially and infinitely good) – an affirmation, 
in his opinion, which first and foremost sounds as an aesthetic judgment, and 
continues to ring true throughout the ages (Hart 2003:253-4). Creation’s beauty – 
Hart (turning to the words of Hillary) holds – can thus undeniably, in its distinct 
moment of being, be seen and understood to be the reflection of the “God who is 
all beauty”61 (2003:252, 254). 
 
In order to explicate and expound on this idea that creation transpires as 
something other than God – in analogical correspondence to the life of the divine 
(as the analogy of being, according to proper proportionality, holds) – and as 
such, wondrously reflects the Trinity’s infinite and joyous beauty, Hart turns to two 
metaphors (complimenting the image of God as artist and creation as artwork), 
which, as will be seen, indeed effectually and rather poetically expresses what 
has been said above, as well as in the previous chapters.  
 
The first metaphor Hart uses to describe and explicate creation’s correspondence 
to God’s beautiful being, is then that of “cosmic music” – an “image”, Hart writes, 
that can be seen as an “especially happy way of describing the analogy of 
																																																								
61 This indeed then exquisitely explains why the beauty of the world is experienced as a 
"mysterious inexhaustible well of delight", which "pleases the sight", "induces desire" and 
does not "allow those touched by it to belong to themselves", as said in Chapter 2. 
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creation to the Trinitarian life”62 (Hart, 2003:276). According to Hart’s thought, it 
could thus be said that creation, in its created “otherness”, joyously resounds as a 
newly composed “expression (and) inflection” on the eternally rich and beautiful 
melody belonging “to the dance and difference, address and response, of the 
Trinity” (2003:276).  
 
Hart holds that the best manner to explicate this proposition is by turning to the 
magnificent opuses of Johan Sebastian Bach – who, in his opinion, can 
undeniably be deemed to be the “greatest of Christian theologians ... the most 
inspired witness to the ordo amoris in the fabric of (creaturely) being” (Hart 
2003:282).  
 
Hart writes that it is indeed in Bach’s music, as nowhere else, that the potential 
“boundlessness of thematic development becomes manifest”; where it is 
perceived “how a theme can unfold inexorably through difference, while remaining 
continuous in each moment ... upon a potentially infinite surface of (variation)” 
(Hart 2003:283). Unlike, say, Wagner’s compositions, that consist of endless 
motivic reoccurrences – synthetic, rationalized and sublated leitmotivs63 – Bach’s 
composition abounds with “motion”, as all thematic content is submitted to “the 
irreducible dissemination that fills it out” (2003:283). In Bach’s music, he writes, 
each note is indeed not a necessary occurrence (imbibed out of that which 
precedes it), or mere mechanical repetition, but an unforced and unnecessary, yet 
wholly fitting, harmonious, and indeed beautiful supplement – veritably making 
Bach’s compositions the “ultimate Christian music (which) reflects as no other 
artifact ever has or could the Christian vision of creation” (2003:283).  
 
Just as is the case in, for example, Bach’s Goldberg Variations (wherein a simple 
aria from the Anna Magdalena Notenbüchlein is stated, only to be displaced by a 
																																																								
62 Hart writes that although there is a long tradition, stretching from Pythagoreanism to 
Neoplatonism, of seeing creation as a “musica mundana” or “harmonica mundi”, this 
image can indeed be held to be especially fitting within Christian theology – and its 
understanding of creation – as will be seen in what follows (Hart 2003:275). 
63 Which, according to Hart, can be seen as an audible expression of a quintessentially 
Hegelian logic, where all (including creaturely existence as well as the divine or Geist) is 
subsumed in one univocal, monotonous existence (Hart 2003:283). 
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majestic sequence of thirty variations composed on its bass line), or his 
“shatteringly profound” Ciaccona at the end of the second Unaccompanied Violin 
Partita (where an initial theme of only four bars is reborn in sixty-four variations, 
passing through the minor, through the major and back to the minor again), the 
beautiful and infinite life of God, Hart writes, can indeed be seen as the “theme” 
on which the “polyphony” of creaturely being, in its utter uniqueness, is raised up 
as a glorious analogical expression (2003:283-285).  
 
Another metaphor Hart subsequently uses to explicate the way in which creation, 
and the beauty it encompasses, come to be as ontological analogy of the glorious 
life of the Trinity, is that of speech or discourse. Hart writes that, in the most 
elementary terms, all that has been said above (and is encapsulated in the 
analogy of being), can be summarized by stating that “God speaks God, and 
creation occurs within that speaking, as a rhetorical embellishment, a needless 
ornament” (Hart 2003:291). According to Hart (following the thought of Hamann in 
his Aesthetica in nuce) God can indeed be thought of as the “mighty orator” and 
the “poet at the beginning of days”, who speaks the “discourse of (creaturely) 
being” into life – neither as a mere reiteration of the beautiful “words” belonging to 
God’s infinite existence (in which case it would have been mere “tautology”), nor 
as a great silence, destitute of any speech at all, but indeed as newly devised 
poetry, needlessly articulated, ex nihilo, as an “endless sequence of beautiful 
turns of phrase” (2003:292).  
 
This, Hart writes, does indeed not mean that “God and world constitute between 
them a single order of content and explication”, but rather that the relationship 
between “the infinite plentitude of God’s Word and the flowing measures of 
creation’s loquacity” is truly that of an "ontological analogy", as stated in the 
analogy of being (Hart 2003:294,97).  
 
In a passage, wondrously entrenched in the logic of Thomas, Przywara and Von 
Balthasar (as stated throughout the thesis), Hart explains: 
Creation’s words are analogous to God’s eternal utterances of himself 
because in their restless dynamism of essence and exposition (or 
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essentia and esse) ... they reflect under the form of a finite and 
complex synthesis the perfect and simple convertibility in God of 
essence and expression (essentia and esse) ... It is this notion of a 
transcendent origination of being’s expressivity that allows for real 
difference, a real “digressionism” ... An ‘expression’ bound entirely to 
its own immanent force express nothing but its own expression – 
express, that is, precisely nothing ... True expressionism ... is possible 
only if there is that moment that allows it to differ, to be at once a new 
word and an act of disclosure ... To see creation thus as an expressive 
surface reflecting God ... is (indeed) not to discern a continuity without 
analogical interval between God’s knowledge of himself and his 
‘reprise’ of that knowledge in what He creates. God is the supreme 
rhetorician. As opposed to the mechanistic monism of Spinozan 
expression, Christian thought makes room for the thought of 
expression as deferral, as writing, transcription, mediation, and 
dissemination; it is the divine distance (this transcendent presence to) 
creation that makes the world an inflection of the eternal Torah, the 
writing that the Logos comprises as difference. 
(Hart 2003:295) 
In this passage, Hart thus beautifully accentuates the fact that the relationship 
between God and creation (effectually exemplified by the image of an orator or 
poet and the words that are uttered, or written, by him or her), can, logically 
speaking, never entail ontological identity (given that creation would then simply 
have been an instance of sheer nothingness). This relationship should indeed 
thus, in complete opposition to any identist (univocal) system, or dualist system 
(which as shown, pretty much amount to the same as an identist system, as 
creation, as pure negation is submerged into the being of God) be seen as a true 
and proper analogical correlation (according, indeed, to proportionality), where 
creaturely existence, with its own positively determined being, marked by a 
distinctive “finite and complex synthesis” of esse and essentia (whereby it is 
forever differentiated from the being of the divine), “expresses” the truth, glory and 
wondrous beauty of the one from whom it stems (whose esse and essentia are 
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one and the same thing, as Thomas and Przywara emphasized) and naturally 
depends on for its initial and continual being (being groundless in itself 64 ). 
According to Hart’s thought it could thus be said that the “words” uttered by God, 
in not being God, speaks of God, and indeed therefore resound, in their distinct 
occurrence, with the beauty of the One who initially and definitively speaks 
“himself”, and also declares his “words” to be wholly good.  
 
In utilizing the imagery of beautiful music and poetic discourse, and conceiving of 
creation as an “inflection” (on God’s infinite symphonic theme) and as spoken 
“expression” (of the God who is the “mighty orator” and “poet at the beginning of 
days”), Hart thus indeed brilliantly (and quite beautifully) exemplifies the way in 
which Christianity (guided by its understanding of God’s act of creation, as a 
willful and joyous making, ex nihilo, of something “other” than Himself) can 
fashion (what he then, in accordance with Thomas, names) “proportional 
analogies” between the distinct “proportions” of creaturely existence, and the 
“infinite ‘proportion’“ from which it stems (as described throughout the whole 
thesis) (Hart 2003:300, 303). This indeed then leads to a confident declaration 
that the beauty of creation does not stand in opposition to the glorious existence 
of God (as those enthused by iconoclasm, asceticism and futurism, as well as the 
Nietzschean postmodernists profess), but in actual fact, in its “differend” moment 
of existence, transpires as “reflection” and “echo” of the splendor, joy and above 
all beauty that marks the everlasting perichoresis of the Trinity (2003:296).  
 
Hart writes (by making use of the words of Maximus and Bonaventure): 
(Given the analogical correspondence between the creaturely and the 
divine, God’s goodness and beauty) radiates from all created things, 
and are seen in all of creation’s weights, measures and proportions. 
Thus every creature is a vestigium of divine beauty, in ways too 
marvelous to calculate or ‘reduce’ ... (C)reation’s rational coherence 
speaks of the eternal ratio of God; the essences of things (are) ... free 
																																																								
64  Creation’s groundlessness is exquisitely exemplified by using the metaphor of 
language, as it could be held that what the “word” of creation says (its content), does not 
necessitate that it is said. 
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expressions of love and delight ... together hymning the glory of their 
creator. It is the overwhelming immensity and variety of created beauty, 
the sheer eloquence with which creation proclaims divine glory, that 
‘corresponds’ to God. Created vestigia are divine locutions in an 
endless and bewildering array of different inflections; and from their 
image one (indeed) receives an image of, share in, and impulse 
towards that delight that belongs to God ... Creation imitates and 
expresses God, as every rhetorical excess express the rhetorician. 
(Hart 2003:309) 
Hart, clearly following the thought of Przywara and Von Balthasar, nonetheless 
then warns that all this talk of the magnificent wonder of an analogical 
correspondence between (the beauty of) God and the (beauty of) creation would 
have been quite futile without the form of Jesus Christ.  For Hart, it is indeed 
solely due to the fact that the everlasting, ever-beautiful “truth of God”, Jesus 
Christ, assumed human form and became a ladder “restoring the broken ladder of 
Adam” that the soul can “enter into and delight in the glory that creation makes 
manifest” (Hart 2003:317). Christ, Hart holds, “the Logos and measure of all 
things”, is therefore (as Von Balthasar also says) the One who calls all analogy 
forth; the One who truly shows the propositions, forms and bounty of creation (as 
discussed above) in their truest light (2003:17).  
 
In a time of sin, Hart writes: 
God himself, who imparts the theme of creation, must give the theme 
again, must himself restate his supreme rhetoric, which comes now in 
the form of a servant.  
(Hart 2003:317) 
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6.4 Salvation 
Hart’s understanding of sin65, which evidently resembles Von Balthasar’s (as 
explained in the fourth chapter), is that of a vile disposition within human 
consciousness, wherein creation is not conceived of as a “gift” of grace out of the 
hand of God, which, as such, exists as analogy of (and before) the infinite life of 
its creator, but, conversely, as an enclosed, self-sufficient and autonomous 
totality, that belongs to, and is ferociously ruled by the (supposed) sovereign and 
all-powerful godhead that is humanity (Hart 2003:298, 346). The sequence of sin, 
according to Hart’s thought, thus involves humanity, wrapped up in self-pride and 
narcissism, willfully turning their gaze (and desire) away from God, towards 
themselves, and fabricating the most “radical kind of interiority, a boundary of 
inwardness” – which indeed then leads to a world of thrones, dominions, 
principalities, authorities and powers; a world of “violence and privation”; a world 
of death66 (Hart, 2003:286, 326). 
 
It is then amidst this (self-inflicted) tragic and violent state of affairs, where the 
soul, as Anselm said, is rendered “unable (and unwilling) to see the beauty of 
God, to hear his harmony, to perceive his fragrance, to taste his sweetness”, that 
God (everlastingly67) chooses to send his Son, Jesus Christ, to re-reveal, re-
affirm, restore and definitely accentuate the truth of creation’s existence, by, in 
fact, becoming man (Hart 2003:320-1, 338).  
 
																																																								
65 Something that he does not explicate or develop in a systematic manner, yet alludes to 
throughout his book.  
66  The sinful state of creaturely existence, as comprehended by Hart, thus clearly 
resembles the violent and strifeful, hyper-immanent Dionysian reality described (and 
subscribed to) by Nietzsche and his disciples – something which Hart readily 
acknowledges. He, in fact, notes that it could be argued that, for example, Foucault’s 
portrayal of the “complexity and inventiveness of (the will to) power” (in a work such as 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison), is as close as one could possibly come to 
a comprehensive description of sin “in theological terms” – the difference being however, 
that Foucault does not pass judgment on power and violence, but rather sees it as the 
ultimate truth of reality, the “wellspring of life” (Hart 2003:69). 
67 Hart believes that the story of Christ’s incarnation “belongs eternally to the life of God” 
and that no contradictions thus exist between “the course of the Son into the world” and 
the “eternal being of the Son as God”. For, he writes, God’s being is indeed always a 
moment of “self-outpouring, manifestation, an act of abasement and exaltation in the 
single gesture of the 'gift'" (Hart 2003:324). 
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For Hart, the wonder of the Gospel is truly that Jesus, the “very form of God”, is 
incarnated in the flesh (Hart 2003:320). Hart writes that, contrary to what 
Nietzsche and his followers believe, Jesus is indeed no “gnostic savior”, no 
“impalpable and unworldly redeemer ... “, but the Lord who embodies a “real and 
imitable practice”, and saves “precisely because he can be grasped ... precisely 
because of his concrete particularity, his real and appearing beauty” (2003:320). 
The fact that Jesus is fully God, and also fully man, without contradiction, 
accordingly then leads Hart (together with Von Balthasar) to declare that He can 
be deemed to be the analogia entis in person – the definitive “ontological analogy 
between God and creation ... who allows all the measures and proportions of 
creation to speak of God, as instances of his glory” (Hart, 2003:325).  
 
Hart writes: 
(T)hat he is the true measure of creation, the form that reveals the 
pleasure of the Father in all his works, and the shape of what is 
pleasing to the Father – is made clear by the boundlessness of the 
analogical response he enfolds in the perfect intensity of his form. If 
creation is an (analogical) address, a divine discourse of glory ... then 
... Christ, in (his) boundless ramifying fecundity, constitutes the analogy 
that perfectly corresponds to the truth of the world – and so (then) 
restores to the world its truth. 
(Hart 2003:329) 
As the analogia entis in person, Christ indeed then retells – in the very motion and 
content of his life, lived both towards the Father and towards creation and his 
fellow humanity – the true story of creation (and its analogical correspondence to 
God’s infinity), that has been lost in the seemingly endless epic of sin (Hart 
2003:325). In the incarnation of Jesus, Hart holds, God thus brings about a return 
of the gift that He has given in creation, by Himself giving it again, anew, 
“according to the Trinitarian dynamism in which donation and restoration are one” 
(2003:325). Turning to the words of Athanasius, Hart writes that the Logos 
becomes flesh, in order to “reestablish the original pattern” after which the world 
was crafted, and also to “impress” again on creation the wondrous and infinite 
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beauty of the divine image. Christ, as God’s supreme beauty, the perpulchrum as 
Bonaventure would say, therefore restores and reveals the truth of creaturely 
beauty by making the beautiful “yet more beautiful”, and the exceedingly beautiful 
“more beautiful still” (2003:320). 
 
According to Hart’s thought, Christ, as the definitive rhetorical expression of God 
(and thus the analogia entis par excellence), can therefore be said to effect a 
“recapitulation” that refashions creation after its ancient goodness and splendor 
(Hart 2003:325).  
 
By making use of the words (and logic) of Irenaeus, a theologian who, next to 
Paul, can be deemed to be the most illustrious writer on the theme of salvation by 
recapitulation (Hart 2003:325), Hart writes: 
Christ’s life effects a narrative reversal, which unwinds the story of sin 
and death and reinaugurates the story that God tells from before the 
foundation of the world – the story of creation he wills, freely, in his 
eternal counsels ... Christ’s life effects an ontological restoration of 
creation’s goodness; it is because the rhetoric of his form restores the 
order of divine rhetoric that creation properly is, that created being is 
redeemed in him.  
(Hart 2003:325) 
This fact, that the incarnation of Christ can be seen as the Father’s “supreme 
rhetorical gesture”, in which all that has been said and continue to be said 
regarding creation is wondrously brought to light and given its perfect emphasis, 
is then, according to Hart, exquisitely accentuated in the Gospels’ (and especially 
John’s) accounts of Christ’s miracles: “The healing of infirmities, the raising of the 
dead, the feeding of the hungry, even the transformation of water into wine” (Hart 
2003:327). Hart writes that Christ’s miracles are not to be seen as attempts to 
manipulate or negate the order of creation, nor as mere “tricks” intended to 
provoke amazement, but rather as acts that signals a definitive affirmation and 
restoration of creation’s original and true beauty and goodness. For Hart, Christ’s 
miracles “repeat God’s gift of creation by imparting joy in the good things of the 
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world – food and wine, fellowship and rejoicing, life and vision and health – to 
those in whom such joy is lacking”, and thus indeed testify to his nature as the 
“creative Word who can command and restore all the words of creation” 
(2003:327-8). Christ’s miracles (like all aspects of his life and ministry), can thus 
be deemed to constitute a semeiosis that restores the “original semeiosis of the 
world ... the language of glory” (2003:328).  
 
According to Hart (again clearly following Von Balthasar’s thought, as held in 
Chapter 4) it is then exactly as a result of the fact that Jesus’s life reinstates the 
true pattern of creation – which evidently stands contrary to the lie of totality and 
its “romances of power, its hierarchies of truth, its prudential violences and 
narrative of rights, rules and possessions” – that He is ultimately brought to the 
cross (Hart 2003:326). The beautiful form of Christ’s life, as the analogy of being 
par excellence, can indeed only ever appear as the definitive “offense” to a world 
order enslaved and blinded by sin, who, then, in a desperate and frantic attempt 
to dispel the unbearable truths of his beauty and peace, pronounces, as retort, the 
only word it truly knows, namely death – as brilliantly illustrated by Pilate saying 
unto Jesus: “Knowest thou not that I have the power to crucify thee”68 (2003:333). 
 
Christ’s beautiful form – given to creation as a gift – is however a truth, according 
to Hart, that cannot ever be made undone, and, in fact, becomes “more manifest 
in being suppressed” (Hart 2003:333). Even though Jesus is thus indeed crucified 
(something He willingly and obediently endures with “inexhaustible love”), the 
cross, as “final word ... pronounced by the powers of the age in defense of their 
rule ... the final argument whereby ... totality claims for itself foundation as old as 
the world”, does not have the ultimate say – for after the violence of the 
crucifixion, the “final drama enacted by totality”, which, as the Gospel of John 
																																																								
68 Hart, understanding Christ's incarnation according to the principle of recapitulation, and 
committing himself to a non-tragic reading of the gospel, is very adamant on the fact that 
the cross should always be seen as a "response of political power" to the revealed truth 
of God (2003:354), rather than a divinely imposed punishment required for the 
satisfaction of the "debt incurred by sin" (which would make God, in his opinion, "complicit 
in the violence of the world" (2003:360). "The violence that befalls Christ" Hart writes, 
belongs to our sacrificial order of justice, an order overcome by his life" (2003:371).  This 
argument, standing against (the traditional reading of) Anselm's "substitution theory" in 
Cur Deus Homo (see 2003:364-72), is one of the most controversial aspects of Hart's 
book, and is indeed strongly challenged by someone like Francesca Murphy (see 2007).  
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makes clear, can be seen as the moment of Christ’s glorification (where He draws 
all the world to himself), Christ is indeed wondrously brought back to life, in the 
flesh, by his Father; “he who was dead is – literally – not dead now”‘; and this, for 
Hart, everlastingly makes all the difference69 (2003:322, 333-4, 391).  
 
Hart writes: 
... the infinite cannot be brought to an end by crucifixion, because it 
continues to be the gift it is even in surrendering itself ... even the 
cross, Rome’s most ‘persuasive’ image of terror, is conquered ... 
(V)iolence shows itself to be inherently finite and exhausts itself upon 
the infinite as gift.  
(Hart 2003:354) 
For Hart, it is then of immense importance to realize that, in the resurrection, it is 
precisely the concrete form of Jesus, “in its proper beauty”, that God "desires and 
calls back to life" (Hart 2003:333). Far from transforming Christ into some “symbol 
of religious truth”, the resurrection, Hart writes, truly vindicates and imparts again 
the whole substance of Christ’s earthly life in all its infinite beauty (as the analogy 
of being in person) – and it is then exactly this beauty, according to him, shining 
forth from (the resurrected) Christ, that brings about a different "ambit of vision", 
where totality is exposed for the lie it is, and the primordial truth of creaturely 
existence, as joyous gift, transpiring as glorious ontological analogy of the divine, 
becomes wondrously clear to see, for those (it should however be noted) who 
accept, and surrender themselves to this truth of Christ in faith (2003:337). 
 
According to Hart, the "form" Christian optics must take, in order to see, through 
Christ, the primordial truth of all that is, is indeed then that of faith – which he 
understands as an acceptance of the truth of God’s Word, and the surrendering of 
one’s life (and hence one’s vision) to the light shining forth form the risen Christ 
																																																								
69 At this point Hart' thought deviates from Von Balthasar's theology, in that he places his 
ultimate focus on Christ's resurrection (which, according to him, renders Christ's death 
void of any significance), where Von Balthasar (although also seeing the resurrection as 
all-important) continues to emphasize the importance of the cross (and the events of Holy 
Saturday), throughout his theology (see Oakes 1994:233-249) .   
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(Hart 2003:337). For Hart, in accordance with Przywara and Von Balthasar, the 
wonder of the analogy of being is thus intrinsically linked to a life of faith, given 
that it is only through an encounter with Christ, as the analogia entis in person,  
that the joyous truth of the world's analogical correspondence to the divine, 
becomes known70 (2003:338).  
 
Hart writes that it can thus be said that there is a “terrible fragility” to the truth that 
creation exists as analogical expression of the divine, given the fact that it, for the 
time being, is still only a “word among words” – imparted as a gift of faith – which, 
naturally, may be rejected (or even distorted or corrupted) (Hart 2003:338-9). 
There will however, according to him, come a day when the infinity of God will 
finally be made manifest for all (willing or unwilling) to see; when sin and the lie of 
totality (although already defeated in Christ’s death and resurrection) will no 
longer have any sway; and when creaturely existence will everlastingly be 
restored and affirmed, through the truth of Christ, as the analogy of the divine.  
6.5 Eschaton 
For Hart, it is of immense importance to understand that, even though the light of 
the eschaton evidently dawns with the event of the resurrection, where sinful 
humanity’s lies of totality is exposed, and the goodness, peace and beauty of 
creaturely existence is restored and re-revealed by Christ, as analogia entis in 
person, Scripture and tradition still speak of a definitive moment in history, when 
the Kingdom of God will ultimately irrupt into human history, and, so, bring all to 
their true end (Hart 2003:396). Hart emphasizes that this final eschatological 
happening should nonetheless not be seen as a (Hegelian) completion of the 
history of the world, but something that is “adventitious” – which “comes suddenly, 
like a thief in the night, and so fulfill no immanent process, consummates none of 
our grand projects, reap no harvest from history’s dialectic” (Hart 2003:396). The 
eschatological vindication of creation, says Hart, is indeed not a consummation of 
																																																								
70 Which, according to Hart – as Balthasar also believed – then informs and influences 
the way a believer lives. Morality, for Hart, is a “labor of vision”, and seeing the world as 
the analogical expression of the divine indeed thus leads, in his opinion, to an ethic where 
all is treated as the making of God, and every event, where death, violence and 
deprivation is at the order of the day, is opposed (Hart 2003:342).  
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history or the fruit of totality, but, in a moment of unexpectedness, “once again 
creation” – since the “gift remains simply the gift it always was”, although it is now 
given conclusively (2003:398).  
 
The definitive coming of God’s Kingdom, according to Hart, can then be seen as 
the “beautiful surfacing” of the truth of creaturely existence (in its created 
particularity); humanity's final liberation from the darkness of sin (and the lies of 
totality), to the light of God’s infinite joy and splendor; a revealing of the fact that 
God’s glory truly transpires in and through the “whole of created being” (Hart 
2003:400-1). Such is indeed the hopeful promise of the eschaton and the “general 
resurrection”, Hart writes, that creation, in which the glory of God has primordially 
been given beautiful analogical expression, “is to be redeemed as such, as an 
aesthetic truth” (2003:401).  
 
Christian eschatology, Hart holds, does thus not presage the negation of worldly 
existence, nor its incorporation into the being of God, but signals its ultimate 
restoration “as God’s creation”, existing as a wondrous analogy – as “likeness in 
difference” – of the divine (as was plainly the creator’s intention from the 
beginning, as Von Balthasar says) (Hart 2003:401). The magnificent message of 
the Kingdom, Hart holds, is thus indeed that “the good of creation is creation 
itself” without any need for any higher justification, seeing as it remains evermore, 
as Augustine writes, a great and beautiful “hymnody, with God as mighty 
composer” – an ontological analogy, which, in its distinctiveness, sings of the 
glory of its creator (2003:401).  
 
Hart then holds that, as the eschatological interruption of the Kingdom constitutes 
an everlasting affirmation of creation, it also, nonetheless, involves a judgment 
that falls across all things, given that the vindication of the true history of 
creaturely existence (as expressed in the analogy of being), necessarily 
comprises the condemnation of all falsehoods standing against it (Hart 2003:399). 
The "language of hell", Hart writes, therefore unavoidably enters Christian 
discourse alongside the wondrous evangel of the coming Kingdom's peace and 
beauty (2003:399).  
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Hart, however, subscribes to, and promulgates the tradition of Christian thought 
that does not make a distinction between the fires of hell and the light of God’s 
glory, and in fact interprets damnation as the soul’s “resistance to the beauty of 
God’s glory, its refusal to open up itself before divine love”, which then causes 
divine love and beauty to seem as “an exterior chastisement” (Hart 2003:399). For 
Hart, hell is thus not a place that the loving God willfully bans sinners to, but a 
condition brought about by the sinful self, unwilling to accept the wondrous truth 
that God reveals, through Christ.  
 
Hart writes: 
Hell is the experience ... of divine glory not as beauty, but as formless 
sublimity; it is the rejection of all analogical vulnerability, the sealing off 
of the ‘self’ (or the cosmos) in univocal singularity, the ‘misreading’ of 
creation as an aboriginal violence. The ‘fire’ of hell is that same infinite 
display of semeia by which God is always declaring his love, 
misconstrued as the chaotic sublime rather than the beautiful, not 
susceptible of analogical appropriation ... it is the soul’s refusal to 
become (as Gregory says) the expanding vessel into which the beauty 
of God endlessly flows. (E)xile is possible within the beauty of the 
infinite only by way of exilic interiority, a fictive inwardness, where the 
creature can grasp itself as isolate essence ... where the analogy of the 
heavens is not the transforming voice of God but only (thus) a mute 
silence ... and so a torment. Hell cannot serve as an objective element 
of the beautiful – a source of delight – because it is an absolute 
privation of form and quantity; it has no surface, nor even a shadow’s 
substance; its aesthetic ‘place’ is the sealed outside of an inside. But 
destroyed by the infinite motion of Christ, it is now always to be 
consigned to the lake of fire.  
(Hart 2003:400) 
Turning in the last few pages of his dogmatica minora to Gregory of Nyssa’s 
eschatology, Hart writes that it should nonetheless, even when speaking of the 
inevitability of hell, be remembered that the Christian God is a “God (that) is on 
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the side of the particular ... (a God that is on the side) of the ... lost”, who eternally 
wills that “nothing be excluded from the good”.  According to him, one can, and in 
fact, should thus – in this "time of waiting"71  –  hope that each and all will 
eventually be redeemed from the history of sin, so that hell can truly be the non-
reality it innately is (see Hart 2003:402-11).  
 
As Hart’s propositions in his The Beauty of the Infinite have now be examined, the 
time has come to return to the study's Research Problem and Research Question, 
as stated in Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
71 As he describes this period between the resurrection and the eschaton in his book In 
the Aftermath: Provocations and Laments (2008:19)   
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion  
7.1 The Research Problem and Research Question Revisited  
Prompted by voices such as R.S. Thomas, Friedrich Nietzsche and Simone Weil, 
this thesis commenced by contending that Christianity, throughout its long and 
complex history, has often been guilty of placing the realm of the divine too starkly 
against creaturely existence, which necessarily then results in the splendor 
evidently found in this corporeal world being seen as the vile antithesis to the 
goodness and beauty of God (a view that was then further considered, and 
developed, in the second chapter of this study, which introduced the field of 
theological aesthetics, and also investigated Christianity’s traditional relationship 
to the aesthetic dimensions of life).  
 
It was subsequently held that besides the fact that this dualistic cosmology 
arguably contributed to (post)modern Western society – unwilling to repudiate 
their earthly existence and disavow their bodily state – choosing to do away with 
the supposed transcendent realm by “inventing the death of God” (a notion further 
addressed in Chapter 5 with its focus on Nietzsche’s and his postmodernist 
disciples’ thought), numerous voices, from different faith traditions, had pointed 
out that the idea that God and the world exist in binary opposition to one another, 
surely contradicts orthodox Christianity’s understanding of (God’s free act of) 
creation, and the event of the incarnation, where God sent his Son to recapitulate 
the world, by becoming flesh.  
 
It was then said that David Bentley Hart can be seen to be a theologian whose 
(aesthetic) theology, as presented in his book The Beauty of the Infinite: The 
Aesthetics of Christian Truth, actively and overtly opposes any system of thought 
that puts God and creation over against each other (or subsequently do away with 
the transcendent realm all together), in holding that the beauty and splendor of 
creation should, in actual fact, be deemed to stand in ontological continuity with 
the beautiful life of the divine – a proposition he veritably grounds in the Thomistic 
principle of the analogia entis, denoting an analogical relationship between the 
being of God and the being of creation. 
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It thus accordingly seemed, at first glance, as if Hart’s thought, reliant on the 
analogy of being, could possibly serve as the perfect resolution for the 
(problematic) dualistic cosmology that has arguably been present and prevalent 
throughout Christianity’s history, as well as the consequent occurrence of a 
radical “immanentism” that sees the beauty of the world as the handiwork of 
Dionysus (without any mention of a transcendent realm whatsoever).  
 
The analogia entis – far from being a simple solution, straightforwardly solving 
one of theology’s (and metaphysics in general’s) biggest challenges – has 
however undoubtedly been one of the most contentious and controversial 
theological notions throughout the ages (and especially in the 20th century when it 
most recently rose to prominence), which evidently serves as clear warning signal 
that it ought to be approached, particularly in the work of a skilled and convincing 
rhetorician such as David Bentley Hart, in a meticulously informed manner (which 
naturally involves a comprehensive understanding of the formative conceptions 
thereof, as found, among other, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Erich 
Przywara and Hans Urs von Balthasar).  
 
Given the abovementioned – which serves as the problématique of this thesis, 
and can be encapsulated by saying 1) that there thus seems to be a serious need 
for a theology that does not negate earthly existence and somehow affirms 
creaturely beauty and splendor in terms of the goodness and beauty of God; 2) 
that David Bentley Hart believes that the answer lies in a theological aesthetics 
grounded in the analogia entis (as presented in his dogmatica minora); 3) yet that 
one should be cautious of an uninformed and uncritical acceptance of the analogy 
of being, given that many reservations regarding its validity and appropriateness 
has been raised – the research question was asked, reading as follows: 
By taking into account Christianity’s relationship with the notion of 
beauty throughout the ages (as presented by recent studies in the field 
of theological aesthetics), and inducting an enquiry into the invention, 
use and working of analogy and the analogia entis in Greek and 
Scholastic thought, as well as the innovative appropriation (and 
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critique) thereof in certain 20th century theological endeavors 
(especially also then concerning aesthetics), this study, guided and 
cautioned by the research problem stated, will ask if David Bentley 
Hart’s employment of the analogia entis could indeed be seen as a 
valid, appropriate, responsible and beneficial manner of affirming an 
aesthetic continuity between God and Creation, and addressing the 
presumed problematic worldview of dualism, and the thought it gives 
rise to. 
In order to answer this question, an investigation regarding the history and 
working of the analogy of being was undertaken, wherein the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas, Erich Przywara, Hans Urs von Balthasar, as well as Karl Barth, was 
comprehensively examined.      
7.2 Invention of the Anti-Christ or Gift of God? 
Ever since the publication of the first volume of his Church Dogmatics, Barth’s 
pronouncement – that the analogy of being is nothing other than the “invention of 
the anti-Christ” (as mentioned in Chapter 4) – has stridently knelled throughout 
the decades, and (sadly) remains, to this day, the very wording the analogia entis 
is most closely associated to72 (White 2011:xi).  
 
In the third chapter of this thesis, which investigated the reemergence of the 
analogy of being in the 20th century, it was seen that the reason behind Barth’s 
uttering of this contemptuous remark, ostensibly lies in his (eventual) realization 
(following years of quandary regarding the matter, as was explicated) that the 
proposal of an ontological analogy between the creaturely and the divine can only 
ever function – in the words of Thomas White – as a vile and heretical attempt to 
“domesticate the transcendence of God” and “distort the (importance of) 
revelation” and should accordingly be dismissed as an instance of natural 
theology, (potentially) serving as a treacherous tool in the hand of the devil (White 
																																																								
72 White notes that most studies that have been conducted on the analogy of being (and 
especially then Przywara’s and Von Balthasar’s use thereof) over the last couple of 
decades, was primarily instigated by interest generated by Barth’s words (White, 2011: 
xi). 
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2011:10). 
 
It can arguably be said that this judgment by Barth, intrinsically affixed to his 
(in)famous anti-Christ-remark, still serves as the most noteworthy critique that has 
been pronounced against the analogy of being – as manifestly seen by the fact 
that most writings on the matter, including Hart’s book, almost exclusively engage 
Barth’s words of contention. The question if Hart’s employment of the analogia 
entis (and any employment of the analogy of being for that matter) can be held to 
be a “valid, appropriate (and) responsible” manner of affirming creation’s 
goodness in relation to God (as the Research Question asks) is thus, in many 
ways, tied up with Barth’s verdict that it has only ever been a profane endeavor to 
equate the creaturely with the divine and bypass the need for revelation.  
 
In this thesis’s investigation regarding the formative conception of the analogy of 
being, as found, among other, in the theologies of Thomas Aquinas (building on 
the thought of Aristotle), Erich Przywara and Hans Urs von Balthasar, it was 
interestingly seen, though, that none of these (original) thinkers ever (naïvely or 
shrewdly) endeavored to bridge the transcendence of God, or to nullify the need 
for God’s revelation, but, in fact, continually and overtly grounded their 
propositions in a rigorous differentiation between creaturely and divine being 
(given that esse and essentia are one and the same thing, and presupposes and 
necessitates one another, in the life of “the First Being, who possesses being 
most perfectly”, while they are divergent and contingent in creaturely beings) – 
which evidently makes “dissimilarity” the first and definitive word in their 
respective descriptions of the analogy of being’s unique working (as explicated 
throughout this thesis).  
 
Przywara and (especially then) Von Balthasar – as shown – even then went as far 
as to say that it is only by means of the analogy of being that the transcendence 
of God is truly ever safeguarded in a proper manner, since dualistic dispositions, 
as sporadically found in Barth’s writings, paradoxically capsize God’s 
transcendence into a radical immanence, while the analogia entis, with its 
assertion of a similarity-amidst-dissimilarity between the very existences of 
creation and God, effectually upholds and accentuates creation’s positively 
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determined distinctness – even in the moment of continuity and similarity with the 
divine (an argument Hart would also then underscore and promulgate in The 
Beauty of the Infinite, as seen in Chapter 5) (White 2011:5). 
 
Michael Hanby thus writes: 
(The) entire point of the doctrine of the analogia entis (for these 
thinkers) ... (was indeed) to insist upon and protect the infinite 
difference between God and the world ... (for it is) by virtue of this 
infinite difference from the world that God is ... (held to be) intimate and 
immanently present to the world ... (as) something other to and 
different from (him) ... and thus somehow ‘like (him)’ (exactly) in and 
through this difference. 
(Hanby 2011:341-2) 
In the investigation of Przywara's and Von Balthasar's thought, it was furthermore 
also seen that the analogy of being, and its affirmation of an ontological 
continuity-amidst-discontinuity between God and creation, does certainly not (if 
understood correctly) stand in opposition to Christ’s incarnation, but can, in fact, 
be said to be fully revealed, recapitulated and brought to fulfillment in this 
wondrous, all-determining event (which, in turn, necessarily presupposes the 
analogy of being). According to Von Balthasar’s thought, Christ, as the “God-man” 
who is “the ultimate union of divine and created being”, can even be held to be the 
analogy of being in person, the “concrete analogy of being”, whose illuminating 
light – alone – allows a world, rendered blind by sin, to know and see the truth of 
creation’s analogical relationship to the beauty and goodness of God (Palakeel, 
1995:106-9; Howsare, 2009:64).  
 
As a result of these findings – which can be encapsulated by saying that the 
formative conceptions of the analogy of being, as found in Thomas, Przywara and 
Von Balthasar, neither naïvely equate the creaturely with the divine, nor do away 
with the importance of the Christ-event – it could be contested (as Przywara and 
Von Balthasar, themselves, tirelessly had) that the proposition of an ontological 
analogy (primarily according to proportionality) between God and creation (as 
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captured in the Cajetanian term, analogia entis), does not stand guilty to the 
charges raised by Barth, and can arguably indeed thus be held to be a “valid, 
appropriate (and) responsible” theological principle, which functions, as Przywara 
originally proclaimed, as “gift” out of the hand of God. 
 
Given the fact that Hart’s conception of the analogy of being is evidently inspired 
by the theologies of Thomas, Przywara and Von Balthasar, and it is then seen (in 
investigating his propositions in The Beauty of the Infinite), that he truly follows 
their thought at a hair’s breadth (by similarly holding that God and creation’s 
ontological similarity transpires within, and because of, their infinitely distinct 
“moments” of being, and only becomes perceptible in a sin-ridden world, trapped 
in totality, with the events of the incarnation, and especially then resurrection, of 
Christ, where creation is evermore recapitulated73 (Bychkov 2005:663)), it can 
positively be asserted that his description (and subsequent use) of the analogia 
entis also stands impervious to Barth’s accusations (as he, himself indeed 
contends, as was shown). 
 
For Hart (as for Thomas, Przywara and Von Balthasar), the analogy of being – far 
from ever equating the creaturely with the divine, or nullifying the importance of 
Christ’s incarnation and a life of faith – indeed illuminates the fact that the world is 
created, and also recapitulated, as a positively determined, distinct “moment” of 
being, which, solely because of this truth, truly stand in wondrous continuity with, 
and exist as beautiful expression of, God’s infinite glory and beauty – as he then 
eloquently elucidates in his magisterial dogmatica minora.  
7.3 The Infinitude of Beauty as Expression of the Beauty of the Infinite 
In Hart’s dogmatica minora (consisting of expositions on the themes of Trinity, 
Creation, Salvation and Eschaton) – which, as John Morrison notes, is certainly 
not “minor” in any conceivable manner (Morrison 2007:662) – it is indeed then 
seen how the analogia entis, as discussed throughout this thesis, brilliantly serves 
																																																								
73 Ellen Charry writes that in Hart's dogmatica minora it is indeed exquisitely shown that 
creation (and the truth of the analogy of being that is established therein) does not stand 
in contradiction to Christ's salvation, but that the two occurrences, in fact, "kiss" (Charry 
2006:103).   
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as “speculative context” of, and definitive motif in, Hart’s fervent assertion that the 
beauty of the world, contrary to what the “religious dualist” and the Nietzschean 
postmodernist contest, comes to be as analogical expression of the infinite 
splendor belonging to the God “who is beauty and infinitely beautiful”, with or 
without creation.  
 
According to Hart, the innermost, all-determining truth of creaturely existence, as 
seen in the telling of the Christian evangel, is indeed that it does not transpire as a 
negated instance of God’s eidos, but truly, ex nihilo, as something novel and 
“other” – complete, as Thomas, Przywara and Von Balthasar (in their expositions 
on the analogy of being) said, with its own “moment" of existence (where esse 
and essentia are differentiated from each other) – which results in the fact that it 
wondrously point to, express and participate in the infinite beauty of the divine, as 
an evident analogy (according to proportionality) of the Creator’s being (on which  
it depends for its initial and continual existence). For Hart, as shown, it is exactly 
also then this truth – standing against any dualistic (or “immanentist”) 
cosmologies – which is everlastingly re-stated and recapitulated (in a world where 
it has become clouded and distorted due to humanity’s sinfulness) in Christ’s 
incarnation, death, and resurrection, and which will one day, with the (abrupt) 
happening of the eschaton, definitively be affirmed and revealed (for all to see) 
when creation is finally rid of any rival words (claiming the world as totality).  
 
Hart’s theological aesthetic, thoroughly reliant on the analogia entis, can indeed 
thus be seen to counter, and remedy, any dualistic thought that construes 
creation as the negation of the goodness of God; or the incarnation as the coming 
of a gnostic savior sent to save the faithful from corporeal reality; or the eschaton 
as the final obliteration of this world, so that the saved few can finally enter the 
realm of God; by ardently asserting that the corporeal world, in the here and now, 
radiates, in its very distinctness from God, with the glory, splendor and joy of the 
divine – evidently making earthly beauty infinite (as analogical expression of 
God’s infinitude that is everlastingly beautiful).  
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
In a world where dualistic cosmologies indubitably continue to abound, and 
modern humanity is regularly impelled (by “prophets” of the Crucified and 
Dionysus) to choose between the realm of God (which seemingly involves a flight 
from this world, and a negation of earthly beauty and pleasure, as R.S. Thomas, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Simone Weil bemoaned), or the realm of ontic reality 
(which, contrarily, involves a fervent embrace of ontic existence, and its violences, 
at the expense of any transcendent reality), the analogy of being, as employed by 
Hart (especially in his dogmatica minora), indeed thus provides a fascinating and 
refreshing third alternative, where the creaturely and the divine are certainly not 
held over against each other (requiring humanity to somehow choose one or the 
other), but rather said to exist in a wondrous and aesthetic continuity-amidst-
discontinuity (which results in creation and the beauty it encompasses, 
analogically expressing the goodness, glory and beauty of the divine). 
 
The analogy of being (as indeed used by Hart), Michael Hanby writes, mediating 
between two “untenable extremes”, can truly thus be held to be immensely 
valuable in recovering an account of creation where it is not seen as a negation of 
the divine, nor as something devoid of any transcendence but as “a novel and 
gratuitous ‘surplus’ of being ... (an) abundance of goodness, truth and beauty, 
which is not God (yet) which is good (and beautiful) and ... ‘like God’ in its very 
difference from God” (Hanby 2011:373-4).   
 
Although the analogy of being remains a controversial principle (by the very fact 
that it, as said, deals with one of the most fundamental questions of all, namely 
the “relation between God and creation” (Betz 2011:36), and is indeed still 
ignored, evaded and even opposed by many a theologian (especially in the 
Reformed tradition, where “dialectic (still) tends to have priority over analogy” 
(2011:44), a strong case could nonetheless be made that – if used correctly (as is 
seemingly the case in Hart’s theological aesthetics) – it veritably seems to 
function as a “valid, appropriate, responsible”, and especially also “beneficial 
manner” of affirming “an aesthetic continuity between God and Creation, and 
addressing the presumed problematic worldview of dualism, and the consequent 
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thought it gives rise to”, given the fact that it illuminates and accentuates an 
aesthetic continuity between the creaturely and the divine, whilst ostensibly not 
falling trap to a naïve natural theology, where God, the “First Being, who 
possesses being most perfectly” and creation, whose being is always a gift of 
grace, are heretically equated with one another.  
As one of the main problems with the analogy of being (and debates surrounding 
its use) – in the words of Eberhard Jüngel – is that it is more often invoked, and 
also criticized, than it is “even remotely understood” (Betz 2011:35), the hope is 
that this thesis, in its own small and humble manner, will help in shedding some 
light on its unique (and indeed often misunderstood) working, and the way that it 
can potentially be appropriated in terms of a theological aesthetic (as seen in the 
work of David Bentley Hart), which, in turn, could possibly contribute in realizing 
Erich Przywara’s original dream, that the analogia entis would truly serve as the 
“point of departure of fruitful discussion” (Przywara 1955:177). 	
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